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THE ARABS IN SIND, 712-1026 A.D.

University of Utah, Ph.D., 1973
History, medieval

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THE ARABS IN
SIND, 712 - 1026 A.D.

by
John Jehangir Bede

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the
University of Utah in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History

University of Utah

August 1973

This dissertation for the
Doctor of Philosophy Degree

by

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply indebted to Dr. Aziz S. Atiya, Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Utah, without whose interest, encouragement and unrelenting guidance, this research could never have been completed.

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ABSTRACT

In 712 A.D. an Arab force from its bases in Shiraz in southern Persia advanced upon the kingdom of Sind in present-day Pakistan and within the ensuing three years overran the entire area from Daybul in the south to Multan in the north. For the next thirty-five years Sind formed a part of the Umayyad Caliphate, while from 750 A.D. to 871 A.D. the Abbasids exercised a somewhat precarious control over the region. The brief Saffarid interregnum lasting from 871 to 900 A.D. subjected Sind to the control of Persia. The following century witnessed the emergence of local Arab dynasties established at Multan in the north and at Mansura in the south. As early as 963 A.D. Sind was threatened by the rising power of the Ghaznavid Turks, but it was not until the beginning of the eleventh century that this threat assumed menacing proportions. By 1026 A.D. Multan and Mansura had been successfully incorporated into the rapidly expanding Ghaznavid empire. Thus ended the Arab authority over the lower Indus valley which had endured with varying degrees of success for nearly three centuries.

Medieval historians, Arabs and Persians alike, have tended to view the annexation of Sind in purely punitive terms--Arab commercial vessels on their way from Ceylon to the Persian Gulf having fallen victims to piratical action from Sind. Subsequent historians, on the whole, have agreed with this point of view. However, this climate of opinion fails to convey a balanced assessment.

Behind the Sind episode lay larger issues, basically economic in scope. The caliphate's financial structure, subjected to the recently concluded civil war, was in an embarrassing state. The rich lands of Sind, comprising the lower Indus valley with its thriving trade centers excited the imagination of Arab policy makers. The far-flung Arab maritime enterprises, moreover, needed a base on the Indian coast. After leaving the Persian Gulf, Arab vessels were out of Islamic waters. Daybul, near modern Karachi, the main port of Sind, acted as the outlet for a major portion of sea-going products of northwestern India. With the subjugation of Sind, completed in the face of major obstacles and with assistance from religious and corporate interests, both these objectives were realized.

In Sind the Hindu-Buddhist population was extended de facto recognition as the "tolerated cults," a concession which by strict definition had been granted to the Jews, the Christians and the Zoroastrians alone. Indian institutions were in the main preserved, though Islamic legal structure was fostered side by side therewith to accommodate the Muslims, both foreigners and native converts alike. Cut off from the protecting arms of a decaying caliphate, the Arabs degenerated into warring factions. During the tenth century, Sind became an arena for the Fatimid-Abbasid contest. To deprive their rivals of lucrative Sind trade and simultaneously to gain a foothold on the Indian coast, the Fatimids dispatched Isma'ilian missionaries who undermined the Islamic orthodoxy and with it the Abbasid connections. The Egyptian connection lasted until the coming of the Turks.

Though they failed to expand their political control over northern India, a task later accomplished by the Central Asian Turks, the Arabs, nevertheless, left their impact on the sub-continent. Islam was permanently implanted in the lower Indus Valley and, except for the brief British interregnum, the area has remained in Muslim hands ever since. The legal status of the Hindu-Buddhist population under the Arabs in Sind was later extended to all of northern India by the Turks. Islamic mysticism, or sufism, one of the most engaging and enduring aspects of Indian Islam, was introduced via Sind. The acquisition of the lower Indus valley provided a tremendous impetus to Arab trade with India. In consequence Muslim commercial colonies sprang up over most of western India--a situation which called for peaceful intercourse. It was the prevalence of this attitude that rendered it possible for the two great communities of India to live peacefully side by side. With the coming of the Turks, however, this state of affairs was replaced by an atmosphere of general hostility. Indian impact on Islamic thought and culture was impressive. Indian medicine, astronomy, mathematics and literature were transmitted to the Islamic world and beyond, generally through Sind. Indian trade connections were highly valued.

This important chapter in the medieval annals of the sub-continent has hitherto received little attention from historians who based their inquiry on extremely tenuous evidence, usually Arabic or Indian, but scarcely on both. In the present essay, an attempt has been made to fill that lacuna. Though our bibliography includes an array of those sources, it suffices here to note the Chachnamah and various epigraphical evidences on the Indian side and al-Buladhuri's Kitab Futuh al-

Buldan, al-Biruni's Tahqiq ma li'l-Hind, and ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah on the Arabic side. By weighing their conflicting statements, it is hoped that we have been able to present an acceptable portrait of a complicated situation in the service of historical scholarship.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It is customary to date the establishment of permanent Muslim rule over India at 1206 A.D. when Qutb ud-din Aibak, a lieutenant of Sultan Mu'izz ud-din of Ghor in modern Afghanistan, proclaimed himself the sultan of Delhi following his master's death.¹ Two centuries earlier the Turkish hordes of Mahmud of Ghazna had repeatedly dealt devastating blows to the Hindu power in northern India but had withdrawn to the Afghan highlands without affecting a political settlement on the Gangetic plains. Both events were amply recorded, though not by the Indians, and both command a respectable position in the annals of Muslim India.

The expansion of Arab arms in Sind, which at its greatest extent embraced the entire lower Indus valley, vast areas of the Baluchistan plateau, as well as substantial portions of Rajasthan and Gujarat, has been relegated a somewhat insignificant position by historians. This is all the more striking in view of the fact that the Arab conquest pre-

¹Sultan Mu'izz ud-din belonged to the Shansbani dynasty of Ghor in Afghanistan which had begun to extend its power at the expense of the Ghaznavids as early as 1151 A.D. when Ala ud-din Hussain captured and burned to the ground the city of Ghazni and earned for himself the infamous title, "jehansuz" or the world burner. In 1191 A.D. the Ghorids had invaded India but were routed at the battlefield of Taroari by a coalition of Indian princes. The following year, however, the Indians were overwhelmed by the Ghorids at the same site. Within a few years most of northern India was affectively under the Ghorid sway.

dates the Ghaznavid episode by roughly three centuries and the establishment of the sultanate of Delhi by five. Thus the pretigious Cambridge History of India, concluding a brief chapter on the Arab conquest of Sind, remarks somewhat derogatorily that, "of the Arab conquest of Sind there is nothing more to be said. It was a mere episode in the history of India and affected only a small portion of the fringe of that vast country."² A similar attitude was taken by the renowned British orientalist, Stanley Lane-Poole. "But the meagre annals of this limited and ineffectual occupation of an unimportant Province," he declares, "need not detain us. The Arab conquest of Sind led to nothing..."³ Hindu historians have agreed with this point of view almost without exception, while the Muslim scholars have done little to improve it.

To what factors can this academic temper be attributed? By far the greatest impediment in this endeavor has been the scarcity of historical records concerning Sind, which has turned scholars to seek more rewarding undertakings elsewhere. The Turks, the Afghans and the Mughuls created an impressive body of historical literature in India. The Arabs, great historians in their own right, have also left abundant literary monuments of their past glory. The conquest of Spain, for example, which coincided with that of Sind, was amply recorded, and so was the Arab occupation of Central Asia. Did Sind stand so obdurately outside the main currents of Arab political and cultural scene so that

²Wolseley Haig, ed., The Cambridge History of India (Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1958), III, 10.

³Stanley Lane-Poole, Medieval India Under Muhammedan Rule (London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1917), p. 13.

it did not fire the imagination of Arab chronicars? Not so! There is strong evidence to indicate that the conquest of Sind was well recorded and so were the subsequent events of the following century.⁴ It is regrettable, however, that these original works are no longer extant. Portions of these lost works were indeed copied by later medieval historians who sometimes added their own brief knowledge of affairs in Sind, mostly scattered throughout their voluminous universal histories. These brief references were periodically implemented by the isolated observation of remarkable individuals generally called "geographers," who visited Sind during the ninth and the tenth centuries.

Of historical records from Sind itself we have no knowledge. Certainly the Ghaznavid scholars, including the celebrated al-Biruni, who witnessed the final destruction of Arab power in Sind, make no reference to indigenous chronicles. It is possible, then, that prior to the eleventh century the native accounts were, by some inexplicable phenomenon destroyed. There is one other possibility of course; the Arabs in the course of time may have become so Indianized that they adopted the Hindu tendency of salutary neglect toward secular historiography. This, however, seems highly improbable. On the whole, historical data on Arab Sind seem to have been difficult to obtain even by the medieval Muslim historians.

Consequently, no standard work on Arab Sind has yet been compiled to this date. Over the past century four main attempts were made to reconstruct certain aspects of the Arab period. Nineteenth century

⁴See below, chapter I, pp. 7-8.

British orientalist and long time Indian civil servant, Sir Henry Elliot, in his celebrated work, The History of India as Told by its Own Historians, devoted a brief but highly valuable section to the Arab episode.⁵ The other three works all appeared in India during the nineteen-thirties. H. C. Ray in his classic work, The Dynastic History of Northern India, published in 1931, considered the rise and fall of Arab power in Sind in the first chapter of the book.⁶ The same year R. C. Majumdar set forth the results of his research in The Decca University Supplement.⁷ Indian Muslim historian Sulaiman Nadvi, in a series of articles entitled "Muslim Colonies in India Before the Muslim Conquest," published in Islamic Culture during 1934-35, dealt briefly with local Arab dynasties in the lower Indus valley during the ninth and tenth centuries.⁸

The researches of these scholars have made significant contributions to Medieval Sind history. Yet they tend to be restricted in their scope and limited in their sources, while basing their conclusions on extremely tenuous evidence. For example, none is a comprehensive treatment of the subject from the middle of the seventh century when

⁵Henry Elliot, The History of India as Told by its Own Historians (Rev. ed., Calcutta: Sisir Gupta, 1956), V,

⁶H. C. Ray, The Dynastic History of Northern India (Calcutta: The Univ. Press, 1931) I, chapter I.

⁷R. C. Majumdar, "The Arab Invasion of India," Dacca University Supplement, XV (1931), 1-64.

⁸Sulaiman Nadvi, "Muslim Colonies in India Before the Muslim Conquest," Islamic Culture, VIII (Oct. 1934), 601-621 and IX (Jan. 1935), 145-166.

the Arabs had become the western neighbors of Sind to the eleventh century when the Ghaznavid forces extinguished Arab dominion over the area. All accept the traditional account for the Arab "Drang nach osten" -- the victimizing of Muslim commercial vessels by the pirates of Daybul and the implication of the Sind monarchy in the whole nasty affair, without questioning it. None endeavours to look into the possible economic motives behind such a move. Moreover, all tend to view it as an isolated incident, rather than a part of an overall and long-planned strategy of general expansion in the East. Besides none really deals exhaustively of both the Arabic and the Indian sources of the two camps.

On the whole the particular treatment is generally subject to preconceived prejudices mainly colored by the religious outlook of the particular authors. Hence Elliot tends to be excessively hostile to the Arabs whereas the reverse is the case with Nadvi. The Hindu historians, though viewing the Arab conquest in a general atmosphere of hostility toward Islam, tend to be less biased than either Elliot or Nadvi. The purpose of this research, therefore, is twofold: to reconstruct a much needed systematic history of Arab rule in Sind and, simultaneously, to reevaluate the major issues at stake during that period. Consequently an attempt has been made to emphasize the use of primary sources, Arabic, Persian, Chinese, Greek and Sanskrit, which have been analyzed at some length in Chapter I. The prevailing political layout of North India on the eve of the Arab invasion forms the basis of Chapter II, while the causes behind the expansion and the military balances between the two rivals are treated in Chapter III.

The actual military operations against various parts of India from 637 to 715 A.D. are dealt with in Chapter IV. Chapter V is devoted to the administrative policies of an Islamic government in an area overwhelmingly non-Muslim. The subsequent history of Sind to 1026 A.D. is traced in Chapter VI. Finally there is a brief concluding section summing up the findings. All computations of the Muslim calendar are based on G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville's book, The Muslim and Christian Calendars.⁹

⁹G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville, The Muslim and Christian Calendars (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963).

CHAPTER II

THE SOURCES

The body of literature covering the Arab period in Sind is deficient at best. This scarcity is more striking in view of the abundance of material dealing with the Ghaznavid and post-Ghaznavid periods of Islamic domination over North India. The occupation of Sind had been carried out with the same sense of purpose and energy that had enabled the Arabs to overrun Spain on the one hand and Central Asia on the other. The marvel of it all is that all these regions were permanently occupied during the same decade. Whereas the conquest and the subsequent histories of Spain and Central Asia were amply recorded, the records pertaining to Sind are meager and in some cases, nonexistent.

Historical

Known evidence points to a loss of literature on Sind rather than a complete absence of it from the beginning. Thus, the Arab historian Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Abdullah al-Madaini (752-839 A.D.) is reputed to have compiled no less than three works on the Arab conquests of Makran and Sind.¹ Unfortunately, none of these are now

¹See Ibn al-Nadim, The Fihrist of al-Nadim; a Tenth-Century Survey of Muslim Culture, translated and edited by Bayard Dodge (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970), I, 150. The works in question were Kitab Fatah Makran, Kitab Thaghr al-Hind and Kitab Umm al-Hind.

extant. Even if these works were available, they would not have recorded the events beyond 839 A.D., the date of al-Madaini's death, whereas the Arab hold over the area lasted for another one hundred and eighty-seven years. For a brief but highly valuable account of Arab rule over Sind, we are indebted to another Arab scholar, Ahmad ibn Jabir al-Baladhuri, who died at Baghdad in 892 A.D. A section of Baladhuri's celebrated work, Kitab Futuh al-Buldan, covers the events in Sind down to the year 842 A.D.² The author is said to have held verbal communication with al-Madaini and, in consequence, incorporated a substantial portion of the latter's material on Sind in his own work. The account of Sind, being a summary of al-Madaini's larger narrative, lacks in details, hardly compensated by precision. It is regrettable that Baladhuri did not bring the events closer to 892 A.D., the year of his death. The brevity of the sections on Sind notwithstanding--the account takes up less than fifteen pages--happens to be the most reliable account extant and as such, indispensable to historians.

For the most detailed, though by no means the most dependable, version of Arab conquest of Sind, we must refer to what has commonly been known as The Chachnamah or the Fatahnamah.³ We do not

²Al-Baladhuri, Kitab Futuh al-Buldan, translated by Francis C. Murgotten and Philip K. Hitti (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916). For Arabic version, see Beladsori, Liber expugnationis regionum, edited by Michael Jan deGoeje (Lugd. Batav.: E. J. Brill, 1866). For an evaluation of al-Baladhuri, see Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur (Weimar: E. Felber, 1898-1902), I, 141.

³The Chachnamah, translated by Kalichbeg Frendunbeg (Karachi: The Commissioner's Press, 1900).

know who the author of this work was and neither did Muhammad Ali ibn Hamid ibn Abu Bakr Kufi, who rendered the manuscript in Persian in 1220 A.D. The original Arabic version is now lost. The translator informs us that he found the manuscript with a Kazi Isma'il bin Ali in Sind, who claimed to have been a direct descendant of early Arab settlers in the area. According to Kazi Isma'il, the work was composed by one of his ancestors in Sind. There is reason to believe, however, that The Chachnamah is no other than one of the three works of al-Madaini already alluded to.⁴ The Chachnamah suffers from two main defects. Being strictly the account of the subjugation of Sind it ends when that undertaking is completed by 715 A.D. It is, moreover, a highly romanticized account which fails to convey a balanced assessment and the statements of which occasionally evoke grave doubts. Many of its latter shortcomings could have been occasioned by the imaginative mind of the translator. Its merits, however, are obvious. The author displays an outstanding familiarity with the Arab and the Indian arts of warfare, with the topography of Sind and of southern Punjab and with a wide range of varied elements touching upon the subject as a whole. From it can be deduced the social, political, religious and economic structures of Sind dating back to the early fifth century A.D.

⁴For this hypothesis, see N. A. Baloch, "Fateh Nama and its Sources," The Proceedings of the Pakistan Historical Conference, 5th Session (1955), 979-982. In the opinion of nineteenth century Indologist Henry Elliot, The Chachnamah was composed prior to 750 A.D., and hence predates Madaini's birth. See Henry Elliot, The History of India As Told by its Own Historians (Calcutta: Sisir Gupta, 1956), II, 37.

During the ninth century, two more Arab historians dealt with the question of Sind briefly. Khalifa ibn Khayyat al-'Usfuri (died 854 A.D.), in his universal history, Tarikh Khalifa ibn Khayyat, covers the Sind episode in less than five pages while Ahmad ibn Ya'qub al-Ya'qubi (died 897 A.D.), in his Tarikh al-Ya'qubi, does no better.⁵ The great historian Abu Ja'far Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (839-923 A.D.), while commenting upon the annexation of Sind in his monumental work Tarikh al-Rusul wa'l Muluk does so merely in one line.⁶

A clearly discernible pattern is evident among the ninth century Muslim historians in their accounts of Sind. All provide scattered and identical references to the Arab dominion over Sind down to the year 842 A.D. The date is not incidental. It is removed from al-Madaini's death merely by a year or two. As all the above-mentioned historians seemed to have utilized al-Madaini's account of Sind, it is entirely possible that none of them were able to, or indeed willing to, acquire historical data on the affairs of distant Sind after 842 A.D. The date also marks the beginning of the end of Abbassid control over the eastern sections of the caliphate where the Tahirids of Khurasan successfully extended their sway. The Tahirids were themselves replaced by the Saffarids who annexed

⁵Al-'Usfuri, Tarikh Khalifa ibn Khayyat (Negav: Imprimerie al-Adabe, 1967), Al-Ya'qubi, Tarikh al-Ya'qubi (Bairut: Dar Sadr, 1960).

⁶Al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Rusul Wa'l Muluk, edited by Michael Jan de Goeje (Lugd. Bat.: E. J. Brill, 1879-1901).

Sind to their growing territories by 871 A.D. By 900 A.D. the Saffarids in their turn gave way to two independent Arab dynasties in the lower Indus Valley established by Multan in southern Punjab and at Mansura in Sind. These, in turn, were overthrown by the Ghaznavids by 1026 A.D. Thus, for a period of approximately one hundred and eighty-five years, Sind, standing obdurately outside the main currents of Islamic political arena, failed to attract the notices or arouse the curiosities of Muslim historians.

To the Ghaznavid historians belongs the credit of recording, though meagerly, the events covering the last thirty years of Arab political control over Sind. Of these we may mention three: al-'Utbi, al-Biruni and al-Gardizi. Abu Nasr Muhammad al-Jabbar al-'Utbi in Kitabul-Yamini covers the history of the Ghaznavid dynasty from 975 to 1030 A.D.⁷ Al-'Utbi lacks historical precision and is repeatedly vague about details. The Ghazna-Multan relations discussed by him are of some value. Abu Raihan Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Biruni is considered by some to be the greatest of Muslim scholars.⁸ His special studies were in the fields of Mathematics and Astronomy, which form the basis of his celebrated work on India,

⁷The original work in Arabic was published in 1883 A.D. in Cairo by al-Azhar, together with Ibn al-Athir's text in the margins. Al-'Utbi's work was translated into Persian in 1206 A.D. by Nasih bin Ja'far al-Jurbadhaqani. A lithographed edition of this translation appeared in Tehran in 1857. It was the Persian translation which was utilized by subsequent compilers, whether in Persia, Central Asia or India.

⁸Vasillii Barthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion (2nd ed., London: Messrs. Luzac and Co., Ltd., 1958), p. 20.

Tahqiq ma li'l-Hind.⁹ It is mostly to al-Biruni's passion for historial research that we owe our meager knowledge of the Shahi dynasty of northern Punjab and some aspects of the Isma'ilian rule over Multan.¹⁰

Around 1050 A.D., Abu Sa'id Abdul-Hayy al-Gardizi, writing in Persian, composed his work, Kitab Zain'l-Akhbar, dealing with the Ghaznavid period. Al-Gardizi lacks the same spirit of historical criticism one finds so abundantly manifested in al-Biruni. He is, however, more precise when describing events and dates than al-'Utbi though considerably briefer.

Thus it is that between the works of al-Madaini and al-Gardizi one aspect of Sind historiography is completed. During this time span, the Arabs were still the holders of political power in Sind.¹¹ Each writer in his own way was able to provide some additional histori-

⁹This is the correct title of the work and not the commonly yet erroneously known titles of Tarikh al-Hind and Tarikh-i-Hind. See Muhammad Nazim, The Life and Times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna (Cambridge: The University Press, 1931), p. 10. The work was rendered into English by Edward Sachau under the title Al-Biruni's India and published in London in 1888 by Trubner and Company.

¹⁰Al-Biruni accompanied Sultan Mahmud on some of his Indian expeditions though it must have been after 1017 A.D., for it was in this year that Khwarizon, whose ruler was al-Biruni's patron, was annexed and the great scholar snatched away to Ghazna. Al-Biruni's attempts to discover the dynastic history of the Shahis were remarkable. "I have been told" he informs us, "that the pedigree of this royal family, written on silk, exists in the fortress of Nagarkot, and I much desired to make myself acquainted with it, but the thing was impossible for various reasons." Edward Sachau, Al-Biruni's India (London: Trubner and Company, Ltd., 1888), II, 11. No doubt a similar investigative spirit must have manifested itself in the case of Multan, but obviously without much success.

¹¹Though al-Gardizi's work was not completed until 1052 A.D., the fall of Mansura in 1026 A.D. occurred during the author's lifetime.

cal data. It is to be regrettably noted that subsequent historians have copied their meager accounts of Sind from the chain of historians stretching from al-Madaini to al-Gardizi, adding little or no information of their own. Of these we may mention four: Ibn al-Athir, Ibn Khaldun, Farishta and Mir Ali Sher Kani. 'Izz ad-Din Abu'l-Husayn Ibn-al-Athir (died 1232 A.D.), in Al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh copied the sections dealing with Sind almost verbatim from al-Baladhuri's Futuh al-Buldan.¹² For the last years of Arab control he relied heavily on al-'Utbi's Kitabu'l-Yamini. He is, however, the first writer to mention the Ismai'lian takeover of Mansura, a fact omitted by al-Biruni as well as by al-Gardizi. Fourteenth century North African scholar Wali Ad-Din Abu Zayd Abd ar-Rahman Ibn Khaldun in the Muqaddimah provides a rare and indeed the only glimpse into the finances of Sind during the early Abbassid period.¹³ Sixteenth century Indian historian Muhammad Qasim Farishta, writing in Persian completed his work, Tarikh-i-Farishta, in 1606 A.D., which deals with the rise of the Muslim power in India.¹⁴

In covering the final fifty years of Arab rule in Sind, Farishta relied mainly on al-Gardizi's Zainu'l Akhbar and, to a lesser

¹²Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1867-1876). Also published in Cairo by al-Azhar in 1883.

¹³Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, translated by Franz Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958).

¹⁴Farishta's work has been translated into English by John Briggs under the title, The History of the Rise of Mohamedan Power in India (Calcutta: S. Day, 1966).

degree, on al-'Utbi's Kitabul Yamini. The work provides some useful hints about the Ghazna-Shahi-Multan diplomatic front.

Mir Ali Sher Kani compiled his work, Tuhfat al-Kiram in Persian around 1770, which is a scanty treatment of the history of Sind from about 400 A.D. down to the middle of the eighteenth century.¹⁵ It is the only work composed in Sind itself, with the somewhat doubtful exception of The Chachnamah. The author was therefore in a position to utilize native verbal traditions not available to other writers. He is the sole writer who provides us with a complete list of the rulers of the Rai dynasty which was overthrown around 622 A.D., together with the exact number of years it held power over the area.

Hindu sources of medieval and pre-medieval Indian history are meager and in the case of Sind, nonexistent. One can sympathize with al-Biruni's concern as early as the eleventh century.

"Unfortunately the Hindus do not pay much attention to the historical order of things," he laments. "They are very careless in relating the chronological succession of their kings, and when they are pressed for information and are at a loss, not knowing what to say, they invariably take to tale-telling."¹⁶ Kashmir, however, of all the Indian regions, can proudly boast of a written chronicle which traces its history from the earliest times down to the year

¹⁵Mir Ali Sher Kani, Tuhfat al-Kiram, translated by J. Postans (Calcutta: Bishops College Press, 1843).

¹⁶Sachau, Al Biruni's India, II, 11.

1027 A.D. The Rajatarangini was composed by Pandit Kalhana in Sanskrit around 1148 A.D. This voluminous work in the form of a poem, assumes a fairly reliable aspect following the founding of the Karkota dynasty at the beginning of the seventh century. During the eighth century Kashmir was in control of substantial portions of northern Punjab and in consequence came into conflict with the Arabs pushing north from their bases at Multan. The Kashmir-Arab conflict and the resultant Kashmiri embassies to the T'ang court of China to solicit aid against the danger from the South, are briefly alluded to by Kalhana.

Geographical

In the absence of adequate historical data on Sind, the accounts of certain travellers who passed through India periodically and recorded their impressions assume paramount importance. These "visitors" can be classified into three categories--religious pilgrims, merchant-adventurers, and geographers. Of the first category we possess the detailed account of the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang, who spent no less than thirteen years in India, from 630 to 643 A.D.¹⁷ This pilgrim's observations about Sind in particular and India in general, though much colored by his religious outlook, are of primary importance to the students of Sind history.

¹⁷Si-Yu-Ki, Buddhist Records of the Western World, translated from the Chinese of Hieun Tsiang by Samuel Beal (London: Truebner and Company, Ltd., 1900).

Following the Arab conquest, when the lower Indus Valley and the surrounding territory was drawn into the vast network of Islamic commercial activities, numerous Muslim merchants frequented western and southern India, though we have the written account of only two of them. The first of these remains anonymous. The author of Akbar as-Sin wa'l-Hind completed his work in 851 A.D., which is an on-the-spot observation of maritime states stretching from Sind to China. The work was edited and added to by Abu Zaid, a merchant from Siraf in Southern Persia around 915 A.D.¹⁸ Abu Zaid informs us of his purpose:

Having very carefully examined the book I was desired to persue, that I might confirm what the author relates so far as he agrees with what I have learnt concerning the affairs of navigation, the kingdoms on the coast, and the state of the countries of which he treats and that I might add what I have elsewhere collected concerning these matters: I find that this book was composed in the year of the Hegira 237 (851 A.D.), and that the accounts given by the author are conformable with what I have heard from merchants who have sailed from Irak or Persia, through these seas.¹⁹

¹⁸The best edition of this work, together with a French translation appeared in Paris in 1948 under the title Akhbar as-Sin wa'l Hind: Relation de la chine et de l'Inde rédigée en 851, translated and edited by J. Sauvaget (Paris: Societe d'edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1948). The English translation, together with Abu Zaid's addition, was published in Vol. I of Robert Kerr, A General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels (London: William Blackwood, 1824).

¹⁹Kerr, op. cit., I, 68-69.

Both accounts are primarily concerned with the maritime activities and understandably so. Yet they occasionally reveal very useful insights into the political, social and religious aspects of various areas including Sind.

During the tenth century a Persian sea captain, Buzurg ibn Shahriyar, composed the work, Ajaibu'l Hind, being a collection of his personal experiences on his many voyages to India and the Far East, as well as material provided to him by other merchants and sailors.²⁰ Reference to Sind, though rare, are of primary importance.

It is to the third category of travellers that we are most indebted. This consists of Muslim geographers who actually visited Sind between 915 and 985 A.D.²¹ In order of their appearance they included Abu'l Hassan, Ali ibn Husayn al-Mas'udi, who passed through Sind in 915 A.D. and recorded his impressions in Muruj al-Zahab wa Ma'adin al-Jawahar.²²

²⁰Ibn Shahriyar, Ajaibu'l Hind, translated by Marcel Devic (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1928).

²¹Major Arabic geographical works were collected and edited by Michael Jan de Goeje in Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1870-1894). English translation of portions relating to India can be found in Henry Elliot, The History of India as Told by its Own Historians, Vol. I: The Arab Geographers (Calcutta: Sisir Gupta, 1956). Sections of these accounts can also be found in Sulaiman Nadvi, "Muslim Colonies in India Before the Muslim Conquest," Islamic Culture, VIII (1934) and IX (1935).

²²Elliot, op. cit., Vol. I, 23-33. Portions of Mas'udi's work were rendered into English by Aloys Sprenger under the title El-Masudis Historical Encyclopedia (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1841), I. All references to Mas'udi are from Sprenger unless otherwise stated.

Abu 'Ishaq Ibrahim ibn Muhammad al-Istakhri followed Mas'udi in 951 A.D., recording his impressions in Kitab Masalik al-Mamalik.²³ Abu'l Qasim Muhammad Ibn Hauqal has the sole distinction of travelling through the lower Indus Valley twice, once in 951 A.D. and again in 976 A.D., holding verbal communications with al-Istakhri on the former occasion. His work, Kitab al-Masalik wa'l-Mamalik, contains his impressions of Sind.²⁴ The last of the geographers to the far-off Sind was Abdullah Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Muqaddisi, considered by some to be one of the greatest geographers of all time.²⁵ The record of his visit in 985 A.D. is to be found in his work Ahsan'l-Taqasim fi Ma'arif al-Aqalim.²⁶

The records of these geographers, though lacking in sufficient details, constitute the main basis of our knowledge of tenth century Sind. Geography, political as well as economic forms and understandably so, the main portions of their narratives. Yet historical research is not altogether lacking and in Mas'udi it finds considerable expression.

In enumerating the sources, we must mention the role of epigraphy. Hindu rulers of the Indian states of Rajasthan and Gujarat claiming to be champions of Hinduism against the hated

²³DeGoeje, Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, I; Elliot, op. cit., I.

²⁴De Goeje, Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, II; Elliot, op. cit., I; Mid. East Lib. Univ. of Utah, Gotha MSS, 312, 569 AH.

²⁵Barthold, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁶De Goeje, Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, III.

outsiders, boastfully recorded the successful outcome of their encounters against the Arabs on copper plates. This epigraphic evidence, mainly coming to light over the past fifty years, is primarily concerned with the expansionist policies of the Arabs prior to 850 A.D.

The above is a fairly exhaustive list of the sources needed to reconstruct the history of Arab Sind. It is unfortunate that more is not available and one cannot but hope that with the passage of time, new evidence will come to the surface, bringing to light those aspects of the Arab period concerning which our present knowledge is relatively insufficient in spite of our efforts in the present essay.

CHAPTER III

INDIA ON THE EVE OF THE ARAB INVASION

On the eve of the Arab invasion of Sind at the beginning of the eighth century A.D., no central political authority had existed in India. In fact since the fall of the Maurya Empire in the first century B.C., which had successfully united India from the Oxus in the northwest to Ceylon in the south, no empire had been able to exercise full political authority over most of the Indian sub-continent until the Mughal Empire reached its greatest extent in the second half of the seventeenth century. To be sure, attempts were made to bring northern India under one rule. Hence the Kushan Empire in the early part of the second century A.D., the Gupta Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries and the empire of Harsha in the first half of the seventh century directed their energies toward achieving political unity for North India, with mixed results. The outlying parts of India in the northwest, however, remained outside the pale of the Gupta Empire and that of Harsha. Eastern Afghanistan, Punjab and Sind had to bear the burden of frequent incursions by the Persian Empire on one hand and by the nomadic hordes of various ethnic origins from Central Asia on the other. At the inception of the eighth century A.D., powerful local dynasties began to emerge in these regions, as well as in Kashmir. In the meantime, however, the Arabs had overrun the Persian Empire and were waging successful campaigns

in Central Asia. The states on the western borderland of India now faced a solid wall of Arab arms. The following areas were particularly hard pressed by the Arab might: Kashmir, eastern Afghanistan, Rajputana, Gujarat and Sind.

Kashmir

One of the most powerful states in India at the time of the Arab invasion was Kashmir. The total area of the state at the time of the British withdrawal in 1947 was 84,516 square miles, and its population, according to the 1941 census, was 3,646,243.¹ At the time of the Arab invasion of Sind the authority of the Kashmirian monarchs extended over parts of northern Punjab as well, and hence covered a larger area than in 1947. No population figures are available for the eighth century. The geography of Kashmir helps to explain the relative security from foreign invasions which the state has enjoyed over the centuries. Lying in the extreme northwest corner of the Indian sub-continent, Kashmir is north of the main invasion routes which lead from Central and Western Asia into India.² Whereas most of the Indian sub-continent is located south of latitude

¹Statistical Abstract for British India (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1942), pp. 4-5 (based on the 1941 census).

²The main invasion routes from Central and Western Asia run from Kabul through the Khaybar Pass to Peshawar, thence to Rawalpindi, Lahore and Delhi. Somewhat lesser in importance is the route running from Kabul to Swat (north of the Khaybar) and thence to Rawalpindi. This is the route used by the main army of Alexander the Great

33 N., all of Kashmir lies north of that line. The main defense of Kashmir against the foreign invasions has been five mountain ranges which run east to west through Kashmir. The Pir Panjal ranges separates Kashmir from the Punjab in the south. This range is nearly 180 miles long and about 30 miles wide. It is named after the famous Pir Panjal Pass which is 11,400 feet high. Other passes in the range include the Banihal, 9,290 feet and Baramula, 5,191 feet high.³ The great Himalayan range lies about 50 miles north of the Pir Panjal range. It is nearly 150 miles long and is perpetually covered with snow, being above the snow line.⁴

Lying between the Pir Panjal range in the south and the Great Himalayan range in the north is the famous Vale of Kashmir, a great basin about eighty-five miles by twenty-five.⁵ The Vale with the city of Srinagar has been the political, cultural and economic center of Kashmir.⁶ The Vale is drained by the upper Jhelum river and has the richest soil in the entire state. Nearly three-fourths of Kashmir's

in 322 B.C. Yet another route leads from Qandhar to Quetta and thence either to Multan and Lahore or to Shikarpur, Ferozpur and Delhi. The Qandhar-Quetta-Shikarpur route was used by the British during the First Afghan War in 1840.

³Meneck B. Pithawalla, An Introduction to Kashmir: Its Geology and Geography (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 24.

⁴Ibid.

⁵O. H. K. Spate, India and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography (London: Methuen and Company, 1954), p. 371.

⁶Srinagar was built by Maurya emperor Asoka, B.C. 273-232. See Vincent Smith, The Early History of India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904), p. 170.

area lies north of the Great Himalayan range, yet in 1941 it contained only 311,300 people out of a total population of 3,646,243.⁷ Three mountain ranges run through these northern areas. Immediately north of the Great Himalayan range is the Zaskar range which cuts Kashmir nearly into two equal halves. The Ladakh range stretches mostly across Tibet, but its western arm lies in Kashmir. Between this range and the Zaskar range flows the upper Indus. The northernmost range is the Karakoram range which separates Kashmir from the Chinese province of Sinkiang. The entire area lying north of the Great Himalayan is extremely cold and mountainous. It contains some of the world's highest peaks such as Godwin Austin, 28,178 feet; Gasherbrum, 28,100 feet; Nanga Parbat, 26,620 feet; and Masherbrum, 25,660 feet. Very little cultivation can be done in such dry wastelands.⁸ The relative security which Kashmir has enjoyed from foreign intrusions due to geography and physiography is shown by the fact that it was not until 1320 A.D. that Islamic rule was established over Kashmir, even though Sind had been conquered by the Muslims as early as 715 A.D. Even the Muslim dynasty which succeeded in establishing its rule over Kashmir in 1320 A.D. was a local Kashmirian dynasty.⁹

⁷Pithawalla, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

⁸For descriptions of the northern areas of Kashmir, see Spate, pp. 380-91; and Pithawalla, op. cit., pp. 25-27.

⁹S. R. Sharma, Mughal Empire in India, Revised Edition (Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 1966), p. 200.

Actually it was not until 1563 that Kashmir was annexed by the Grand Mughal Akbar to his empire governed from Agra.¹⁰

The relative security which the rulers of the Vale enjoyed from foreign conquests did not mean that they played a passive role in the power politics of their southern neighbors. As a matter of fact, almost a hundred years before the conquest of Sind by the Arabs in 715 A.D., the rulers of Kashmir had begun a vigorous campaign of expansion in the south and southwest of Kashmir which eventually brought them into conflict with the Arabs in Sind. At the beginning of the seventh century A.D., Durlabhavardhava founded the Karkota dynasty which lasted until 855 A.D. The date of this monarch's accession is a matter of some dispute and the dates of 589 and 602 have been suggested.¹¹ Durlabhavardhava ruled for thirty-six years and during his reign he wrested parts of north-western Punjab from the Turki Sahi dynasty of Kabul.¹² It was during the reign of this monarch that Hiuen Tsiang, famous Chinese pilgrim, visited Kashmir in 631 A.D. His account throws some light on the conditions in Kashmir:

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Gwasha Kaul, Kashmir Through the Ages (Srinagar: Chronicle Publishing House, 1954), p. 10; H. C. Ray, The Dynastic History of Northern India (Calcutta: The University Press, 1931), I, 112; Kalhana's Rajatarangini, trans. from Sanskrit by M. A. Stein (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1961), I, 87. Kalhana, a Kashmiri Pandit, wrote this chronicle of the kings of Kashmir in 1149 A.D.

¹²Si-Yu-Ki, Buddhist Records of the Western World, trans. from Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang by Samuel Beal (London: Truebner and Company, 1900), I, 136; Ray, op. cit., I, 112.

The Kingdom of Kashmir is about 7,000 li in circuit; and on all sides it is enclosed by mountains. These mountains are very high.... The neighboring states that have attacked it have never succeeded in subduing it....The soil is fit for producing cereals and abounds with fruits and flowers....The people wear leather doublets and clothes of white linen....They are light and frivolous and of a weak, pusillanimous disposition. There are both heretics (non-Buddhists) and believers among them.¹³

The fourth ruler of the Karkota dynasty was Chandrapida who probably died in 720 A.D.¹⁴ It was during the reign of this ruler that Kashmir came into conflict with the Arabs. The threat of the Arabs from Sind forced the Kashmirian monarch to solicit the aid of the Tang emperor of China in 713 A.D.¹⁵ King Lalitaditya-Mukdapida who ruled Kashmir from 725 to 756 A.D. greatly expanded the kingdom of Kashmir. According to Kalhana, he conquered all of eastern and northeastern Afghanistan, parts of Central Asia, and all of northern India and even parts of the Deccan.¹⁶ Sir Aurel Stein who edited Rajatarangini refused to accept these extensive conquests as reality, arguing that such extensive campaigns were simply beyond the possibilities offered by the manpower and resources of Kashmir.¹⁷ However, "his conquest of Kanauj in the Ganga-Yamuna Doab, Tukharistan

¹³Si-Yu-Ki, I, 148. There are about 3 li to one mile.

¹⁴The dates of this ruler's reign are a matter of considerable dispute. See Rajatarangini, I, 67; Ray, op. cit., I, 112; Hermann Goetz, Studies in the History and Art of Kashmir and the Indian Himalaya (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1969), pp. 8-12.

¹⁵Goetz, op. cit., pp. 11-12; Rajatarangini, I, 67.

¹⁶Rajatarangini, I, 128-35.

¹⁷Ibid., I, 82-92.

in the upper Oxus valley and Daraddesa in the upper Kishen Ganga appears to be based on historical data."¹⁸

German scholar, Herman Goetz, however, attempted to show that Lalitaditya did actually conquer all of northern and central India, together with eastern Afghanistan, and that he even invaded eastern Turkistan, and indeed died somewhere in the Tarim basin.¹⁹ In 736 A.D. this ruler sent an embassy to the Tang court to solicit aid against the Arabs.²⁰

Eastern Afghanistan and Punjab

At the beginning of the eighth century there were two states located on the extreme northwestern corner of India. These were the kingdom of Zabulistan and the kingdom of Kapisi. The kingdom of Kapisi included the territory enclosed by the Indus on the east, the Hindukush mountains on the north and west and 34° N. on the south in

¹⁸Ray, op. cit., I, 112. The Ganga-Yamuna Doab and Daraddesa correspond roughly to western and southern portions of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh.

¹⁹Goetz, op. cit., pp. 8-22.

²⁰Rajatarangini, I, 67. Lalitaditya's prime minister was a Buddhist Tokharian (modern Badakhshan province in northeastern Afghanistan), Chankuna, who had been in the Chinese service. He might have persuaded Lalitaditya to form some kind of an alliance with the Tang emperor against the Arabs in Central Asia and Sind. See Goetz, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

modern Afghanistan and 32 N. in modern West Pakistan. It commanded the main invasion and trade routes between Central Asia and India.²¹

The kingdom of Zabulistan was made up of the territory watered by the Helmand River and its tributaries in southeastern Afghanistan.²² Here "the country flattens and runs out among jagged, isolated hills into the Registan, the great desert stretching away to the Persian border, unbroken save by the Helmand River."²³

By 631 the rulers of Kapisi had lost their territories lying east of the Indus to Kashmir.²⁴ Between the Indus on the east and the Safid Koh mountain range nearly sixty miles to the west lies the fertile valley of Peshawar called Gandhara at the beginning of the eighth century A.D.²⁵ Gandhara was separated from the western

²¹Part of this kingdom lay in modern West Pakistan and included the districts of Peshawar, Kohat and Bannu of the present-day North Western Frontier Province. In Afghanistan it included the areas around Kabul and Jalalabad. See Si-Yu-Ki, I, 54-55; also R. C. Majumdar, "The Arab Invasion of India," Dacca University Supplement, No. XV (1931), 5-7.

²²Si-Yu-Ki, I, 190.

²³William K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan. A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, Third edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 8. This area corresponds roughly to Sijistan of the Arab geographers. See G. Le Strange, Lands of the Eastern Caliphate (London: Cambridge University Press, 1905), Chapter xxiv.

²⁴This information is provided by Hieun Tsiang who visited these territories, now mainly the Rawalpindi district of the Punjab, in 631 A.D. and observed that formerly they were part of the kingdom of Kapisi. Si-Yu-Ki, II, 136-47.

²⁵Gandhara was the home of the famous Indo-Greek sculpture which flourished in northwestern India between the second century B.C. and 300 A.D.

portion of the kingdom of Kapisi by the barren mountain range of the Safid Koh. Today these mountains form the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the famous Khaybar Pass is located here twelve miles west of Peshawar. West of the Khaybar Pass, the Bamiyan Valley and the Kabul Valley were the richest sections of the kingdom of Kapisi. Both these valleys are enclosed by high mountains which present formidable barriers to invading armies.²⁶

When Hieun Tsiang passed through northern Afghanistan in 630 A.D. he found the territories lying north of the Kindukush under the rule of the Western Turks. The pilgrim met the Khakan or Yabghu of the Western Turks on the shore of the lake Issik-kul. Taking advantage of the campaigns which Khusru Parviz (590-628 A.D.), the Persian monarch, was waging against the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius, the Western Turks had extended their dominions southwards to the province of Gandhara.²⁷ Soon after Hieun Tsiang's departure, Central Asia became a battle ground between four contending groups: the Arabs, the Chinese, the Turks and the Indians. This four-way contest lasted for more than a hundred years.²⁸

²⁶There are some passes which lead through these mountains into the Kabul Valley. In the north these include the Khawak Pass, 11,640 feet; the Qipchak Pass, 13,900 feet; the Salang Pass, 14,237 feet, and the Kaoshan Pass. In the west are the Kharzar Pass, the Shibar Pass, the Haji Gak Pass and the Unai Pass. In the south is the Khurd Kabul Pass. Bamiyan Valley can be approached from the north by passing through the Ak Robat Pass, 12,650 feet, and from the west through the Nil Pass. See Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., pp. 10-13.

²⁷H. A. R. Gibb, The Arab Conquests in Central Asia (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923), pp. 3-11; Percy Sykes, A History of Afghanistan (London: Macmillan and Company, 1940), I, 151.

²⁸See H.A.R. Gibb, The Arab Conquests in Central Asia (London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1923).

On the west the kingdoms of Kapisi and Zabulistan were bordered by the Sassanid empire. Zabulistan was bordered on the southwest by Sassanid territories and on the southeast by the kingdom of Sind.²⁹

As mentioned earlier, the political history of the kingdoms of Kapisi and Zabulistan from the sixth to the tenth centuries is extremely obscure. Hieun Tsiang, who passed through Kapisi in 631 A.D., has left us a brief account of it:

It produces cereals of all sorts and many kinds of fruit trees. The shen horses are bred here....Here are also found objects of merchandise from all parts. The climate is cold and windy. The people are cruel and fierce; their language is coarse and rude; their marriage rites a mere intermingling of the sexes. For clothing they use hair garments....In commerce they use gold and silver coins, and also little copper coins....The king is a Kshattrya by caste. He is of a shrewd character and, being brave and determined, he has brought into subjection the neighboring countries, some tens of which he rules.³⁰

The most controversial statement of the above account is the sentence, "The king is of the Kshattrya caste." The origins of the ruling house of Kapisi are shrouded in mystery. In 1893 M.A. Stein upheld the view that the ruling house of Kapisi at the time

²⁹B. D. Mirchandani, "Chach-Nama: References to Persia, Zabul, Kashmir and Kanauj," Journal of Indian History, XLIII (1965), 371.

³⁰Si-Yu-Ki, I, 54-55. This account applies particularly to the Kabul Valley.

of Hieun Tsiang's visit was Kushan by race.³¹ The Kushans were a branch of the Yue Chi tribe of the Turki nomads who gradually succeeded in consolidating their power over the Punjab and Afghanistan during the first two centuries of the Christian era. The greatest ruler of the Kushan dynasty was Kanishka who reigned from 120 A.D. to 160 A.D.³² Kanishka became a Buddhist and under his patronage Gandhara, as well as the Kabul Valley, became great centers of Buddhist learning.³³

Kanishka and his immediate successors borrowed the term "King of Kings" from the Persians and used it on their coins with Greek letters "BAONANOBABO".³⁴ The term apparently came to denote the later petty Kushan principalities which sprung up in western Punjab and eastern Afghanistan after the death of Kanishka. Thus Gupta emperor, Samudra Gupta, who reigned from 335 to 375 A.D., claimed acts of homage from the "Sahi-Sahanusahi" of eastern

³¹M. A. Stein, "Der Geschichte der Sahis von Kabul," Festgruss an Rudolf von Roth zum Doktor Jubiläum. Discussed in Ray, op. cit., I, 61.

³²Smith, op. cit., pp. 263-67.

³³Ibid., pp. 272-85.

³⁴Ray, op. cit., I, 55; Smith, op. cit., "Contents of plate of Indian coins (1) in the British Museum," pages unnumbered (at the beginning of the book).

Afghanistan and western Punjab.³⁵ As late as 450 A.D. the coins of these later Kushans bear the word PAONANOPAO.³⁶

The Arab geographer-historian Al-Baladhuri in Kitab Futuh Al-Buldan refers to the ruler of Kabul in 670 as "Kabul Shah."³⁷ At the beginning of the eleventh century Arabicized Turkish scholar Al-Biruni provided a somewhat meager account of the rulers of eastern Afghanistan and western Punjab:

The Hindus had kings residing in Kabul, Turks who were said to be of Tibetan origin. The first of them, Barhatakin, came into the country and entered a cave in Kabul....He wore Turkish dress, a short tunic open in front, a high hat, boots and arms....He brought those countries under his sway and ruled them under the title of a shahiya of Kabul. The rule remained among the descendents for generations, the number of which is said to be about sixty....One of this series of kings was Kanik, the same who is said to have built the Vihara (Buddhistic monastery) of Purushavar.... The last king of this race was Lagaturman and his Vazir was Kallar, a Brahman...the last king of this Tibetan house after it had held the royal power for so long a period, let it by degree slip from his hands....Now the vizir put him in chains and imprisoned him for correction, but there he himself found ruling sweet, his riches enabled him to carry out his plans, and so he occupied the royal throne.³⁸

³⁵Ray, op. cit., I, 55 and 57.

³⁶Numismatic Chronicle, 3rd Ser., XIII (1893), 167-69.

³⁷Al-Baladhuri, Kitab Futuh Al-Buldan, part II, trans. from Arabic by Francis C. Murgotten and Philip K. Hitti (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916), p. 147.

³⁸Al Beruni's India, trans. by Edward Sachau (London: Trubner and Company, 1888), II, 10-13.

Kanik doubtlessly refers to the Kushan emperor Kanishka who did build a great monastery at Peshawar.³⁹ The usurpation of the Brahmin Vazir, Kallar, supposedly took place in the middle of the ninth century A.D.⁴⁰ Thus, according to Al-Biruni, the rulers of eastern Afghanistan prior to the middle of the ninth century were descendents of the Turki tribe of the Kushans and are accordingly known as the Turki-Shahi. The view that the Turki Shahis were the descendents of the Kushan rulers was upheld by Vincent Smith and M. A. Stein.⁴¹ Ray only points out that this connection is "probable."⁴² Percy Sykes fails to touch the issue altogether.⁴³ Fraser-Tytler states that Hieun Tsiang found in Kapisi a "Turkish (or Ephthalite) ruler."⁴⁴ If the ruler was an Ephthalite, he could not have been a Kushan.⁴⁵ Majumdar merely describes the ruler as "an Indian, Kshattriya by caste."⁴⁶

³⁹Smith, op. cit., p. 277.

⁴⁰The exact date of the event is subject to dispute. See Ray, op. cit., I, 72-76.

⁴¹Smith, op. cit., p. 388; Stein, "Die Geschichte der Sahis von Kabul," in Ray, op. cit., I, 62.

⁴²Ray, op. cit., I, 71.

⁴³Sykes, op. cit., I, 154.

⁴⁴Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 24.

⁴⁵The Ephthalite or Huns (Arabic Haytal, Chinese Ye-Tha) were a nomadic people who originally lived to the north of the Great Wall of China. In 425 A.D. the Huns burst upon Central Asia, and within fifty years their empire included all of Central Asia, Afghanistan and a greater part of northwestern India. Their power was finally crushed by the combined efforts of Khusru Anushirvan, the Persian monarch, and the western Turks around 554 A.D. See Sykes, op. cit., I, 143.

⁴⁶Majumdar, op. cit., p. 9.

As was already pointed out, Hieun Tsiang describes the ruler of Kapisi as a "Kshattriya." Since Kshattriya is the second caste of Hinduism, could the ruler be of Hindu origin? None of the scholars mentioned in this paper accepts the theory of the Hindu origins of the rulers of Kapisi. Ray brushed this idea aside in a few sentences:

By this the pilgrim probably meant nothing more than that the king belonged to the Brahmanical faith; but even if he was right in his description of the caste of the prince it presents no insuperable difficulties. The history of the gradual assimilation of the Yueh-chi hordes in the fold of Hinduism is well known....There is no reason to believe that this process of assimilation did not continue amongst the successors of the Great Kusans; and it is quite likely that some of their chiefs even claimed Ksatriya rank.⁴⁷

The capital of the kingdom of Kapisi at the time of Hieun Tsiang's visit was the city of Kapisi, located on the banks of the Ghorband River some forty miles north of the present city of Kabul.⁴⁸

The history of the kingdom of Zabulistan which lay south of the kingdom of Kapisi is extremely obscure. Hieun Tsiang visited the kingdom in 630 A.D. He called it Tsao-ta or Tsao-li:

This country is about 7000 li in circuit, the capital of which is called Hosina (Ghazna)Mountains and valleys succeed each other, with plains intervening, fit for cultivation.... The climate is cold; there are frequent hail and snow storms. The people are naturally light-hearted and impulsive....Their writing and language differ from those of other countries. Although

⁴⁷Ray, op. cit., I, 61-62.

⁴⁸Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 9. The city was founded by Alexander the Great in 328 B.C.

they worship a hundred spirits, yet they also greatly revere the three precious ones (Buddhism). The reigning sovereign...is the successor of a long line of kings.⁴⁹

The capital of this kingdom, Ho-Si-Na, has been identified by some scholars with modern Ghazni.⁵⁰ Numismatic evidence points out to a line of powerful rulers in Zabulistan during the seventh century A.D. The title of Shahi is used by these rulers. One of them, Shahi Tigin, calls himself lord of Takan (India) and Khurasan. Another ruler, Vasudeva, calls himself the ruler of Zabulistan and Multan. The coins of these two kings use both the Pahlavi and the Indian script. The word Zabulistan appears on the coins of some kings who ruled the territory watered by the Helmand River and its tributaries.⁵¹ The connection between the Shahis of Kapisi and those of Zabulistan is presently not known.

Sind

The present state of Sind in West Pakistan covers an area of 57,117 square miles and has a population of 6,424,699.⁵²

⁴⁹Si-Yu-Ki, II, 283-84.

⁵⁰Thomas Watters, On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India (629-645 A.D.), Indian edition (Delhi: Munshi Ram Manohar Lal, 1961), II, 625. Also, Smith, op. cit., map facing p. 354. Cunningham, however, includes Kandhar which is nearly 200 miles south of Ghazni in the territories of the kingdom of Kapisi. Alexander Cunningham, Ancient Geography of India (London: Trubner and Company, 1871), pp. 19-20.

⁵¹On the coins of Zabulistan, see Alexander Cunningham, Later Indo-Scythians (Varanasi, India: Indological Bookstore, 1962), pp. 269-272, 291.

⁵²Kazi Saied-Uddin Ahmad, "Sind," Encyclopedia Britanica, 1972 ed., Vol. XX, 559.

Almost the whole of the central plain from the Panjnad to the Arabian Sea is marked by the changes in the course of the Indus or its tributaries....Aridity limits forests to about 1,200 square miles near the Indus from Chotki to the mid-delta....The climate is arid and extreme. The winters are mild and the summers very hot, the temperature frequently rising to 114 fahrenheit and occasionally to 120 fahrenheit....Rainfall is both scanty and irregular, the mean annual for Hyderabad being nine inches. The climate of the coastal strip is equable and humid.⁵³

Present-day Sind is bordered on the north and west by the Pakistan provinces of the Punjab and Baluchistan respectively and on the east and southeast by the Indian states of Rajasthan and Gujarat. The Arabian Sea makes its southern boundary.

At the time of the Arab invasion in 712 A.D., Sind was being ruled by the Brahmin dynasty which had been founded by a Brahmin named Chach in 622 A.D. This dynasty had been preceded by the Rai dynasty which had ruled Sind since 450 A.D. The Chachnamah⁵⁴ mentions three rulers of the Rai dynasty, namely, Diwaji, his son

⁵³Ibid., p. 560. For information on the geography of Sind, see also H. T. Sorley, Gazetteer of the Province of Sind (1907) (Lahore: Gazetteer Cell, Board of Revenue, 1968-69); Manekji Pithawalla, A Physical Economic Geography of Sind, the Lower Indus Delta (Karachi: Sindhi Adabi Board, 1959).

⁵⁴The Chachnamah is the earliest account of Sind which contains information regarding the Rai and the Brahmin dynasties. The work was translated from Arabic into Persian by Muhammad Ali bin Hamid bin Abu Bakr Kufi in 1216 A.D. According to this translator, he found the manuscript in Sind with Maulana Kazi Ismail whose ancestors had come to Sind with the Arab army in 712 A.D. The manuscript had been written, according to Kazi Ismail, by one of his ancestors.

Sihras and Sihras' son Sahasi.⁵⁵ However, two additional names are mentioned in Tuhfat al-Kiram, a Persian work written by Ali Sher Kani in 1774-75 in India, namely Sihras II, son of Sahasi, and Sahasi II, son of Sihras II.⁵⁶ This work also assigns a period of 137 years to the five rulers of the Rai dynasty.⁵⁷

The origins of the Rai dynasty have been much debated by the historians. Sir A. Cunningham was the first person to advance the view that the rulers of the Rai dynasty were certainly descendents of the Huns who had invaded India in the third quarter of the fifth century A.D.⁵⁸ The Imperial Gazetteer of India supported Cunningham's view,⁵⁹ and so did Henry Cousens in The Antiquities of Sind and Baluchistan published in 1929.⁶⁰ A. F. Hoernle in 1889 believed that

⁵⁵Chachnamah, trans. from Persian by Mirza Fredunbeg Kalichbeg (Karachi: The Commissioner's Press, 1900), pp. 12-13; Also H. M. Elliot, The History of India as Told by its Own Historians, Revised edition (Calcutta: Sisir Gupta, 1956), chapter iii, "Chach-Nama," III, 38-39.

⁵⁶Ali Sher Kani, Tuhfat al-Kiram, trans. by J. Postans (Calcutta: Bishop's College Press, 1843), p. 5.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 6.

⁵⁸Cunningham set forth his views about the Rai dynasty in a paper he read before the International Oriental Congress in London in 1892. See Sir A. Cunningham, "Later Indo-Scythians, White Huns or Ephthalites," Numismatic Chronicle, XII (1894), 243-93.

⁵⁹Imperial Gazetteer of India, XXII (Calcutta: Supritendent of Government Printing, 1908), 177.

⁶⁰Henry Cousens, The Antiquities of Sind with Historical Outline, Vol. 46, in The Archaeological Survey of India, Imperial Series (Calcutta: Central Publishing Branch, 1929), p. 7.

Sind was actually conquered by the Huns and hinted at the Hunnish origins of the Rai dynasty.⁶¹ Indian historians are either silent about the origins of this dynasty or do not agree with the Western scholars.

Neither R. C. Majumdar nor H. C. Ray discusses the origins of the Rai dynasty.⁶² In 1921 C. V. Vaidya advanced the view that it was of Mauryan origin and hence its rulers were the descendents of the illustrious Maurya dunasty which was established in India immediately after the invasion of Alexander the Great about three centuries before Christ.⁶³ In 1964, B. D. Mirchandani in an article, "Sind and the White Huns," argued that Sind was never conquered by the Huns. He rejected the theory of the Hunnish origins of the Rai dynasty, but failed to establish any new basis for its origins.⁶⁴

The Rai dynasty ruled Sind for a period of 137 years.⁶⁵ The capital of the kingdom was at Alor near the modern city of Rohri

⁶¹For Hoernle's view see Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal for 1889, p. 229.

⁶²R. C. Majumdar, "The Arab Invasion of India," Decca University Supplement, Bulletin XV (1931); H. C. Ray, The Dynastic History of Northern India, Vol. I, chapter i, "Dynastic History of Sind."

⁶³C. V. Vaidya, History of Medieval Hindu India (Poona: Oriental Book Supplying Agency, 1921-1926), I, 19.

⁶⁴B. D. Mirchandani, "Sind and the White Huns," Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay, N.S. Vol. XXXIX (1964), 61-93.

⁶⁵Kani, op. cit., p. 6. This is the only work which actually mentions the duration of the Rai dynasty, though it does not mention any dates.

(N. latitude 27 39', E. longitude 68 59'). It was "a large city adorned with all kinds of palaces and villas, gardens and groves, reservoirs and streams, parterres and flowers. It was situated on the banks of the Sihun (Indus) which they call Mihran."⁶⁶ At the time of the overthrow of the Rai dynasty in 622 A.D. the kingdom of Sind extended from the Arabian Sea in the south to beyond the city of Multan in the north--a distance of more than 500 miles. It stretched out approximately a hundred miles east and a hundred miles west from the banks of the Indus. It was divided into four provinces with headquarters at Brahmanabad, Siwistan, Iskandah and Multan.⁶⁷ The latter two were in the southern Punjab. The geographical location of the kingdom of Sind isolated it from the main political developments of North India. Sind did not form a part of any of the great Indian empires after the Christian era. The Kushan Empire in the second century A.D., the Gupta Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. and the empire of Harsha in the seventh century A.D.

⁶⁶The Chachnamah, p. 11.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 12. With the exception of Multan which has been positively identified, the locations of other sites has given rise to much controversy. See Shahpurshah Hodiwalla, Studies in Indo-Muslim History (Bombay: Hodiwalla, 1939), I, 78-88; H. T. Lambrick, Sind, A General Introduction (Hyderabad: Sindhi Adabi Board, 1964), pp. 156, 159, 161, 164; Malcolm R. Haig, Indus Delta Country (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., 1894), pp. 50-70; Malcolm Haig, "On the Sites of Brahmanabad and Mansurah in Sind," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, N.S. XVI (1884), 281-94; Henry Cousens, Antiquities of Sind, pp. 59-60, 67.

did not include Sind in their territories.⁶⁸ As already pointed out, the conquest of Sind by the Huns is a matter of controversy. Sind under the Rai dynasty and later under the Brahmin dynasty, however, came into conflict with the Sassanids of Iran and with the petty states of southern Punjab in the north. The present Pakistan-Iran border seems to have been a constant bone of contention between Iran and Sind.⁶⁹ Rai Sihras II, the fourth ruler of the Rai dynasty, lost his life in a campaign against the Persians in Makran.⁷⁰

The fertile lands of southern Punjab in the north, however, were more rewarding than the dry lands of Makran and Sistan in the west. The city of Multan in particular was a special target for the Sindian expansion in the north. As has been pointed out, two of the administrative centers of the kingdom of Sind were located in southern Punjab. Chinese Buddhist pilgrim, Hiuen Tsiang, who was in the neighborhood of Sind in 642, found that Multan was not a part of Sind but was a dependency of the kingdom of Cheka with headquarters

⁶⁸For the extent of these empires, see Smith, Early History of India, pp. 274, 300 and the map facing it showing the extent of the Gupta empire, and 354 and the map facing it showing the extent of Harsha's empire.

⁶⁹Present-day Pakistan-Iran boundary starts at 61 E. longitude on the coast of the Arabian Sea and runs in a north-easterly direction to approximately 63 E. longitude and 27.50 N. latitude. It then proceeds in a north-westerly direction to 61 E. longitude and 30 N. latitude.

⁷⁰The Chachnamah, p. 13; Kani, op. cit., p. 5. Neither of these works gives any date for this incident. For a discussion suggesting that the Persian Monarch who defeated Sihras II was probably Khusru Parviz (590-628 A.D.), see Mirchandani, op. cit., p. 82.

at the modern city of Sialkot in northeastern Pakistan close to the borders of Kashmir.⁷¹ According to the Chachnamah, Multan was one of the administrative centers of Sihras II, the fourth ruler of the Rai dynasty.⁷² By 622 A.D., however, Multan was again in the possession of the ruler of Sind.⁷³ Sihras II lost his life against the Persians and a brief chaos followed after which his son, Sahasi II, sat on the throne.⁷⁴ Upon the death of Sahasi II, another period of chaos followed and peace was not restored for at least another quarter of a century.⁷⁵ It is therefore possible to conclude that during these chaotic times Multan was lost by Sind to the kingdom of Cheka and not recovered until after the visit of Hiuen Tsiang in 642 A.D.

Sahasi II died without any heir and the throne was secured by a Brahmin minister, Chach, who married the widow of the deceased king.⁷⁶ The date of Chach's succession is actually given in Tuhfat al-Kiram as being "about the first year of the Hijera."⁷⁷ This date has presented historians with a serious problem. When Hiuen Tsiang visited the kingdom of Sin-Tu in 642 A.D., he observed

⁷¹Si-Yu-Ki, II, 274.

⁷²The Chachnamah, p. 12.

⁷³Ibid., p. 28.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 13.

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 21-36.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 18-22; Kani, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

⁷⁷Kani, op. cit., p. 7.

that "the king is of the Sudra caste."⁷⁸ According to the Chachnamah Chach ruled for forty years and was succeeded by his brother Chandar who ruled for eight years.⁷⁹ After Chandar's death the kingdom was divided between his son Duraj, who ruled at Brahmanabad, and Dahir, the younger son of Chach, who ruled at Alor. After a year, Duraj was ousted by Daharsiah, the older son of Chach.⁸⁰ For the next thirty years the kingdom of Sind was divided between Dahir and Daharsiah. After Daharsiah's death the kingdom was re-united by Dahir who ruled for eight more years before he was attacked by the king of Ramal.⁸¹ The Chachnamah takes up the Arab invasion of Sind immediately after the attack by the king of Ramal. The dates for the rulers of the Brahmin dynasty can be arranged as follows:⁸²

Chach	40 years . . . A.D. 622-662
Chandar	8 years . . . A.D. 662-669
{ Dahir	1 year . . . A.D. 669-670
{ Duraj	
{ Dahir	30 years . . . A.D. 670-700
{ Daharsiah	
Dahir	8 years
	+ X years . . . A.D. 700-708
	+ X years
Total = 87 years + X years	

⁷⁸Si-Yu-Ki, II, 272.

⁷⁹The Chachnamah, p. 39.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 42.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 55.

⁸²Majumdar, "The Arab Invasion," p. 12.

Dahir was killed by the Arabs in 712 A.D.⁸³ Supposing that as little as one year had passed between the Ramal episode and the death of Dahir, the total number of years for the Brahmin dynasty adds up to 88 solar years of India or 90 lunar years of the Islamic calendar. Thus the date in Tuhfat al-Kiram for the accession of Chach seems to be correct, i.e., 622 A.D.

On the basis of the observation supplied by the Chinese pilgrims certain historians concluded that Chach could not have ascended to the throne until after 642 A.D. Cunningham, Vaidya and Smith upheld this view.⁸⁴ Ray simply stated that "as it is supposed that Yuan Chwang could not have committed so palpable a mistake as to describe a Brahman as a Sudra, the period of the rule of the Rai dynasty is extended till the middle of the seventh century A.D."⁸⁵ Majumdar calculated the date of Chach's accession as 622 A.D. and observed that the pilgrims did not actually visit Sind.⁸⁶ The problem was dealt with in some detail by B. D. Mirchandani in 1964 when he argued with considerable force that the kingdom of Sin-Tu which the Chinese pilgrims had visited was not the same as Sind, but was a small kingdom in western Punjab situated on the northwest of Sind.⁸⁷

⁸³The Chachnamah, pp. 142-43.

⁸⁴For Cunningham, see Mirchandani, op. cit., p. 69; Vaidya, Medieval Hindu India, I, 19; Smith, Early History of India, p. 369.

⁸⁵Ray, The Dynastic History of Northern India, I, 5.

⁸⁶Majumdar, "The Arab Invasion," pp. 25-26.

⁸⁷Mirchandani, "Sind and the White Huns," pp. 85-93. "The long narrow strip of country bounded on the west by the Sulaiman mountains and on the east by the river Indus, extending below the Salt Range to the point where that river is joined by the waters of the Punjab, now known as Derajat, corresponds to the pilgrim's Sin-Tu kingdom."

The pilgrim's observation about the caste of the king of Sin-Tu, therefore, has no bearing on the date of Chach's acquisition of the throne of Sind which took place, according to Mirchandani, in 622 A.D.

Chach seems to have been a vigorous ruler. When he ascended the throne, the provincial governors refused to accept his authority. Chach proceeded to pacify the country and in so doing greatly expanded the area of the country.⁸⁸ On the basis of information supplied by the Chachnamah, the kingdom of Sind at the time of Chach's death included a greater part of southern and central Punjab, most of present-day Pakistani Baluchistan including eastern Makran, as well as the entire present-day province of Sind.⁸⁹ In the north the kingdom of Sind now bordered on the territory of Kashmir, in the northwest on Zabulistan and in the east it shared a common frontier with petty Rajput states. In the northeast the expansionist policies of North Indian Emperor Harsha, whose rule extended from 606 to 647 A.D., brought him into conflict with Sind. The result was probably "a brilliant conclusion of hostilities."⁹⁰ Even during the lifetime

⁸⁸For a detailed account of the campaigns of Chach, see The Chachnamah, pp. 25-39.

⁸⁹For identification of places mentioned in The Chachnamah in connection with the campaigns of Chach, see Cunningham, Ancient Geography, pp. 270-94; Haig, Indus Delta Country, pp. 57-79; Cousens, Antiquities of Sind, pp. 48-70, 76-79; Le Strange, Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, pp. 330-33, 347; Al-Baladhuri, op. cit., pp. 210-13.

⁹⁰R. S. Tripathy, History of Kanauj to the Muslim Conquest (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1959), p. 114. The date for this conflict is not known.

of Chach the Arabs had overrun Persia and had become the western neighbors of Sind.

Rajputana and Gujarat

At the time of the Arab invasion, Sind was bordered on the east and southeast by numerous petty kingdoms. One of the most powerful of these states was that of Kanauj. Emperor Harsha Verdhana, who ruled a large part of northern India from his capital at Kanauj, had died in 647 A.D.⁹¹ For the next half century, "an impenetrable gloom surrounds its (Kanauj) history."⁹² "When the obscurity lifts we find a powerful monarch, Yasovarman, occupying its throne."⁹³ The dates of Yasovarman's rule are subject to dispute, but "his reign may be placed between A.D. 700 and 740."⁹⁴ The territorial ambitions of Yasovarman brought him into conflict with the Chalukya dynasty of the Deccan in the south and the Kashmirian ruler Lalitaditya in the north. Yasovarman's dominions were finally overrun by Lalitaditya.⁹⁵ However, before the Kashmir-Kanauj conflict

⁹¹Harsha's empire included most of the territory lying north of the Narmada River, but excluded Kashmir, Western Panjab, Sind and Rajputana.

⁹²R. C. Majumdar, ed., The Classical Age, Vol. III in the series History and Culture of the Indian People, ed. by R. C. Majumdar (Bombay: Bharatya Vidhya, 1955), p. 128.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 131. For other views on this controversy, see Rama S. Tripathi, History of Kanauj to the Muslim Conquest, pp. 194-97; Smith, "The History of the City of Kanauj and of King Yasovarman," Journal of Royal Asiatic Society (1908), p. 784.

⁹⁵Majumdar, The Classical Age, pp. 130-31; Goetz, op. cit., pp. 3-8; Tripathi, op. cit., pp. 197-98; Rajatarangini, I, 144-46.

Yasovarman realized the Arab threat from Sind and accordingly, in cooperation with Kashmir, took military and diplomatic steps to check it. Kanauj was conquered by the Gurjara-Pratiharas of Rajputana "sometime before the year 836 A.D."⁹⁶ Under the Gurjara-Pratihara Kanauj became a powerful kingdom and effectively blocked the Arab advance to the east.⁹⁷

The Gangetic Valley where the city of Kanauj was located is separated from Sind by the present state of Rajasthan or Rajputana in India. Most of Rajputana and part of Sind lie in the Great Indian Desert or Thar covering approximately 100,000 square miles.⁹⁸

Except in the extreme south, rainfall is under, generally well under, 10 inches. Mean monthly temperatures range from 60 Fahrenheit (January) to 95 Fahrenheit (May) but diurnal ranges are naturally high--20-30 at all seasons. Vegetation is extremely stunted and thorny open scrub, largely acacia: "the term 'tree' is rather a courteous acknowledgement of descent than an indication of size"....Pastoralism is important, sheep and goats providing raw materials for the crafts of the few towns; and the camel is still one of the chief means of transport.⁹⁹

In this vast stretch of the desert no centralized authority existed at the time of the Arab invasion of Sind. Various Rajput chiefs had carved out independent kingdoms for themselves.

⁹⁶Ray, op. cit., I, 72.

⁹⁷See below, chapter VII, p. 162.

⁹⁸Spate, op. cit., p. 567.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 568.

The most important Rajput state was that of the Gurjara-Pratiharas founded by Harichandra about the middle of the sixth century. It centered around Jodhpur in present-day Rajasthan.¹⁰⁰ Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang visited this kingdom during the fourth decade of the seventh century A.D.:

The country is 5000 li or so in circuit, the capital, which is called Pi-lo-mo-lo is 30 li or so around....The population is dense; the establishments are rich and well supplied with materials (wealth). They mostly are unbelievers; a few are attached to the law of Buddha....The king is of the Kshatriya caste. He is just twenty years old; he is distinguished for wisdom, and he is courageous. He is a deep believer in the law of Buddha; and highly honours men of distinguished ability.¹⁰¹

The young ruler mentioned by the pilgrim "may be identified with King Tata, son of Nagabhata, about whom it is said in a record of the family that, considering life to be evanescent as lighting, he abdicated in favour of his younger brother, Bhoja, and himself retired to a hermitage."¹⁰² Tata and his three successors probably ruled between 640 and 720 A.D.¹⁰³ The next king, Siluka, was the great-grandson of Tata. He undertook a vigorous campaign of expansion which eventually made the Gurjara-Pratihara kingdom supreme

¹⁰⁰Epigraphia Indica, XVIII, 87-90, "The Jodhpur Inscription of Pratihara Bauka."

¹⁰¹Si-Yu-Ki, II, 269-70. Hiuen Tsiang calls this kingdom Kiu-che-lo.

¹⁰²Majumdar, The Classical Age, p. 153.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 154.

in Rajputana.¹⁰⁴ Either Siluka or his successor was on the throne when the Arabs of Sind swept over a greater part of Rajputana and Gujarat between 724 and 738 A.D.¹⁰⁵

Of all the Rajput states that of Jaisalmer was nearest to the Arab territories in Sind, and as such was the first to bear the brunt of the Arab arms from Sind.¹⁰⁶ At the time of the Arab conquest of Sind, the clan of Bhatti was ruling in Jaisalmer. The origin of this clan is not clear.¹⁰⁷ The first Bhatti ruler who came into conflict with the Arabs of Sind during the first quarter of the eighth century was Tunno.¹⁰⁸ Hard pressed by the Arabs on their western border, the Bhattis were compelled to expand eastward

¹⁰⁴Ibid. The Gurjara-Pratihara kingdom now included the Rajput state of Bikaner as well.

¹⁰⁵Ibid. The dates of this ruler are a matter of controversy. According to Krishna Kumar, "the Arab invasion took place when either Yasovardhana or his son, Canduka, was ruling on the throne at Jodhpur." "Identification of Bhatti and Devaraja on the Jodhpur Inscription of Pratihara Bauka," Indian Historical Quarterly, XV (1939), 601. Yasovardhana and Canduka were grandfather and father respectively of Siluka.

¹⁰⁶On the eve of Indian independence in August 1947, the princely state of Jaisalmer was the most westerly state of Rajputana and it bordered on the province of Sind in the northwest, west and southwest. The city of Jaisalmer is less than 100 miles from the Sind-Rajputana border.

¹⁰⁷According to the bardic traditions of Jaisalmer, the Bhattis were members of a tribe called Yadu which left India and settled in Zabulistan. Centuries later they re-entered India and settled in western Rajputana. No dates have been assigned to these movements. See James Tod, Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan or the Central and Western Rajput States of India (London: Oxford University Press, 1920), Vol. II, Book vii, "Annals of Jaisalmer," 1169-1189.

¹⁰⁸Tod, op. cit., 1191-1193.

and consequently came into conflict with the Gurjara-Pratiharas of Jodhpur. This conflict proved disastrous to the Rajput states.

At the beginning of the eighth century A.D. the Gurjara-Pratiharas had established their rule in two other sections of western India as well--southern Gujarat and western Malwa. The exact date of the founding of Gurjara-Pratihara dynasties in these two regions is not known. However, it is probable that "the Gurjaras occupied their territories in Gujarat not long after A.D. 610, and eventually Malwa, or at least a large portion of it, also passed into their hands."¹⁰⁹ In southern Gujarat the Gurjara-Pratihara capital was the city of Nandipuri.¹¹⁰ At the time of the Arab invasions of Sind, Jayabhata III was ruling in Nandipuri.¹¹¹ In Western Malwa the Gurjara-Pratihara capital was the city of Avanti (modern Ujjain).¹¹² Pratiharas of Nandipuri and Avanti were able to offer successful resistance to the Arabs from Sind between 724 and 738 A.D.

The state of Gujarat lies in the southeast of Sind. Here two independent kingdoms had been established at the time of the Arab invasion of Sind--the kingdom of Valabhi and the Gurjara-Pratihara kingdom with its capital at Nandipuri.

¹⁰⁹Majumdar, The Classical Age, pp. 66-67.

¹¹⁰Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. I, Pt. II (1877), 313.

¹¹¹L. D. Barnett, Antiquities of India (London: P. L. Warner, 1914), p. 71.

¹¹²S. R. Sharma, The Crescent in India (Bombay: Hind Kitab, 1954), p. 71.

The kingdom of Valabhi had been founded by the descendants of Bhatarka who was the governor of Saurashtra or Kathiawar Peninsula during the third quarter of the fifth century A.D. under the Gupta empire.¹¹³ The exact extent of this kingdom is not known, but since Bhatarka was the governor of Saurashtra it may be presumed that it roughly corresponded to that province which includes all of the Kathiawar Peninsula:

Most of Kathiawar lies below 600 feet, but there are two hill masses, E of Rajkot in the N (1100 feet) and the higher and bolder Gir Range (up to 2100 feet) in the S. These two dissected plateaus have a perfect radial drainage pattern; they are linked by a narrow and sinuous neck over 600 feet separating the two major rivers of Kathiawar, the Bhadar (110 miles long) flowing W and the Shetrunji E....The rainfall is precarious, variability being everywhere over 50%. Mean temperatures run high, 80-85 F. in January and 90-95 in May, when mean maxima is around 110. The natural cover of most of the region is dry thorn forest, very open and stunted, with small patches of dry deciduous on the Gir and Girhar Hills....Mangroves are exploited for fuel along the coast....Water is of course the primary determinant of agriculture.... The larger blocks of cultivation are thus located at the foot of the ridges or low plateaus, or on the broader interfluves.¹¹⁴

The kingdom of Valabhi was occasionally at odds with its southern neighbor, the Gurjara Pratihara kingdom of Nandipuri. The Valabhi king, Dharasena IV, who ascended the throne about 644 A.D. and Siladitya III who ruled from 662 to 684 A.D., both defeated their

¹¹³Majumdar, The Classical Age, p. 61.

¹¹⁴Spate, op. cit., pp. 596-97.

southern neighbor, but in both cases the Valabhi occupation of the Gurjara-Pratihara kingdom seems to have been of a short duration.¹¹⁵

From 691 to 762 A.D. Siladitya IV and Siladitya V ruled over Valabhi. The date of the accession of Siladitya V to the throne is not known with certainty.¹¹⁶ In 733 A.D. the Valabhi territories were invaded by a combined force of the Chalukyas of Deccan and the Gurjara-Pratiharas of Nandipur.¹¹⁷ The Valabhi ruler was defeated and was compelled to surrender a large portion of his territory in the south to the allies.¹¹⁸ This territory, known as Lata, was placed under Tayasraya Pulikesin, a member of the royal house of the Chalukyas.¹¹⁹

A study of the western states of India on the eve of the Arab invasion of Sind therefore shows that powerful dynasties were ruling over these states which were in the process of consolidation and some even of expansion. The expansionist policies of some of these states were detrimental to the security of India in the face of an Arab thrust. Kapisi, Zabulistan and Sind, states which faced a solid wall

¹¹⁵Majumdar, The Classical Age, pp. 147-48.

¹¹⁶Krishnakumari Virji in his Ancient History of Saurashtra (Bombay: Konkan Institute of Arts and Science, 1952), p. 97, places the date of Siladitya's accession in 740 A.D. Barnett, op. cit., p. 72 places it in 722 A.D. Majumdar simply states that it probably was during the reign of Siladitya V that Valabhi was invaded by the Arabs, The Classical Age, p. 150.

¹¹⁷The Chalukya dynasty ruled over the Deccan from 550 to 753 A.D.

¹¹⁸Virji, op. cit., pp. 94-95.

¹¹⁹Epigraphia Indica, Vol. XXIII, 1, note I.

of Arab arms from the Hindukush mountains in the north to the Arabian Sea in the south took no united stand against a common enemy. Only when the Arabs had overrun Sind and had established a nominal supremacy over Kapisi and Zabulistan did the remainder of western Indian states attempt to take some kind of joint action against the Arabs.

CHAPTER IV

IMPERIAL EXPANSION: CAUSES AND POTENTIAL

The annexation of Sind to the caliphate in 715 A.D. and the British empire in 1843 presents a striking picture of analogous imperial expansion. The very location of Sind rendered it a wretched victim of those forces of expansionism, both Umayyad and British, which were determined to devote the full strength of their militarism in placing the frontiers of their empires on the Indus. Both Sir Charles Napier and al-Hajjaj, chief protagonists of Sind campaigns, were merely tools in the execution of this policy.¹ Unlike Napier, who remorsefully noted, "I have Sind," al-Hajjaj had no second thoughts about his actions--by his very nature he was not inclined to do so.²

¹Sir Charles Napier was the British general in command of the Sind expedition of 1843. Al-Hajjaj was the Umayyad viceroy of Iraq and hence administrator of all Arab territory east of the Euphrates.

²Also interpreted to mean, "I have sinned," the British invasion of Sind being entirely unprovoked. The play upon words is significant in the present instance.

The immediate casus belli between the caliphate and Sind were the activities of Indian pirates off Daybul, Arab passengers on their way from Ceylon having been captured by them.³ The demand of Hajjaj that Dahir, the Sindian monarch, free the passengers and punish the pirates was as unreasonable as the latter's reply that such a step was beyond his control was reasonable. Subject as they were to periodical raids upon their territory by the Arab prefects of Sijistan and Makran, the Sindian rulers were too well aware of expansionist designs of their western neighbors.⁴ The thwarting of this Drang nach Osten, diplomatically if possible, militarily if necessary, having become the chief concern of Sindian policy makers. Punishment of pirates, had it been within their power, would be in conformity with their strict policy of avoiding any antagonistic acts towards their neighbors, a fact of great inconvenience to Muslim historians who have endeavored to place the blame squarely upon the Hindu ruler of Sind.⁵

³For details, see below, Chapter iii.

⁴Sijistan and western Makran had been overrun by the Arabs prior to the annexation of Sind. From here occasional foreys were conducted against Sindian territories. See below, Chapter V, pp. 4-11.

⁵Muslim historians have never admitted the validity of any other argument. See al-Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 216; The Chachnamah, pp. 69-70; Tuhfat al-Kiram, p. 10. Eminent Indian Muslim scholar Syed Amir Ali, in his History of the Saracens, has this to say: "About the same time Mohammad, the son of Kasim, governor of Makran, harassed by the predatory tribes who inhabited the country between Sind and Baluchistan, led an expedition into India which ended in the annexation of Sind, Multan and part of the Punjab as far as the Beas," p. 104.

Consequently we must search for deeper motives behind the Arab drive to the Indus. Economically the caliphate was in a series of serious crises, faced as it had been with two decades of constant internal upheavals. The rising discontent of the "Mawali" or non-Arab Muslims demanding that the theoretical injunctions against any form of discrimination within the Umma or Islamic community, economic as well as social, be obeyed to the very letter, threatened to throw the Umayyad financial machinery out of gear.⁶ The Mawali simply refused to pay the taxes above the rate paid by the Arabs and clamoured for life pensions in return for military service. The Umayyad attempt to subordinate the interests of the Umma at large to those of the Arab hopelessly failed in the end, pulling down the dynasty with it in 750 A.D. But the policy makers of 700 A.D. were convinced of the righteousness of their acts. Mawali grievances expressed in terms of political discontent were ruthlessly crushed.⁷ Ironically the very grievances which had inspired rebellious acts were now multiplied--the Umayyads demanding "jiziah" even from the

⁶For a discussion of politics, economics and religion under the Umayyads in general and Hajjaj in particular, see below, Chapter VI, Part I, "Islamic Institutions."

⁷Phillip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, Tenth edition (New York: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1970), pp. 206-08; Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History, Revised edition (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), pp. 75-76; Ameer Ali, A Short History of the Saracens (London: Macmillan and Company, 1921), pp. 90-96; Julius Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, Translated by Margaret Weir (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1927), pp. 113-200; Carl Brockelman, History of the Islamic People, Translated by Joel Carmichel and Moshe Perlman (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960), pp. 77-80.

Mawali, putting severe restrictions upon their movements and actually discouraging conversion to the Islamic faith.

By 710 A.D. the temptation to seek external sources of revenue in the form of new territorial acquisitions had become an obsession with Hajjaj. Beyond the Arab frontier at Makran lay the Indian kingdom of Sind, as yet unconquered. Hajjaj entertained no false illusion about the wealth of this state--one can see that in his promise to deposit twice the amount spent on the expedition in the central treasury.⁸ That the Sind enterprise was not undertaken in answer to a need for an external divisionary symbol is clearly shown by the dispatch of six thousand Syrian, rather than Iraqi, troops to Sind; the former providing the basis of Umayyad military regime while the latter clearly in sympathy with the Mawali.⁹

Religious sanctions to be sure were involved in the name of planting Islam on the very doorstep of Idolatrous India. Yet it is difficult to conceive of Hajjaj as discouraging conversion at home, but attempting to save souls in distant Sind.

The value of maritime trade activity diligently pursued by pre- and post-Islamic Arabs like, was not lost on Hajjaj's mind.¹⁰ It is

⁸The Chachnamah, p. 74.

⁹In 700 A.D. a force of Kufan and Basrans under Abd ar-Rahman ibn al-Ashath was dispatched by Hajjaj against Kabul. The army failing in its mission, turned against the Umayyads and almost succeeded in overthrowing them. See below, Chapter V, Part II, "Military Operations Against Sijistan, Zabulistan and Makran."

¹⁰See below, Chapter VIII, pp. 183-205.

to be noted that provincial governors exposed to this trade were more enthusiastic exponents of annexations of Indian coastal areas than the central governments at Madina and Damascus.¹¹ The inclusion of Daybul, one of the chief ports of the western coast of India and the first major one for ships leaving Basra for the East, in the Islamic empire, facilitated and strengthened Arab commercial interests with India.¹²

As a general rule, great Arab conquests have followed a more or less set pattern, that of consolidation and expansion. The expulsion of the Byzantines from Syria and Egypt on the one hand and the overthrow of the Persian empire on the other were realized only after the Muslim territory had been consolidated in the Arabian peninsula. In the second round of expansion, all North Africa west of Egypt was annexed to the Arab Empire by Caliph Muawiya (661-681 A.D.), who had vigorously proceeded to reorganize the affairs of that empire following the first civil war in the annals of Islamic history.¹³

¹¹The Arab governor of Bahrain and Uman had dispatched naval expeditions against Indian coastal cities as early as 637 A.D. He was severely reprimanded by Caliph Umar. See below, Chapter V, Part I, "Naval Operations Against the Coastal Cities of India, 637-638 A.D." Hajjaj's enthusiasm for annexation of Sind was not shared by the Caliph at Damascus.

¹²See below, Chapter VIII, pp. 197-205.

¹³Muawiya, scion of the powerful clan of Beni Umayya had been appointed governor of Syria by Caliph Umar in 639 A.D. His appointment was confirmed by Umar's successor, Uthman, a fellow clansman of Muawiya. The mysterious circumstances leading to the murder of Uthman in 656 A.D. and the subsequent "election" of Ali as the Caliph were looked upon by Muawiya with great suspicion, and consequently he refused to pay allegiance to Ali. The resultant civil war dragged on until the murder of Ali in 661 A.D., leaving Muawiya the undisputed master of the Islamic empire.

Civil strife and rebellions again rent the Islamic empire for almost two decades and peace was not fully restored until the last years of Caliph Abdul-Malik's reign (685-705 A.D.). Under Caliph al-Walid (705-715 A.D.), the Arabs entered the third phase of imperial expansion and in so doing extended the boundaries of his realm to include Spain, Central Asia and Sind. It is not inconceivable that Hajjaj, who had played a major role in the consolidation of the conquests made between 685 and 705 A.D., would have accepted Dahir's explanation with a more reasonable attitude than he actually did, had the Islamic empire been a trifle more unstable than it was. As it was, the third period of consolidation was over, and further expansion was to follow it. Sind, Spain, and Central Asia became victims of this cycle.

The conquest of Sind can also be regarded as the inevitable result of Arab occupation of the Iranian plateau. Over the centuries the Indian subcontinent has been invaded by the hordes of various ethnic groups of people who have poured into its plains through the mountain passes of the Northwest, in search of better pastures. Historically these invading armies have always first consolidated their holds on the mountains of the Hindukush in the north or on the Baluchistan plateau in the south. Once in control of these mountains, the urge to swarm down on the rich plains of India was irresistible. This urge could be checked only if a strong central power from within India was capable of launching a counter movement toward the Northwest. Hence the Mauriyan empire in the third century

B.C., pursuing a vigorous expansionist policy, evicted the Greek garrisons left behind by Alexander the Great in northwestern India. Long afterwards these tactics recurred with the same success. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Mughul empire successfully defended the northwestern invasion routes against the Persians and the Turks. More recently in search of a "scientific frontier," the British occupied Afghanistan twice, in 1840 and again in 1878, and annexed Baluchistan to their British Indian empire. It happened, however, rarely that an Indian government was strong enough to pursue a vigorous northwestern policy. As soon as the control of the Northwest had passed into the hands of a militarily powerful and hostile people and at the same time India lacked a unified central government, the stage was set for an invasion of the Indus Valley. Such a condition existed on the eve of the Arab invasion of Sind. As seen in the foregoing pages, no central authority had existed in India at the beginning of the eighth century, but four regional kingdoms --namely Kashmir, Kapisi, Zabulistan and Sind--had been established in the Northwest.¹⁴ The Arabs had overrun Persia and were in partial control of the Hindukush. By the very logic of events they could not be expected to sit quietly and gaze upon the rich lands of India in their eastern proximity. As it was by their nature and desert training, they were better suited to invade India through the southern route, and in so doing they successfully over-

¹⁴See above, Chapter III.

ran the kingdom of Sind situated at the southerly end of the aforementioned border states.

The annexation of Sind, therefore, can be ascribed, in varying contexts to the above-mentioned factors; and it remains very doubtful whether there was anything so unusual about piratical activity off Daybul as to justify so shattering a blow.

Arab Art of War

The phenomenal rise of the Arab empire from its birthplace in the desert of Arabia to the borders of India on the one hand, and to those of southern France on the other, within a single century is one of the miracles of history. The Arab "blitzkrieg" which overwhelmed the armies of the Persians, the Byzantines, the Turks, the Indians and the Visigoths has fascinated and intrigued historians over the centuries. What were the main factors underlying this "blitzkrieg" which counted Sind among its victims?

A study of the Arabian art of war from the rise of Islam to the fall of Sind reveals that though the Arabs modified a few of their techniques, the essential elements remained approximately the same. The Arab military machine on the eve of Islamic expansion was summed up by Sir John Glubb, a soldier-scholar who was the builder and the supreme commander of the renowned Arab Legion in Jordan for a number of years:

It seems to me misleading, in describing these early Arabian battles, to speak as some European historians have, of armies, generals and soldiers. In Arabia every man was in an emergency expected to fight for his tribe. Apart from such crises there were no soldiers, nor was any training deemed necessary. The warriors fought not in companies or battalions, but grouped by tribes and clans, each commanded by its chief. Battles normally commenced by single combats between champions, watched by the forces of both sides drawn up opposite each other. Finally the rival war parties charged, and the issue was decided in a wild mêlée, consisting of a great number of confused hand-to-hand encounters.¹⁵

In pre-Islamic Arabia where nomadic tribes formed the essential elements of all political, social, economic and even religious organizations, standing armies could have hardly been the order of the day. Tribal loyalties were considered above and beyond all others and as a result the early Islamic military machine was geared to suit this necessity.

A fleeting survey of the first two battles of Islam against the Meccan forces, Badr fought in 624 A.D. and Uhud fought a year later, goes to show the art of warfare or the lack of it among the Arabs of the early seventh century.¹⁶ The supreme commander of

¹⁵Sir John B. Glubb, The Great Arab Conquests (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1963), p. 65.

¹⁶For an excellent documentary account of these battles, see M. Hamidullah, "The Battle Fields of the Prophet Muhammad," Islamic Review, XL (October 1952), 13-19. For a military analysis, see Sir John Glubb, op. cit., Chapter iii, "The Well Bucket," pp. 55-81. For other narratives, see Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Madina (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 1-50; William Muir, Life of Mahomet, Third Edition (London: Smith Elder and Company), 1894), pp. 207-31. For traditional accounts see A. Guillaum, The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 435-581. The author of this work, Muhammad ibn Ishaq, probably died at Baghdad in 768 A.D. It is, however, best

the Muslim forces on both occasions was the Prophet himself. The Meccans outnumbered the Muslims by one thousand to three hundred at Badr and by three thousand to seven hundred at Uhud. Both armies were grouped together according to tribal affiliations, being distinguished by distinct banners and commanded by their own chiefs. Other than the supreme commander, Muhammad, in the case of Muslim forces no other hierarchy of command existed, neither were there any uniforms. In both cases the cavalry formed the most important branch of contending forces. Since each soldier was to provide his own weapons and mount, only the well-to-do could be expected to fight in the cavalry ranks. Muslim infantry, which included a number of archers, actually outnumbered the cavalry. However, in later battles of Islam this proportion was reversed. The principal weapon was the sword, the one imported from India being most highly prized. Lances, spears and javelins were also extensively employed. "Covering fire" was supplied by arrows. At Badr the Prophet's orders as to the use of the weapons were explicit. "Do not waste your arrows while the enemy is still beyond reach; discharge your arrows only when the target is within reach; when the enemy approaches begin to throw stones with your hands; on his nearer approach use lances and spears, the sword being drawn only finally for hand-to-hand fighting."¹⁷

known by its editor Ibn Hisham who died in Egypt in 833 A.D. Hereinafter it will be referred to as Ibn Hisham; Al-Waqidi, Kitab al Maghazi, edited by Marsden Jones (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), Vol. I, 19-200; Muhammad ibn Sa'ad, al-Tabaqat al-Kubra (Bairut: Dar Sadr, 1957), Vol. II, 11-100.

¹⁷Quoted in Hamidullah, op. cit., Vol. XL, 18.

Defensive armour was highly prized and was imported from Persia, Byzantium and India. It normally consisted of a pot helmet and a coat of chain-mail. At Uhud the Prophet was wearing two coats of mail and a helmet. During the battle he received a blow on the head which forced his helmet down into his forehead.¹⁸ Had the blow been a trifle more severe world history might have been different. It is, however, appropriate to point out that the high cost of armour prevented a majority of Arab warriors from obtaining it.

Among the martial traditions of their age, the Arabs, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, observed two with the utmost of scruples-- individual combat and exhortation by women, indicating a manner of warfare at once chivalrous and romantic. As the Muslim and Meccan forces were arrayed against each other three warriors from the latter stepped out of their battle lines and challenged the Muslims. Three Muslim warriors accepted the challenge. It was only after these individual combats were over that regular battles commenced.

Arab women frequently accompanied the warriors to the battle fields. At Uhud they proceeded to rouse the enthusiasm of the Meccans as both forces drew towards one another. They beat upon tambourines reciting martial poetry and letting down their long hair.¹⁹ In

¹⁸Ibid., p. 17; Glubb, op. cit., pp. 72-73.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 71. According to one authority the Arab women accompanied the warriors with bows and arrows and part of their duty was "the pursuit and punishment of deserters and even, if circumstances warranted, with putting them to death." Jacques Boudet, The Ancient Art of Warfare (London: The Cresset Press, 1966), p. 178.

many later battles of Islam this action by Arab women played not an insignificant role.

At Badr the Prophet was able to point out almost the exact spots where rival Arab commanders would fall in battle.²⁰ There was nothing supernatural about his predictions, however, as they were prompted by the old Arab practice of learning as much as possible about the tactics of enemy forces as well as about the individual behaviors of rival commanders. In their later battles against the Byzantines, the Persians, the Turks and the Indians, the Arabs utilized this practice with considerable success.

From the beginning, it was obvious to the Arab commanders that their forces could not stand up to the better armed and disciplined Byzantine and Persian forces in conventional warfare. The Arabs, therefore, relied on three main factors to win their battles--harassment, speed and individual initiative. They made it one of their fundamental principles never to face freshly arrived enemy troops and particularly at a site selected for battle by their rivals. The enemy forces had to be harassed in a manner which Glubb labels as "the pirate strategy."²¹ Considering the desert as an ocean where they could sail at will, the Arabs attempted to lure the enemy forces at the edge of the desert. From here, the Arabs could carry out periodical raids against different sections of the main enemy forces

²⁰Hamidullah, op. cit. (October 1952), p. 17.

²¹Glubb, op. cit., Chapter vi, "Pirate Strategy," pp. 123-36. See also Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History, Rev. ed. (New York : Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p. 55.

without being successfully pursued into the desert. Enemy supply lines were the main target for Arab "pirates." Only when the enemy was thoroughly exhausted and confused would the Arabs engage in the main battle.

The chief section of Arab forces was the cavalry which enabled them to gain superiority in speed and mobility over their rivals. There were no conventional battle formations--individual commanders used their own discretion according to time and space. However, since the Arabs were almost always on the offensive their best troops were concentrated in the center for the main attack on the enemy forces.²² The right and left wings were extremely mobile and capable of executing maneuvers which surprised and shocked the enemy. A certain number of warriors were always kept as reserve and in case of possible reverses were thrown into battle with mostly favorable results.²³ At Badr the Muslims would have won the day, had it not been for the Quraish reserve cavalry charge under Khalid ibn al-Walid which turned the tables against the Muslims.²⁴ The terrible force of the Arab cavalry charge against the center usually broke the enemy formations. In case this was not accomplished,

²²Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, Second edition (New York: B. Franklin, 1959), Vol. I, 213.

²³"The generals of the East had already discovered the great precept which modern military science has claimed as its own, that in a cavalry combat the side which holds back the last reserve must win." Ibid., I, 213.

²⁴Hamidullah, op. cit. (November 1952), p. 17; Glubb, op. cit., p. 72.

the Arab mobile columns would attack the enemy from the rear. If the elephants were the main obstacles, then methods were devised to frighten them. These included cutting off their trunks, poking their eyes with spears or throwing fire arrows at them. The Arabs preferred to fight with the desert at their backs, since this was the haven with which they were better acquainted and to which they could resort if temporary flight became advisable. They paid dearly at the Battle of the Bridge in 636 A.D. against the Persians when the Arab commander made the mistake of crossing the river, thereby placing himself between the enemy in front and the river at the back with little space for rapid movements.²⁵ At Tours in 732 A.D. there were neither elephants nor a desert. The Arabs were forced to fight at close formations against freshly arrived Frankish forces. The Frankish center was composed of foot soldiers dressed in wolf skins with their long hair falling on their shoulders. These foot soldiers formed a huge hollow square, preventing the Arabs from surprising them from the rear. Heavily armed Frankish cavalry on both wings held the Arabs at bay.²⁶ The Arab warriors with their mounts hurled themselves against the Frankish center with the usual courage and fury. The Franks, however, used the other sides of the squares to cut down the Arabs without

²⁵Glubb, op. cit., pp. 112-64; Sir William Muir, Annals of the Early Caliphate (London: Smith Elder and Company, 1883), pp. 129-32.

²⁶Tom Wintringham, The Story of Weapons and Tactics (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1943), p. 56.

giving way, among the fallen being Abd-al-Rahman, the Arab commander himself.²⁷

During three centuries of spectacular Arab military feats Tours and the Battle of the Bridge were seldom repeated. The Arabs had learned their lesson well. So had the Byzantines. After losing North Africa and most of their west Asiatic possessions to the Arabs, the Byzantines had deemed it wise to study the military techniques of their new rivals. Byzantine emperor Leo the Wise in his Tactica, a military treatise written around 900 A.D., advocates special measures needed against the Arabs. He pays due respects to the Arab military methods. "Of all the barbarous nations," said Leo, "they are the best advised and most prudent in their military operations."²⁸ Realizing that on open fields, the Arabs could be ridden down by the Byzantine heavy cavalry, Leo recommends that attempts be made to close ranks with the Arabs at once instead of exchanging arrows from a distance. The Arabs also dreaded steady and well-armed infantry, and foot-archers were their special dread since the infantry carried larger and heavier bows than the cavalry. The Arab horsemen were thus liable to have their horses shot from under them. Byzantine generals were also recommended to be careful about flanks and cover

²⁷For the battle of Tours see Charles Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, Vol. I, 58; Philip Hitti, A History of the Arabs, p. 500; J. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 342; Ameer Ali, A Short History of the Saracens, p. 150.

²⁸Quoted in Charles Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, Vol. I, 208.

their rear by a river, marsh or defile. Infantry was to be placed in the center with cavalry on the flanks and the two arms were never to be separated. Heedless pursuit by the cavalry was especially to be avoided.²⁹ The Persians, the Turks, the Indians, the Byzantines of the seventh century and the Crusaders of a later date would have done well, had they taken time to study the Muslim military methods as did Leo the Wise.

By far the greatest weakness of the Arabs in matters military was their total lack of experience with siege warfare. In view of their nomadic existence in Arabia, this is not hard to understand. The simple expedience of digging a ditch around the city of Madina in 627 A.D. had prevented the Meccan forces from investing it.³⁰ The Arabs had partially overcome this weakness by an imaginative method. They would besiege a city and lay waste the countryside. The city simply would be starved out into surrender. In case the city was well supplied and help would arrive to relieve it or if the Arabs would run out of supplies, then the besiegers would be at a loss. The metropolis of Constantinople managed to withstand the Arabs successfully, precisely because the above factors were favoring it.³¹

²⁹Ibid., Vol. V, 206.

³⁰The siege of Madina is also known as the battle of Khanduq or Ditch. See Hamidullah, op. cit. (December 1952), 8-13; Glubb, op. cit., pp. 82-86.

³¹The Arabs besieged Constantinople in 669, 677 and then again in 717 A.D. See Glubb, op. cit., pp. 350-52; Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. 123-25; Hitti, op. cit., pp. 201-204.

Insofar as the Arabs at large were concerned, their belief that battles were won by desperate courage alone, and that no skilled training or organization were required from a commander, remained steadfast throughout their major battles against the Byzantines and the Persians. Indeed it is said that "the Arabs were victorious not owing to, but in spite of, their commanders."³² This individual courage was further enhanced by the Arab tribal allegiance, for the Arab tribesmen fought infinitely better among "the sons of their uncles" than in mixed groups among men of other tribes.³³ An esprit-de-corps was thus displayed by the Arab tribal levies which the better armed and disciplined Byzantine and Persian forces lacked.

The concept of "jihad" or Holy War in Islam gave a further boost to Arab character already courageous and fiery. It was one of the principal duties of the Caliph as commander of the faithful to keep pushing back the geographical wall separating the "dar al-Islam" (the land of Islam) from the "dar al-Harb" (the war territory). In this Holy War those who forfeited their lives were at once admitted to paradise.³⁴ Accordingly, the Arab warriors, in utter indifference

³²Glubb, op. cit., p. 160. An excellent example of this kind of attitude was provided when Caliph Umar appointed a common recruit, Abu Ubaid, to command the army against the Persians at the Battle of the Bridge in 635 A.D. The sole qualification of Abu Ubaid being that he had been the first person to volunteer for service against the Persians when Caliph Umar decided to raise a new levy for Iraq. On this occasion, however, the Arabs lost the battle.

³³Quoted in Glubb, op. cit., p. 192. At Badr many Meccans were hesitant to bear arms against the Muslims since many Muslim warriors were at the same time fellow members of the Quraish tribe.

³⁴For Quranic sanction of "jihad" see Quran, IX, 29. Theoretically there is no secular war in Islam.

to their lives, hurled themselves against the better equipped armies of their enemies with results mostly disastrous for the latter.

It is not to suggest that the Arab military methods did not undergo any change during the three-quarters of a century, from the battle of Badr to the conquest of Sind. The sheer force of necessity was the sufficient factor to bring about certain fundamental changes. As early as 635 Arab commander, Khalid ibn al-Walid, when facing the Byzantines at Yarmuk had deemed it prudent to reorganize the battle formation of his troops along the tightly-knit lines used by the Byzantines themselves. As already pointed out the Arabs until this time had assembled by tribes and clans, forming long lines three ranks deep, composed respectively of lancers, archers and swordsmen. Khalid replaced this order with a series of homogeneous units, grouped according to their weapons and special fighting skills, and arranged so that a fixed number of soldiers per unit should be led by an experience and proven officer.³⁵

In the same year Saad ibn abi Waqqas, Arab commander facing the Persian forces at Qadasiya, appointed a deputy commander and commanders for the advanced and flank guards, as well as standard-bearers for the various tribal banners and section-commanders for every group of ten men. There is no specific mention of any appointments between formation and section-commanders unless the standard-

³⁵Jacques Boudet, The Ancient Art of Warfare (London: The Cresset Press, 1966), Vol. I, 177.

bearers were unit-commanders.³⁶ Quartermasters were later made responsible for provisioning the troops, and military judges dealt with breaches of discipline.³⁷

In all fairness to the Byzantines, it must be pointed out that although they were defeated in most of their major encounters with the Arabs, yet their military machine became the model for the latter. By the beginning of the eighth century A.D. the process of imitation was so complete that "in outfit and armour the Arab warrior was hard to distinguish from the Greek. The weapons were essentially the same. The cavalry used plain and rounded saddles, not unlike those of the Byzantines."³⁸ Byzantine siege artillery, such as the ballista, the mangonel and the battering ram added to the Arab knowledge of siege warfare, at one time so completely lacking. In this respect, the Arabs proved to be progressive and altogether open to learning from their enemies as well as their subjects.

Within less than a century following the death of the Prophet, the warriors of Islam had succeeded in combining the best of the Arab and Byzantine martial traditions. Byzantine armour, siege warfare and certain battle formations combined with Arab modility, esprit-de-corps and valor rendered the Muslim forces formidable

³⁶Glubb, op. cit., p. 192.

³⁷Boudet, op. cit., p. 177.

³⁸Hitti, op. cit., p. 226. Also see Ibn Qutaiba, Uyun al-Akhbar (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub, 1930), Vol. I, 128-32, for Arab weapons.

opponents.³⁹ Would the Indian military machine be able to successfully meet this challenge?

Indian Art of War

In their zest for organized society the ancient Indians incorporated warfare into their body politic and had elevated it to the position of fine art. According to the Arthasatra or Treatise on Polity, a work compiled by Chanakya, Prime Minister of the first Maurya emperor, Chandragupta (323-298 B.C.), all conquests fell into three categories: righteous conquest, conquest for greed and demoniac conquest.⁴⁰ The first is the conquest in which the defeated king is forced to render homage and tribute, after which he is reinstated as a vassal. In the second type of conquest enormous booty is demanded and large portions of territory are annexed. The third involves the political annihilation of the conquered kingdom and its incorporation in that of the victor. Inasmuch as a great majority of Indian kingdoms were involved in interstate warfare, any one of the above mentioned three categories of conquest could be applied. However, the states occupying the northwestern section of the subcontinent had to deal constantly with various non-Indian

³⁹The basic difference between the Byzantines and the Arab tactics still continued to be the main reliance of the former on heavy infantry and of the latter on light cavalry.

⁴⁰Ramachandra Dikshitar, War in Ancient India (Madras: Macmillan Company, 1948), pp. 58-75.

hordes referred to by the contemporary Indian sources as mlecchas, tajikas or yavanas which meant simply "the barbarians."⁴¹ Hence the Persians, the Greeks, the Kushans, the Huns, the Arabs and the Turks were all barbarians, according to Indian thinking. No ground was to be given in dealing with these groups and the most severe treatment was to be meted out to them.⁴² The concept of the demoniac conquest was, therefore, most commonly applicable. The meanest category was thus elevated to a position at once noble and heroic when confronting the barbarians.

The Arthasastra says nothing about fairplay in battle, but for later sources such as the Manava-ahamasasra, or the code of Manu, a legal treatise compiled during the Gupta period (third and fourth centuries A.D.), a battle was ideally a gigantic tournament with many rules: a warrior in a chariot might not strike one on foot; and enemy in flight, wounded or asking quarter might not be slain; the lives of enemy soldiers who had lost their weapons were to be respected; poisoned weapons were not to be used.⁴³ Later texts introduced the concept of military honour, not found in the realistic Arthasastra. Flight from an encounter is the deepest of shame. The

⁴¹Gustav Oppert, On the Weapons, Army Organization and Political Maxims of the Ancient Hindus (London: Trubner and Company, 1880), p. 33.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Dikshitar, op. cit., pp. 67-72; A. L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), pp. 126-27.

The soldier slain while in flight incurs the wrath of his lord and suffers proportionately in after-life, but the warrior who gives his life fighting to the last minute passes straight to heaven. "Such ideals culminated in the 'jauhar,' the final holocaust in which many a Rajput king fought to the last on the battlements while Bajput families burned themselves to death in the inner chambers."⁴⁴ The spirit of the Arthasastra was, however, not wholly forgotten, and many a medieval king and chief of India, including some from Sind, refused to pay the supreme sacrifice when defeat was certain and instead accepted the suzerainty of the hated "mleccha."

Ancient and early medieval Indian armies were composed of mainly six categories of soldiers: hereditary troops forming the backbone of the army; mercenaries; troops provided by the corporations; troops supplied by allies; deserters from the enemy; and wild tribesmen used for guerrilla warfare.⁴⁵ The third category perhaps refers to private armies maintained by merchant guilds for the protection of their caravans and trading posts. It is highly probable that in the case of Sind all but the fifth category--deserters from the enemy--formed the main army.

Major Indian states maintained standing armies whose numbers were simply staggering. Classical accounts assert that the forces of the last Nandu king who was overthrown by Chandra Gupta, the founder of the Maurya dynasty, immediately following the invasion by

⁴⁴Basham, op. cit., p. 126.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 128.

Alexander the Great in 322 B.C. consisted of 20,000 cavalry, 2,000 chariots, 200,000 footmen and as many as 6,000 elephants.⁴⁶ Chandra Gupta himself is said to have overrun India with 600,000 men.⁴⁷ The Chinese pilgrim, Hsuan Tsiang, records that emperor Harrsha had 60,000 elephants and 100,000 cavalry at the height of his power.⁴⁸ The ninth century Arab traveller, Al-Masudi, says that the Pratihara king of western and central India had four armies of 800,000 men each.⁴⁹ While these figures are probably exaggerated, they are nevertheless given by such varied sources as the Greeks, the Arabs and the Chinese and reveal the practice of maintaining standing armies of truly phenomenal proportions. The financing of such vast standing armies put a severe drain on the royal treasury. In fact it was not uncommon for a monarch to allot one-half of total income for defense.⁵⁰

The traditional divisions of the Indian army were five, consisting of elephants, cavalry, chariots and infantry and were

⁴⁶A. L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India, pp. 131-32.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 132.

⁴⁸Si-Yu-Ki: Buddhist Records of Western World, Translated from the Chinese of Hieun Tsiang by Charles Beal, Vol. II, 101.

⁴⁹Henry Elliot, The History of India as Told by its Own Historians, Vol. I, "The Arab Geographers," 29.

⁵⁰According to the Nitisastra or Treatise on Politics, a medieval Indian work, one-twelfth of the revenue was to be allotted for the king's personal use; one-twelfth for charity; one-twelfth for the payment of civil servants, and a similar portion for public works. The remaining half was to be spent on defense. See Basham, op. cit., pp. 111-12.

collectively known as the "Caturangabala."⁵¹ Three more categories were later added to the "Caturangabala," namely commissariat, "mantra" or advisory counsel and intelligence. Of the combatant ranks of the army, the Kshtriya caste provided the cavalry and warriors in chariots and on elephants.⁵² The lower castes, such as the Vaishas and Sudras made up the infantry. The use of chariots, which consisted of a driver and one or two warriors, gradually declined, and by the time of the Arab invasion had ceased altogether.⁵³

The smallest unit of the army was a "patti" consisting of one chariot, one elephant, three horses and five men. The "senamukha," "gulma," "gana," "vahini," "prtana," "camu" and "ankini" were respectively three times as large as the corps preceding them and the ninth formation, called "aksauhini," was ten times as numerous as the preceding "anikini" and was considered to represent a complete field army. An "aksanhini" thus included more than a hundred thousand infantry, sixty thousand cavalry, twenty-two thousand elephants and

⁵¹In Sanskrit "caturanga" means chess, a game which originated in ancient India. The organization, the composition and maneuvers of ancient and medieval Indian armies, and those of the game of chess were strikingly similar.

⁵²Sarva Daman Singh, Ancient Indian Warfare With Special Reference to the Vedic Period (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), p. 149.

⁵³Dikshitar, op. cit., p. 165.

a similar number of chariots.⁵⁴ All ranks of the standing army received regular monthly pay.⁵⁵

The lengthy list of ancient Indian arms as enumerated in various Hindu texts included no less than one hundred and thirty-seven items classified into three basic groups according to their use: those which were thrown, those which were not thrown and those which could be used by either of the above methods. The most important of these were the bow and arrow, sword, lance, javelin, disc, battle-axe, anvil, sickle, "astara" or a type of boomerang, tridents, artillery including ballistas and battering rams, incendiary missiles, fireballs and a host of other minor items.⁵⁶ The Indian bow came in various sizes but the most powerful was some five to six feet long and was rested on the ground and steadied with one foot. According to the ancient Greek historian Arrian, "there is nothing which can resist an Indian archer's shot, neither shield or breast-plate nor any stronger defence if such there be."⁵⁷ Among its many varieties

⁵⁴Gustav Oppert, On the Weapons, Army Organization and Political Maxims of the Ancient Hindus, p. 5.

⁵⁵No doubt the pay scale varied considerably according to place and time. According to the aforementioned Arthashastra the commander-in-chief was to receive four thousand panas monthly while a common infantry soldier received only forty-one panas. According to 1948 calculations there were approximately twenty panas to one pound sterling. See Dikshitar, op. cit., p. 210.

⁵⁶Oppert, op. cit., pp. 1-35; Dikshitar, op. cit., pp. 93-152; Jogeshi C. Ray, "Fire-Arms in Ancient India," Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. VIII (1932), 266-71.

⁵⁷Quoted in Dikshitar, op. cit., p. 100.

the long two-handed slashing sword was the most dangerous. An especially long lance called the "tomora" was used in fighting from the backs of the elephants.

In spite of occasional references to metal armour in some ancient and early medieval Hindu works, it is evident from foreign accounts, sculpture, iconography and cave-paintings that very little protective armour, mostly made of animal skin, was utilized by the Indian forces.⁵⁸ Shields and breastplates were the most common type of protective armour, while helmets and turbans when used served as headgear. On the whole, however, the Indian warrior was not burdened by any cumbersome metallic paraphernalia.

In tactical matters the great reliance placed on elephants was from the practical point of view unfortunate. Once the war elephants were frightened and demoralized, especially by fire, they would stampede from the field of battle throwing their riders and trampling the near troops on their own side. In conventional battle formations, the elephants were placed in the front with infantry in the center. Lancers were stationed behind the elephants and in front of the archers. Cavalry units took up positions on the flanks. Elephant and cavalry units also carried bows and arrows, though lighter than those carried by the regular archers. As previously mentioned, heavy and steady infantry formations were the best defense against the Arab

⁵⁸Singh, op. cit., pp. 116-18; Basham, op. cit., p. 133; Dikshitar, op. cit., pp. 127-52. Animals whose hides were most commonly used for this purpose included rhinoceros, elephant and bison.

cavalry charges. The Franks at Tours and the Byzantines in their later battles had successfully stemmed the tide of Arab arms by their infantry columns. The Indian foot soldiers, however, were hampered by the presence of elephants and in case of panic were actually trampled by the massive beasts. The elephants, at the same time appreciably reduced the mobility of Indian armies. The Indian bow carried by the regular infantry was much larger than the one carried by the Arabs. Hence the archers would have relatively little difficulty in shooting the Arab horses from under their riders while at the same time could regroup to face fresh waves of Arab horsemen from various other directions. Heavy infantry armed with long lances and swords could then deal with the remaining Arab cavalry. As it was the Indian commanders displayed almost a pathetic faith in the elephants' ability to engage and destroy the enemy in the opening phases of the battle.⁵⁹ Once the beast was unnerved, however, the entire battle formation simply collapsed. Unlike the Arabs who were capable of covering enormous distances in a short time, the Indian armies were slow and ponderous. They dwelt in huge camps which were for all practical purposes mobile cities with royal quarters, shopping centers, officers' families and concubines, as well as prostitutes. Thus, fully mobilized and including auxiliaries and non-combatants,

⁵⁹In 326 B.C. at the battle of Hydaspes the Indian war elephants easily destroyed the celebrated Greek phalanx of Alexander the Great. The Greek cavalry, however, succeeded in frightening the beasts by using fire, with predictable results.

it is possible that the fighting force of a large kingdom numbered well over a million.⁶⁰

By far the greatest obstacle to the progress of Arab arms in Sind was the massive fortifications all along the lower Indus. The science of military architecture was familiar to the Indians even before the coming of the Aryans some two millenniums before Christ. Rigveda, recording the military exploits of the Aryāns, speaks of towns and forts built by the Dasas or pre-Aryan Dravidians. "Indra (major Aryan divinity) is Purandara, the fort destroyer. He rends forts as age consumes a garment."⁶¹ By the beginning of the seventh century A.D. the Indian subcontinent was studded with fortifications of various shapes and sizes. The most ingenious methods were devised by local rulers in constructing the types of defense systems most effective in holding the enemy armies at bay. Unfortunately over the past twelve centuries most of the fortifications have either fallen in complete decay or have been so modified by successive generations that very little information can be had about the Hindu military architecture on the eve of the Arab invasion of Sind.⁶² In a study of Indian fortifications, out of twenty-four sites selected, not a single one could be dated prior to the tenth century A.D., without extensive modifications.⁶³ Three of these sites, Daulatabad, Chitor

⁶⁰Basham, op. cit., p. 132.

⁶¹Quoted in J. N. Kamalapur, The Deccan Forts (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1961), p. 5.

⁶²Sidney Toy, The Strongholds of India (Melbourne: W. Heinemann, 1957), p. 10.

⁶³This particularly holds true in the case of pre-Arab Sind. The sites of all major strongholds there, with the exception of

and Gingee, however, have preserved to some degree the essential Hindu characteristics, and in the case of Daulatabad these date back to the ninth century or earlier. All three sites, though separated by hundreds of miles, display numerous identical features.⁶⁴ The fortress of Daulatabad is built on a conical rock 600 feet high.⁶⁵ A strong wall, about three miles in perimeter and defended by a moat and glacis, runs around the hill at the base. Between this outer wall and the citadel are three other encircling walls. Beyond the fourth wall rises the citadel, the sides of which have been scraped all around almost vertically for a height of 150 feet. From this point the only approach to the citadel is across another moat along a narrow and strongly defended gallery and up and through a narrow and steep tunnel. Emerging from the tunnel, one is still about 200 feet from the summit. Part of the defenses are actually cut into the rock, and otherwise huge granite boulders are used. The entrance to the city is through the outermost wall by way of a strong hornwork consisting of a succession of gateways and courts. The hornwork is very thick

Multan, cannot be identified with certainty. Multan itself has been rebuilt so often that the original fortifications can no longer be reconstructed.

⁶⁴Daulatabad is situated in the Deccan not far from the renowned Ellora Caves. Gingee is in South India, approximately 100 miles south of Madras, while Chitor is in Rajputana nearly 300 miles north of Daulatabad.

⁶⁵The description of this fortress is taken from five sources: Sidney Toy, The Strongholds of India, pp. 33-40; Sidney Toy, The Fortified Cities of India (London: W. Heinemann, 1965), pp. 98-104; J. N. Kamalapur, The Deccan Forts, pp. 106-10; Thomas Haig, Historical Landmarks of the Deccan (Allahabad: Pioneer Press, 1907), pp. 27-31; and Stuart Piggot, Some Ancient Cities of India (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 78-88.

and lofty walls convoluted on the outer faces and is defended by large bastions. The entrance from the wall enclosing the city to the second court is through a lofty vaulted passage with a two-leaved door at either end, a large recess for the guard on the right and a stairway to the parapet walk over the gate on the left. The doors, eleven feet wide, are formidable barriers, six inches thick strengthened behind by leavy batons spaced at short intervals and secured when closed by a timber bar about ten inches square. They are studded with eight inch long iron spikes against elephant attack. The second court is defended by a row of guardrooms on either side and from towers flanking the next gateway. This pattern continues until the fourth wall is reached. Immediately below this wall is another moat which had been excavated out of living rock. Beyond the moat rises the hill, scraped all around up to a height of 150 feet. The bridge from the fourth wall to the base of the citadel descends rapidly by a flight of steps and rises again to the level of the gallery on the other side. This arrangement was an alternative to a drawbridge since the height of water in the moat was under control and in time of danger water could be raised to such a level as to render the bridge impassable. The gallery passes round three sides of a tall bastion and assailants rushing through it would be under attack from the battlements of the bastion. From the end of the gallery a few steps lead down to a small open court on one side of which is the entrance to the tunnel. The long ascending tunnel rises rapidly by a flight of steep steps. Opening off it are chambers for guards commanding the approach. At the end of the tunnel is a trap-door, issuing from which

one arrives at the foot of a very wide and long series of steps ascending to a pavilion. From this level a further flight of a hundred steps leads up to the level summit of the citadel. The citadel has a plentiful supply of water from its own perennial springs.⁶⁶ The second court now has a mosque, no doubt constructed much later, but evidences of Hindu temples are not lacking.

The fortresses of Chitor and Gingee, though hundreds of miles removed from Daulatabad, display essentially the same features, i.e., moats, series of massive walls and doors, complicated and intricate defensive techniques such as tunnels, and ample supply of water. The building materials most commonly used include granite, basalt, hornblende, calerite and trap-stone.

In Sind most of the cultivated land lay along the Indus river. Consequently the entire line of defense ran parallel to this stream and from Daybul in the south to Multan in the north covered a distance of approximately five hundred miles. An enemy advancing along this line would encounter fortresses of various sizes, the capture of which must require a steadiness of purpose as well as siege equipment of an advanced type. In studying the Arabian and the Indian arts of war, we can conclude that in terms of numbers and quality of equipment the advantage clearly lay with the Indians. We may extend this advantage to include fortifications of an advance type. Mobility, however, so vital in Islamic conquests, favored the Arabs, who also out-generated their Indian rivals in tactical matters.

⁶⁶Water was obtained by digging wells outside the citadel as well as by constructing huge tanks or cisterns to hold water during the rainy season.

CHAPTER V

ARAB EXPEDITIONS AGAINST INDIA: 637 A.D.-715 A.D.


The earliest Arab naval and land expeditions against India actually precede the conquest of Sind by almost three-quarters of a century. Even before Persia had been completely subjugated the Arabs had already launched naval operations against Indian coastal cities.

Phase I: Naval Operations Against the Coastal Cities of India 637 A.D.-638 A.D.

In 637 A.D. Uthman ath-Thaqifi, the governor of al-Bahrain and Uman, sent naval units to attack the cities of Tana, Barwas and al-Daybul on the west coast of India.¹ The port of Tana was situated in the dominions of the Chaukalyas of Deccan; Barwas or Broach was a part of the territory ruled by the Gurjara-Prathiharas of Nandipuri, while al-Daybul near modern Karachi was the chief port of Sind. These operations originated from naval bases in Uman.² Uthman's brothers al-Hakim and al-Mughira were in charge of forces against al-Daybul

¹Al-Baladhuri, Kitab Futuh Al-Buldan, p. 209.

²These enterprises were apparently undertaken without the knowledge or approval of the central government at Madina. For when Caliph Umar I (634-644 A.D.) was informed of them he was quite indignant. "O brother of the Thakif," he wrote, "thou hast put a worm upon the wood. By Allah, I swear that if they had been smitten I would exact from thy tribe the equivalent." Quoted in Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 209.



Sind and Vicinity, 630-1020 A.D.

and Broach respectively. The outcome of these expeditions is not known with certainty. Al-Baladhuri, the most reliable and earliest of Arab historians and geographers concerned with the Indo-Arab relations, states that al-Mughira "met the enemy in battle and won a victory."³ The Chachnamah, however, informs us that al-Mughira lost his life outside the walls of Daybul.⁴ In studying this issue two factors should be considered. First that it is not possible to speak of an Arab "navy" in conventional terms at this stage.⁵ To be sure small fishing vessels or minor crafts roamed the coastal areas of the Persian Gulf but large troop carriers or fighting vessels were simply out of the question.⁶ It was only during the caliphate of Muawiya (661-681 A.D.) that the foundations for a powerful Muslim navy were laid.⁷ Second, that the cities of India were so massively fortified that even if some Arabs managed to reach them in their somewhat antiquated naval vessels they could not be captured without heavy siege artillery which the Arabs at that time wholly lacked. However, it is not inconceivable

³Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 209.

⁴The Chachnamah, p. 58.

⁵Umar seemed to have had a dread for the sea. In reply to Muawiya's request to construct a navy (Muawiya was appointed the governor of Syria by Umar in 639 A.D.), the Caliph was quite explicit, "Nay! By Him who sent Muhammad with the truth, I will never let any Muslim venture upon it....How can I permit my soldiers to sail upon this unfithful and cruel sea." Quoted in Ali Muhammad Fahmy, "The Muslim Navy During the Days of the Early Caliphate," The Islamic Review, Vol. 40 (1952), 24.

⁶George Hourani, Arab Seafaring In the Indian Ocean (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 77.

⁷Fahmy, op. cit., p. 25.

that the Arabs did cover hundreds of miles in their "ships," and actually reached their targets. The Indians in that case could have issued out of their strongholds, given battle to the enemy and returned within the safety of the walls. Realizing the hopelessness of the situation the Arabs then returned to their homes.⁸ In view of Caliph Umar's positively hostile attitude towards naval undertakings, further adventures against Indian coastal cities were suspended for the time being.

Phase II: Military Operations Against Sijistan, Zabulistan and Makran

By 650 A.D. major military operations against Persia were over and the Arabs were now in direct contact with the Hindu states of Zabulistan, Sijistan and Sind, and the Indo-Arab contest for the control of India's western border was underway.

In 651 or 652 A.D. Caliph Uthman instructed Abdallah ibn Amir ibn Kuraiz, the governor of Iraq to dispatch someone to the "frontier of al-Hind" to gather information about that land. The person chosen for this assignment was al-Hakim ibn Jaballah al-Abdi. Al-Hakim's report was most unfavorable. "The water supply is scanty; the dates

⁸The failure of other Arab naval operations at this time must be noticed. In 638 A.D. al-Ala ibn al-Hadrami, the governor of al-Bahrain and successor to Uthman, himself crossed the gulf and attacked the Persian coast. The operation was a complete failure. In 641 A.D. Alqama ibn Mujazziz led a naval force across the Red Sea to ward off attacks on the Muslims on the Abyssinian coast. It resulted in a disaster. See Fahmy, op. cit., p. 24. For a critical analysis of these naval undertakings see Baloch, N. B. Khan As-Sindi, "The Probable Date of the First Arab Expeditions to India," Islamic Culture, Vol. XX (1946), 250-66.

are inferior; and the robbers are bold! A small army would be lost there and a large army would starve."⁹ On the basis of this report any advance upon India via Makran was dropped for the time being.

In 652 A.D. the Arab general Abdallah ibn Amir set out to conquer Khurasan via Kirman. At a place called Shakk ash-Shirajan in western Kirman he dispatched his lieutenant, Ar-Rabi ibn Ziyad, against Sijistan which lay east of Kirman.¹⁰ Ar-Rabi proceeded eastward, crossing the Great Desert with little difficulty and appeared on the borders of Sijistan. He spent the next six months conducting military operations against western Sijistan which appeared to have been ruled by petty Persian chieftains.¹¹ Sijistan had many fortified strongholds and the Arabs lacked heavy siege artillery. Consequently the Arab commander deemed it prudent to conclude treaties with native rulers rather than gamble on unconditional surrenders. These treaties resulted in the establishment of loose Arab hegemony over the area, albeit a precarious one. The main body of Arab forces was stationed at Zarang, the chief city of western Sijistan.¹²

⁹Baladhuri, op. cit., pp. 209-10; M. Ishaq, "Hakim bin Jaballah al-Abdi--A Heroic Personality of Early Islam," Journal of Pakistan Historical Society, Vol. III (1955), 139-40; The Chachnamah, pp. 59-60.

¹⁰Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 141.

¹¹Baladhuri uses such terminology as the "dehqan" (gentry), "satrap" (governor) and proper names like "Abarwiz" which are clearly Persian.

¹²These treaties invariably imposed a heavy tribute but seems to have left the administration in local hands.

For the next two years general peace prevailed throughout the area. However, the replacement of Ar-Rabi by a less competent administrator resulted in an uprising of massive scale and the Arab garrisons were expelled from Sijistan.¹³ Undaunted, ibn Amir next appointed the redoubtable Arab general Abd-ar-Rahman ibn Samurah as the governor-designate of Sijistan.¹⁴ This governor advanced eastward until he reached Kishsh "of the land of al-Hind."¹⁵ The district of ad-Dawar or modern Zimindawar in southeast Afghanistan lay ahead. In this mountainous region a temple with a huge idol of gold with rubies for eyes was located. After brushing aside enemy resistance Abd-ar-Rahman entered the temple and cut off one hand of the idol and took out its eyes. He then said to the keeper, "Keep the gold and the gems. I only wanted to show that it had no power to harm or help."¹⁶ Under him the Arab armies also penetrated Zabulistan lying northeast of Sijistan.¹⁷ Treaties were negotiated with the native rulers and once again Arab hegemony was ascertained over the entire region. The peace was, however, short lived. Taking advantage of the disturbed

¹³Baladhuri, op. cit., pp. 142-43.

¹⁴The affairs of Sijistan were entrusted to the governor-general of Iraq who in turn appointed the governors over the area. In practice military commanders were "designated" governors of Sijistan and then were ordered to proceed there and wrest control of their would-be administrative areas from native rulers or, in some cases, from rival Arab factions.

¹⁵Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 143.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 144.

¹⁷"The highlands of the Kandahar country, along the upper waters of the Helmund were known as Zabulistan." Le-Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, p. 334.

conditions which prevailed in the Islamic empire following the assassination of Caliph Uthman in the Sijistanis once more drove the Arab garrisons out.

During the first Civil War in Islam which lasted until the death of Caliph Ali in 661 A.D., Sijistan became an arena for various contending Arab groups including the followers of Ali, Muawiya as well as some colorful independent personalities.¹⁸

After consolidating the internal affairs of the empire, Caliph Muawiya launched the Arabs on their second round of expansion.¹⁹ Abd-ar-Rahman ibn-Samurah was once again placed in charge of operations in Sijistan. Advancing from Khurasan, the Arab forces besieged Kabul which was heavily fortified. The siege lasted for several months. One night the defenders sallied forth and engaged the Arabs in battle. An elephant was wounded and fell at the gates, thus preventing the Indians from closing it. The Arabs forced their way into the city and the inhabitants surrendered. Within a short time the triumphant Arab armies overran Sijistan and Zabulistan as well.²⁰

In 670 A.D. Abd-ar-Rahman was replaced by ar-Rabi ibn Ziyad who apparently was unable to maintain order.²¹ Consequently "Kabul

¹⁸Baladhuri, op. cit., pp. 144-45.

¹⁹During Muawiya's rule North Africa west of Egypt was overrun, advances were made in Central Asia and byzantine naval supremacy was successfully challenged.

²⁰Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 146.

²¹Baladhuri does not mention the date of this replacement but merely states that Abd-ar-Arhman was relieved of his command when

Shah" drove the Arabs from Kabul while "Ratbil" did likewise in Sijistan.²² This is the first time that the rulers of these two places are mentioned by their titles. For the next two centuries we find the Kabul Shahs and Ratbils defending their lands against the Arabs and occasionally concluding treaties with them. Muawiya was able to re-establish Arab authority over the region but his son Yazid (681-683 A.D.) was less successful. An Arab army was almost annihilated and its commander abu-Ubaidah was captured. He was, however, set free on the payment of a ransom to the amount of half a million dirhams.²³ During the second Civil War in Islam which lasted more or less continuously from 683 to 700 A.D. Sijistan once again became the arena for rival Arab factions and "Ratbil aided and abetted them."²⁴

In 700 A.D. al-Hajjaj, the Viceroy of Iraq, decided to pacify Sijistan once and for all. For this purpose an army of Kufans and Basrans were assembled and was so well equipped that it was named the "army of peacocks." The command of this army was entrusted to Abd-ar-Rahman ibn Ash'ath a scion of the royal house

"Ziyad came to al-Basrah." The reference is to the appointment of Ziyad ibn abi as the governor-general of Iraq by Muawiya in 670 A.D. See Glubb, The Great Arab Conquests, p. 357.

²²Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 147. For further details concerning these rulers see Ahmad Ali Kohzad, "Les Ratbils Shah de Kaboul," Afghanistan, Vol. V, No. II (1950), 1-18.

²³Ibid., p. 147.

²⁴Ibid., p. 149. For an excellent account of the second civil war in Islam see Julius Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, pp. 113-200.

of Kinda in Central Arabia.²⁵ On reaching Sijistan Abd-ar-Rahman realized that his army was wholly unsuited for mountain warfare. Hajjaj was notified of the situation and permission was requested to delay operations until the soldiers had been adequately trained for this terrain. Hajjaj, however, accused Abd-ar-Rahman of cowardice, whereupon the latter hastily negotiated a peace treaty with Ratbil and marched against Hajjaj.²⁶ The Iraqis who were not kindly disposed toward the Umayyads in general and Hajjaj in particular joined the rebellion wholeheartedly. The resulting conflict almost cost the Umayyads their throne. In the end Abd-ar-Rahman was defeated and with a few followers reached Sijistan where he sought Ratbil's protection.²⁷ In 702 or 703 A.D. Hajjaj concluded a non-aggression treaty with Ratbil valid for nine years.²⁸ Before the terms of this treaty ran out the invasion of Sind was already underway.

²⁵Surprisingly Baladhuri does not provide any information about this expedition. See Wellhausen, op. cit., pp. 232-47.

²⁶For a very detailed account of this rebellion, see al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk, edited by De Goeje, Second Series (Lugd. Bat.: E. J. Brill, 1882), Vol. II, 1042-1132.

²⁷According to Baladhuri Abd-ar-Rahman committed suicide when he discovered that Ratbil had decided to betray him. See Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 151.

²⁸Baladhuri, op. cit., pp. 151-52; Wellhausen, op. cit., pp. 240-41. Sijistan was never completely subdued by the Arabs. It was permanently occupied by the Muslims in 870 A.D. under Yaqub ibn Laith al-Saffar, a Persian and the founder of the Saffarid dynasty of Iran. Kabul remained a part of the territories ruled by the Hindu Shahi dynasty till 968 A.D. when it was annexed by the Yamini rulers of Turkish origins to their vast territories governed from Ghazni in modern Afghanistan.

As was previously mentioned ar-Rabi had successfully overrun Kirman in 653 A.D. on his way to Sijistan. Directly east of Kirman lay Makran, the eastern part of which formed a part of the kingdom of Sind. Shortly after his appointment as the governor-general of Iraq in 670 A.D., Ziyad ibn Abi appointed Sinan ibn Salamah in command of operation on the Kirman frontier. "He proceeded to the frontier and conquered Makran by force."²⁹ From bases in Sijistan, Kabul and Makran, the Arabs occasionally made forays further east. The most consistent target of these Arab raids was the mountainous area of al-Kikan in present-day Pakistani Baluchistan which formed a part of the territories ruled by the Sindian monarchs.³⁰ As early as 660 A.D. an expedition was undertaken against this region by al-Harith ibn Murrah operating from Sijistan. He perished there with most of his followers three years later.³¹ In 664 A.D. al-Muhallab ibn Abi-Sufrah moved east from bases in the Kabul valley and penetrated deep into the present-day North Western Frontier Province of Pakistan. He reached "Bannah and al-Ahwaz, towns between al-Multan and Kabul."³² He is also said to have led excursions into al-Kikan which was at least four hundred miles southwest of Bannu.

²⁹Baladhuri, op. cit., pp. 211-12.

³⁰See Le-Strange, Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, p. 332.

³¹Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 210; The Chachnamah, p. 60.

³²"Bannah" has been identified as occupying the sites of the present-day city of Bannu, approximately three hundred miles southeast of Kabul. For a penetrating study of this expedition, see S. Q. Fatimi, "First Muslim Invasion of the North West Frontier of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent 44 A.H., 664-65 A.D.," Journal of Asiatic Society of Pakistan, Vol. VII, No. I (June 1963), 37-44.

Shortly before 667 A.D. Arab forces under Abdallah ibn-Sawwar al-Abdi again raided al-Kikan and presented Muawiya with fine horses from this area. Abdullah, however, lost his life against the Kikanis.³³ Western Makran was successfully annexed to the Caliphate about 670 A.D. From here Rashid Ibn Amir, the governor of Makran, conducted a raid against al-Kikan but lost his life during the campaign.³⁴ By this time Arab patience with Makran was running thin. Baladhuri quotes al-Asha, an Arab poet, as saying:

And thou art going to Makran--
 How far the destination from the starting place!
 I have no use for Makran,
 Either to fight there or to trade.
 I was told about it; I did not go there;
 And I always dislike to hear about it.
 Most people there are hungry,
 And the rest of them are depraved.³⁵

Arab attempts to occupy al-Kikan permanently, however, resulted in a fiasco.³⁶ In 712 A.D. when Arab forces under Muhammad

³³Arab forces on this occasion were accompanied by camp followers which included women. One night fire was spotted in the camp site and it was discovered that date-custard was being prepared for a woman in childbirth. Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 211.

³⁴Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 212.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Baladhuri provides the most systematic account of Arab attempts to permanently occupy Kabul, Sijistan and Makran. References to these places are also found in the accounts of other major Medieval Muslim writers but these seldom amount to more than a few lines. The Italian scholar, Leone Caetani, attempted to place in the Chronographia Islamica these references in a chronological order around the turn of the century. In 1966 these were translated and published in the Journal of Pakistan Historical Society, Vol. XIV, 104-25.

ibn al-Qasim were marching across Makran on their way to Sind al-Kikan was still unsubdued.³⁷

The Conquest of Sind 711-715 A.D.

The immediate causes of the outbreak of hostilities between the caliphate and Sind were the activities of some Indian pirates off the coast of that Indian state.³⁸ When Muhammad ibn Harun ibn-Dhira an-Namari was the governor of Makran,³⁹ the pirates off the coast of Daybul attacked some vessels on their way to the Persian

³⁷ Leone Caetani mentions no less than eleven Arab expeditions against al-Kikan between 660 and 675 A.D. See Journal of Pakistan Historical Society, Vol. XIV, 106-112.

³⁸ Piratical activities had infested the northwesterly portions of the Indian Ocean from time immemorial. The Arab tribes of Bad-al-Qais, particularly the Lukaiz inhabiting the coasts of the Persian Gulf and Uman had had frequent clashes with Indian pirates long before the conquest of Sind. See N. B. Baloch, "The Most Probable Site of Debal," Islamic Culture, Vol. XXVI, No. II (April 1952), 96. Also see George Hourani, Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean, p. 70; V. Minorsky, "Mand," Encyclopedia of Islam, Edited by M. Houtsma, A. J. Wensinck and others (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1936), Vol. III, 235-36; Henry Elliot, The History of India as Told by its Own Historians, Vol. V. 122-35.

³⁹ The time of ibn Harun's appointment to the governorship of Makran is a matter of dispute. The Chachnamah, p. 69, gives the date as 86 A.H. or 705 A.D. and further states that he was governor for five years. Arab historian Khalifa ibn Khayyat al-Usfuri (died 900 A.D.) gives it as 80 A.H. or 699 A.D. See Tarikh Khalifa ibn-Khayyat (Negav, Iraq: Imprimerie al-Adabe, 1967), Vol. I, 299; Leone Caetani, on the strength of the Arab historian al-Dhahabi gives it as 79 A.H. or 698 A.D., Journal of Pakistan Historical Society, Vol. XIV, 117; Elliot, op. cit., Vol. V, 25, believes that it was shortly before the accession of Caliph al-Walid in 86 A.H. Mujumdar, "The Arab Invasion" footnote 2 on page 32, concludes it to be around 91 A.H. or 709 A.D. The Chachnamah, the oldest of these sources is perhaps most reliable in this case.

Gulf from Ceylon.⁴⁰ It is not known whether the ships were Arab, Ceylonese or Indian. What is known with certainty is the fact that among the passengers aboard were some Arab women and children. According to Baladhuri, "the King of the island of Rubies sent to al-Hajjaj some women who were born in his country as Moslems, their fathers who had been merchants, having died. He wanted to court favor with al-Hajjaj by sending them back."⁴¹ Apparently the fathers of the said women were Moslem Arab settlers in Ceylon. Baladhuri and the Chachnamah both relate that one of the captive women cried out, "O Hajjaj," When Hajjaj heard of this, he said, "Here I am."⁴²

Accordingly messengers were dispatched to the court of Dahir, the Sindian monarch, "asking him to set the women free."⁴³ Inasmuch

⁴⁰The third and the successful expedition against Sind was dispatched in late 711 A.D. Two previous attempts to capture Daybul had failed. Provided that as little as one year had elapsed between the first and the third attempts, and that another six months or so were required in corresponding with the Sindian ruler and persuading the Caliph to grant permission and provisions against Sind, the attack on the ships could have occurred as late as the middle of 710 A.D. or as early as 708 A.D., the date of Harun's appointment as the governor of Makran.

⁴¹Baladhuri, op. cit., pp. 215-16. The Chachnamah states that the Moslem women were going to the Kaaba and to Damascus and carried presents from the Ceylonese ruler for the Caliph as well as for Hajjaj. See p. 69.

⁴²Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 216; The Chachnamah, p. 69. Majumdar apparently misread the line in Baladhuri, since he says, "Both Baladhuri and The Chachnamah refer to the miraculous legend that the captive women cried out 'O Hajjaj,' and Hajjaj replied, 'Here I am,' p. 32, footnote 4. The fact is that Baladhuri clearly states, 'Al-Hajjaj heard of this.' Apparently then someone aboard the ship escaped the pirates and reported the incident to Hajjaj as related in The Chachnamah."

⁴³Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 216.

as piracy was widespread in the area, it must be admitted that the demand was an unreasonable one, and doubly so since it insinuated that Dahir himself was somehow involved in the whole affair. Dahir's answer, however, pointed out the realities of the situation, "Pirates over whom I have no control captured them."⁴⁴ Negotiations were then suspended by Hajjaj and mobilization begun.

Al-Walid, the Caliph, however, was adamant and would not hear of dispatching troops to Sind. Sind was simply too far, he said, and military operations there would be too costly. Hajjaj, however, was bent on invading Sind and pressed the matter in the name of religion and revenue, pointing out that Islam would gain a foothold in India and promising to deposit in the central treasury, twice the amount required to add Sind to the expanding territories of the caliphate.⁴⁵ Permission was now granted.

Accordingly Arab forces under Ubaidallah ibn-Nabhan arrived at Daybul. Outside the walls of the city the Arab commander was killed and his forces routed.⁴⁶ Arab historians are curiously silent about this incident and Baladhuri who does mention it does so only in one line. Two aspects of this fiasco must be considered. First it is specifically mentioned that Daybul and not Sind that was the real target. Second, no mention is made of crossing eastern Makran or of

⁴⁴Ibid. According to The Chachnamah, p. 17, "That is the work of a band of robbers than whom (sic) none is more powerful. They do not even care for us."

⁴⁵The Chachnamah, pp. 71, 74; Tuhfat al-Kiram, pp. 13-14.

⁴⁶Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 216.

reinforcements being provided by the Arab governor of western Makran-- factors explicitly cited in connection with the later two attempts. Since Daybul was accessible by sea, it appears that this abortive attempt upon the city was not made by land. The episode is reminiscent of the two attempts upon Daybul by sea almost sixty years earlier and already alluded to. Al-Hajjaj who doubtlessly must have known about these previous attacks on Daybul, apparently had failed to appreciate the massive defensive system of the city.

Undeterred, Hajjaj plunged into the task of organizing another expedition against Daybul. Budail ibn-Tahfah who was in Uman was to sail to Daybul. Governor Harun of Makran was to march overland and join Budail at or near Daybul. Additional troops and weapons were dispatched from Uman by sea under Abdallah bin Kahtam Aslami. The plan went well and the Arabs besieged Daybul. Dahir, the Sindian monarch, sent his son Jaisimaha to Daybul to participate in conducting the defense operation. A pitched battle took place outside the walls of the city. The appearance of war elephants frightened the horses. The Arab ranks were broken, Budail was slain and his forces routed.⁴⁷ By now it was obvious to Hajjaj that the Sind campaign would require a major military feat, the success of whose operations must ultimately depend upon the Arab ability to break through the defensive framework

⁴⁷Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 216; The Chachnamah, p. 72. "It is said that when the news of Bazil's martyrdom reached Hajjaj, he became very sad and said, 'O crier of the mosque at every time of prayer, when you call the people remind me of Bazil's name, that I may pray for him to avenge him.'"

which surrounded the cities of Sind. No efforts were spared in mobilizing Arab forces. The core of the army consisted of 6,000 picked Syrian cavalry.⁴⁸ To this were added 6,000 camel-riders and 3,000 baggage camels.⁴⁹ Governor Harun was ordered to join the main army at Makran with extra contingents. Heavy siege equipment was shipped by sea. The command of this élite force was entrusted to Muhammad ibn al-Qasim al-Thaqafi, a seventeen-year old youth who was a close relative of al-Hajjaj.⁵⁰ Muhammad was in southern Persia conducting campaigns against some rebellious tribes. At Shiraz final preparations were made for the departure. Hajjaj was not taking any chances. His instructions were explicit:

When you arrive in the country of the enemy, encamp in plains and open fields that your movements may be free and extensive. At the time of battle, divide yourselves into detached columns, and then rush in from different directions, as you shall have to fight with veteran heroes. And when they make an assault, you make a firm stand and

⁴⁸The strength of the Umayyad rule was essentially based upon the loyalty and training of Syrian tribes who had been extensively employed by Iraqi tribes--inveterate enemies of the ruling house. That Hajjaj should dispatch part of the empire's best troops to far-off Sind argues well for a relative stability of the regime on the one hand and a distinct mistrust in the loyalty of the Iraqi Arabs on the other.

⁴⁹The Chachnamah, p. 74; Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 74.

⁵⁰Muhammad was the son of al-Qasim who was the first cousin of al-Hajjaj, both being the grandsons of al-Hakim who in turn was the great-grandson of Thaqaf, the founder of the clan. The Thaqafis, as well as the Quraishites belonged to the prestigious Adani stock. For a detailed analysis of Muhammad's background, see Baloch, "Muhammad ibn al-Qasim. A Study of His Family Background and Personality," Islamic Culture, Vol. XXVII (1953).

shower arrows on them. You must make such coats of mail for horses as to give them the appearance of wild beasts, like lions and the elephants.⁵¹

Accordingly, "he ordered tailors and armourers to prepare several coats of mail in the shape of lions and elephants, and he forwarded them."⁵²

More than a thousand miles separated Shiraz from Daybul. Approximately three-fourths of this distance actually lay within the Islamic territory. All precise information about the departure date is lacking, but 711 A.D. is generally accepted by most historians and is reasonably correct.⁵³

No apparent difficulties having been encountered, the Arab forces safely reached Makran. After a few days rest the march was resumed with governor Harun accompanying Muhammad. Harun, however, was not destined to reach Sind, and died on the way of an "attack of illness."⁵⁴ Soon the army crossed over the frontier into Sind. Before reaching Daybul two Sindian outposts, Armail and Fannazbur,

⁵¹The Chachnamah, p. 76.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 76-77. According to Baladhuri Hajjaj supplied Muhammad with everything "even to thread and needles." He also prepared "clean cotton and soaked it in vinegar made of sour wine and then hung it up in the shade to dry. He said, 'When ye get to as-Sind, vinegar is scarce there, so put this cotton in water; then heat it up, and season with it.'" Op. cit., pp. 216-17.

⁵³Caliph Walid died in February 715 A.D. and his successor, Sulaiman, immediately had Muhammad imprisoned. Over three years were actually required to overrun Sind. So 711 A.D. is probably correct.

⁵⁴The Chachnamah, p. 77.

were overrun,⁵⁵ while further instructions were received from ever-anxious Hajjaj:

When you come in the vicinity of Debal, make a ditch, twelve cubit wide and six cubit deep. When you face the enemy, be silent and (even) if the enemy shout at you and use obscene language and assault you, do not engage in (a pitched) battle till I send orders to that effect. You will be constantly hearing from me...⁵⁶

We know the day Daybul was reached, Friday, the tenth of Muharram, the year although not given was probably 711 A.D.⁵⁷ The arrival was duly celebrated. "The troops unfurled their banners and sounded their kettle-drums, and their several divisions encamped at the places appointed for them."⁵⁸ As a coincidence the ships bearing heavy siege artillery also arrived on the same day. One piece called "arus" or bride belonged to the Caliph and was so huge that it required 500 men to operate it.⁵⁹ A ditch was accordingly dug around the camp and further orders from Hajjaj were awaited. The Indians sallied forth from the city every day but were unable to cross the ditch. On the seventh day, orders having been received from Hajjaj, the Arabs

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 79; Al-Yaqubi, Tarikh al-Yaqubi (Bairut: Dar Sadr, 1960), Vol. II, 288; Ibn Khayyat, op. cit., Vol. I, 299.

⁵⁶The Chachnamah, p. 79.

⁵⁷Ibid. Baladhuri merely states that it was Friday.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 81; Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 217, "Lances were set up along the trenches, with flags flying from them. The troops camped according to their flags."

⁵⁹The Chachnamah, p. 81; Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 217; Ibn al-Athir, Al Kamil Fi al-Tarikh (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1867), Vol. IV, 425.

engaged the enemy and drove them within the walls of Daybul. Nothing more could be done. The city walls were too formidable and Arab artillery was ineffective. The situation was utterly hopeless and confused. Additional Indian troops could arrive any minute from the north. The stage was now set for a third Arab disaster. The sudden appearance of a Brahmin from within the city, however, radically altered the situation. "We have learnt from our science of the stars," said he, "that the country of Sind will be conquered by the army of Islam." This was hardly calculated to encourage the besiegers. What he had to say next was what they needed to know. In the heart of Daybul was a magnificent temple of huge proportions. A massive green silken flag bearing some religious insignia constantly flew over that temple.⁶⁰ That flag, according to the Brahmin, was the clue to Daybul's defense even more so than its walls. "As long as that standard of the temple stands in its place it is impossible for the fort to be taken by you."⁶¹ Hajjaj was informed of the situation. His answer sealed the fate of Daybul. "If any of the people of Sind ask for mercy and protection, do give it to him, but not to the residents of Debal, whom you must not spare on any account."⁶² Jaubat Salmi, chief artillery engineer was ordered by Muhammad to knock down the flag. The feat was accomplished by a single shot of "arus." The

⁶⁰The Chachnamah, p. 81; Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 217; Yaqubi, Tarikh al-Yaqubi, Vol. II, 288; Athir, op. cit., Vol. IV, 426.

⁶¹The Chachnamah, p. 81.

⁶²Ibid., p. 82.

Arabs scaled the walls with their ladders and were successful in forcing their way to the gates through the ranks of the demoralized defenders.⁶³ In accordance with Hajjaj's wishes, three days of indiscriminate slaughter were kept up.⁶⁴ Of the enormous booty obtained, one-fifth was sent to the central treasury, the remainder being divided up among the warriors. Four thousand soldiers were stationed in a separate section of the city, complete with a mosque.⁶⁵ A governor, Hamid ibn Daraa Jandi, was appointed city governor and the main army proceeded north toward Nirun, heavy equipment being re-embarked upon the boats and taken upstream the river. Dahir's son, Jaisiah, commanding the garrison at Nirun, was ordered by his father to leave the city, cross the Indus and to retire on Brahminabad. The move might have been a tactical one, but it was clearly destructive to the morale of the people within.⁶⁶ The Buddhist governor sought added reinforcement from Dahir and was actually in consultation with the latter when the Arabs arrived outside the gates of the

⁶³According to The Chachnamah the appearance of the Brahmin took place seven days after Muhammad's arrival at Daybul. Hajjaj was notified of the situation. On the ninth day of the siege, however, the city was taken. This provides only two days for the messenger to make the return trip from Daybul to Kufa, an impossible feat by medieval transport standards. The Chachnamah is clearly wrong.

⁶⁴The Chachnamah, p. 83; Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 218.

⁶⁵Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 218. Only The Chachnamah, p. 85, provides the name of the governor.

⁶⁶The Chachnamah, p. 89; Tuhfat al-Kiram, p. 15.

city.⁶⁷ Lack of adequate provisions caused some apprehension among the besieging forces but the situation was soon remedied when the governor returned and, realizing the hopelessness of the situation, decided to negotiate. The resulting settlement prevented a Daybul-type massacre, but otherwise Arab control over the area was recognized as absolute. After attending to certain administrative details, the main army marched north to Siwistan, a fortified city with a citadel on a hill.⁶⁸ Dahir's cousin, Bachehra, was in command of the city's defense. The predominantly Buddhist population was in favor of negotiation, a proposal utterly treasonous to Bachehra who rightly calculated enemy weakness in siege warfare. The assault on Siwistan was futile. Alternative methods were now devised. Spies were sent within the city who entered into negotiations with the Buddhist leaders.⁶⁹ The siege operations were kept up night and day for a week while within the city itself the Indian commander found himself entirely deserted by the population at large. Consequently "when the world was hid behind the pitch-dark curtain of night, he issued from

⁶⁷A curious incident is related by Baladhuri, p. 219 and The Chachnamah, p. 91, in connection with the occupation of Nirun. Following the defeat of Arab forces under Budail at Daybul, the people of Nirun, eighty miles to the north had concluded a treaty with Hajjaj which in effect placed the city under the latter's protection. Two factors, however, invalidate this incident. First the act itself would be clearly treasonable and subject to retaliatory measures by the central government. Second, it is hardly conceivable that such a treaty would be negotiated or indeed a need for such an act arisen, in view of the utter defeat of Arab forces at Daybul.

⁶⁸The Chachnamah, p. 93; Baladhuri, p. 219 calls it Sahban; Tuhfat al-Kiram, p. 10.

⁶⁹The Chachnamah, pp. 94-95.

the northern gate and, crossing the river, fled away."⁷⁰ The gates were now opened and the Arabs poured into the town. Muhammad "collected silver and gold wherever he could find them, and also secured ornaments and cash from the people, excepting those of the Samani (Buddhist) party with whom he had made a solemn compact."⁷¹

While Muhammad was busy pacifying the neighborhood of Siwistan,⁷² further instructions were received from Hajjaj, "Now give up other towns, and come back to Nirun and arrange to cross the Mehran (Indus) and march against Dahar."⁷³ At Nirun final preparations were made to cross the Indus. Any move on the part of the Indians while the river-crossing was being effected would result in an Arab debacle of the first magnitude. Hajjaj's next instructions were calculated to overcome this danger.

Spend as much money as you can. Give them (Indians) large rewards and presents. Do not disappoint those who want estates and lands, but comply with their requests. Encourage them by giving them written promises of protection and safety.⁷⁴

The mistake made by the Arab commander at the Battle of the Bridge against the Persians was not to be repeated. "Do not allow (the enemy) to cross the Mehran at their will. Tell them that if they

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 94.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 95.

⁷²For geographical details concerning Siwistan and locality see H. T. Lambrick, Sind: A General Introduction, Chapter 9, "Sind in 7th and 8th Centuries," pp. 156-58.

⁷³The Chachnamah, p. 98.

⁷⁴Ibid.

would come over to your side of the river they would not be checked.... Whenever you meet the enemy in order to give them battle, let the battle field be an open plain."⁷⁵ If Dahir refused to cross the river, the Arabs could then take the drastic step first, but only after a solemn promise from the enemy that the crossing be effected without hindrance.

Dahir was now informed that he had the first choice in crossing the Indus. Indian military advisors were in favor of letting the Arabs do the crossing, "When once the waters of the Mehran are behind their backs, no one can come at their call to assist them. They will be helpless like prisoners in your hands."⁷⁶ Some renegade Arabs⁷⁷ at the court of Dahir were against such a move:

We must not in any way consider their coming over to this side of the river as a good thing. You should order the boatmen on the river and the jats and other country tribes on the plains to watch them, and to stop the roads by which they get supplies of provisions for the army, like grass and grain and firewood; and to seize these articles wherever they find them, and to molest the stragglers of their army who may separate themselves from the main body. In this way their ranks will be thinned. Some of them will die of hunger, and some of want of clothes and other necessities of life.⁷⁸

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 102.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 109-10.

⁷⁷On becoming the viceroy of Iraq, Hajjaj had appointed Said ibn-Aslam governor of Makran. A local rebellion led by the Arab Clan of Ilafi cost Said his life. Fearing terrible retribution from Hajjaj, the clan fled to Sind and entered the services of Dahir.

⁷⁸The Chachnamah, pp. 110-11.

The Indian military view prevailed. One cannot but wonder what might have been the fate of Sind had Dahir accepted the alternative view point. Hajjaj, notified of Dahir's decision, wasted no time in replying, "...When you wish to cross the river first examine carefully the crossing-places on the banks. Secure such places on other streams and lakes (also). Let those of the natives of the place who live in boats be won over by solemn promises, and recognize their services in a deserving manner."⁷⁹

Negotiations and alliances were now hurriedly concluded with the neighboring chiefs, among them being Mokah, son of Basayeh, who threw over his allegiance, went over to Muhammad and provided him with boats to cross the Indus. In return the entire district of Bet was granted him in perpetuity.⁸⁰ Dahir who was constantly informed of Arab troop movements now advanced to the eastern bank of the river and successfully frustrated every Arab effort to cross the stream. The situation was rendered dangerous with the news that a certain element in Siwistan under the leadership of Chandram Halah, one-time governor of the area, had succeeded in expelling the Arab garrison from the city.⁸¹ In case of a simultaneous attack by Dahir and Chandram Halah, a disaster would surely follow. One thousand horsemen were dispatched post haste to Siwistan under Ma'asab ibn Abd-ar-Rahman. A large portion of Siwistan's population was favorably inclined toward

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 113.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 124.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 116.

the Arabs. Issuing forth from the city, Chandram engaged the Arab cavalry whose lightning charges, however, forced the former to retreat toward the city gates. The Buddhist population at this crucial point, slammed the gates in the face of Chandram who fell before the Arabs with most of his followers. Four thousand war-like Jat tribesmen from the neighborhood of Siwistan now threw in their lots with the Arabs, no doubt motivated by the promise of loot and plunder.⁸²

However, all efforts by the Arabs to effect a crossing were in vain, the Indian army rendering every move by the enemy ineffective. After nearly two months the Arabs were in acute physical difficulties for "grain and grass had begun to fail, the supply of provisions for men had been nearly consumed, and the army had become perplexed and anxious. Disease broke out among the horses on account of their using different kinds of fodder, and every horse that was attacked by an illness was killed and eaten."⁸³ In desperation urgent appeals were made to Hajjaj to send two thousand horses as well as a goodly supply of vinegar as "my men badly require it, because owing to their eating disagreeable kinds of food out of season the humours of their bodies are disturbed and they get unwell."⁸⁴ The supplies

⁸¹Ibid., p. 116.

⁸²Ibid., pp. 116-17. Baladhuri, p. 219 refers to the second conquest of Siwistan as that of Sadusan.

⁸³The Chachnamah, p. 120.

⁸⁴Ibid.

were soon received with a note from Hajjaj who was not entirely satisfied with the general scheme of things. "It is strange," wrote the over-anxious viceroy, "that after gaining an upper hand and subduing the enemy, you have so long remained inactive....I cannot but feel surprise at the weakness and indiscreetness of your policy...."⁸⁵

Muhammad was now ordered to cross the Indus without delay. It was decided to take advantage of the island of Bet to cross by a bridge of boats where they would have two narrow streams instead of a single wide one. The boats were now lashed together along the side of the bank of the river equal to the width of the stream, the lower end now being secured, the upper end was let go and allowed to swing around till it came in contact with the opposite bank where it was fastened. The mobile bridge carried a number of archers who kept a small detachment of Indian soldiers from interfering with the landing operations.⁸⁶ Dahir, surprisingly, stayed at his camp-site with the main army. On hearing of Arab troop movements on the east bank, he sent his son, Jaisiah, against the enemy. In the ensuing battle Jaisiah's forces were routed and he barely escaped with his life.

The state was now set for the main battle of the entire campaign. The two opposing forces assembled near the town of Jitor situated by a lake. The Sind forces consisted of five thousand

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 120-21. According to Yaqubi the opposing armies were drawn up against each other for several months. Op. cit., Vol. II, 289.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 125. Crossing of the river is also mentioned in Baladhuri, p. 220; Athir, op. cit., Vol. IV, 426; Yaqubi, op. cit., Vol. II, 289.

cavalry, twenty thousand infantry and sixty war elephants. Arab combat forces had consisted of six thousand cavalry at the time of departure from Shiraz. These were reinforced at Makran. Two thousand horses were sent by Hajjaj on the eve of the battle against Dahir, but these were no doubt replacements for the horses eaten up by the army. The Chachnamah twice refers to Arab numerical strength before the fateful battle. In neither case does the number exceed five thousand. There were, however, Indian allies, some of them cavalry units, who must have raised the Arab strength appreciably. We have the names of five Arab tribes contributing contingents for the Sind campaign:

It was the hour of morning prayer when the five lines stood arrayed with their colours flying. One line was formed by the men of the family of Aliyah; another by the children of Tamim; a third by Bikr Rail and his men; a fourth by Abdul Kais with his tribesmen; and a fifth by the people of the Azdi tribe. All these five lines turned their faces to Muhammad Kasim in order to hear his orders.⁸⁷

In actual battle formation, the Arab ranks were divided into three sections--center, right wing and left wing. "All the horsemen were so covered with coats of mail that they appeared to be as it were, drowned in iron."⁸⁸ Each section was also assigned three hundred naphtha-shooting archers. The main Indian cavalry was posted in the center around Dahir who was mounted on a huge white elephant and carried "a circular disc in the form of a mirror with

⁸⁷The Chachnamah, p. 138.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 126.

sharp knives. He threw it as men throw a noose at everyone whether a horse, man, or a foot-soldier who approached and severed his head from his body."⁸⁹ The horsemen were encased in iron, and some of them whose hair hung loose held drawn swords while others whose hair was tied in knots bore swords and shields. Infantry units, including archers, preceded the center. Some elephant corps were attached to infantry units while others stayed around Dahir. A few cavalry units were dispatched ahead of the main army to engage the enemy.

For four days indecisive sundry battles and skirmishes took place, the main battle being joined on the fifth. After a brief encounter with the enemy, an Arab cavalry unit swung around the Indian rear and succeeded in creating momentary panic. A vigorous Indian counter-attack on Arab center supported by war elephants rendered the Arab maneuver ineffective.⁹⁰ On the following day the Sind forces outflanked the enemy left and right wings and moved in for the kill:

Thus the infidels made a rush on the Arabs from all sides and fought so steadily and bravely that the army of Islam became irresolute, and their lines were broken up in great confusion. It was generally believed that the Arabs were defeated and put to flight and men were struck dumb and overawed Muhammad Kasim was then so much perplexed that he called out to his boy water-bearer "Give me a little water to drink." He drank water and then returned and loudly shouted, "Here am I your commander. Muhammad Kasim. Whither are you running away...."⁹¹

⁸⁹Ibid., pp. 137 and 141.

⁹⁰Ibid., pp. 140-41.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 142.

The situation seemed so utterly hopeless that even the personal bodyguards of Muhammad abandoned him. One of the Indian contingents under their chief Mokah Basayeh, an Arab ally, now rushed to Muhammad's side to protect him. The Arabs then regrouped, but were not able to take the initiative all day.

By now it was becoming apparent to Muhammad that this type of war of attrition could be disastrous to the Arab arms. With the fall of Daybul still fresh in his mind, he now searched for a symbol, the destruction of which might simultaneously result in the defeat of the enemy forces. The symbol, of course, was the huge white elephant visible from any point of the battle field on which rode the Sindian monarch. On the following day as Dahir plunged his elephant into the Arab ranks Muhammad ordered his archers to shoot naphtha arrows at the beast. The litter on the elephant, supporting Dahir and entourage, caught fire and the panicky animal rushed toward the lake, throwing its royal rider in the water. Arab horsemen immediately surrounded Dahir and pierced his heart with an arrow. The absence of their leader had a demoralizing effect on the Indians who were now defeated with a frightful slaughter.⁹² Jaisiha, Dahir's son, retreated to the city of Brahminabad approximately eighty miles north of the

⁹²Ibid., p. 143. According to Baladhuri, p. 220, "A fierce battle ensued the like of which had not been heard of. Dahir was forced to dismount. He kept fighting, but was killed near evening." Al-Tabari, discussing the events of the year 90 A.H., dismisses the entire Sind episode in a brief sentence:

battle field. Muhammad ordered all captive prisoners to be put to death and their families sold into slavery. Dahir's queen, Bai, shut herself up in the fort of Raor and put up a brave resistance. When it was apparent that the end was near she burned herself with other ladies to death saying, "It is certain that we cannot escape the clutches of these 'chandals' and cow eaters."⁹³ The fort was taken and six thousand war prisoners were slaughtered in cold blood. The army now spent nearly five months investing minor strongholds on the way to Brahminabad.⁹⁴ Before reaching this stronghold a proclamation was issued inviting the population at large to accept Islam and be treated accordingly. Dahir's prime minister Siyakar accepted this invitation and was appointed one of the chief counsellors of the state. His knowledge of matters military and civilian was beneficial to the Arab cause.⁹⁵ At Brahminabad the garrison numbering forty thousand had been left by Jaisiah to defend the site. Jaisiah himself was roaming the country at large harassing the enemy whenever possible and periodically cutting their supply lines. The city was besieged for six months but the siege was wholly ineffective--Arab siege equipment making no impression on its defense complex. Within the city, however, all was not well. Whereas the garrison was confident that it could hold the Arabs at bay indefinitely, the great mercantile houses had begun to entertain other thoughts; according to

⁹³"Chandal" denotes a person of very low caste--a Sudra.

⁹⁴For probable location of Brahminabad, see H. T. Lambrick, Sind: A General Introduction, pp. 159-61.

⁹⁵The Chachnamah, pp. 157-58.

their calculations the city's economy could not withstand the siege much longer. A negotiated settlement with the enemy was now discussed. The Arabs would exterminate the garrison once the city surrendered, no agreement could change that fact. Accordingly secret envoys were dispatched to the Arab camp and a satisfactory arrangement was worked out. The merchants would facilitate Arab entry into Brahminabad. In return all non-combatants would be guaranteed their lives, liberties and properties. The following day part of the garrison issued out of the city walls to engage the enemy. As the Arabs slowly drove the Indians back through the gate some soldiers who were fellow conspirators of the merchants, deliberately left the gate open and the Arabs marched in. The city was invested; six thousand combatants were put to death and their families enslaved.⁹⁶ At Brahminabad the city's administration in particular and that of the country in general became the deepest preoccupation of the victors and will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

For the first time there is a clear mention of fresh troops arriving in India. Writing to Muhammad after the fall of Brahminabad Hajjaj advises him to move on Alor and Multan, "Those two cities are the capitals of kings and in them lie the external and internal treasures of kings....I have appointed Amir Katabiah (sic) son of Muslim Kuraishi, and I am sending him to you with fresh recruits.

⁹⁶The Chachnamah, pp. 158-64, provides the most detailed account of the fall of Brahminabad. See also Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 221; Athir, op. cit., Vol. IV, 426.

Hand over all your hostages to his charge."⁹⁷ Alor, the capital of Sind and roughly one hundred and fifty miles north of Brahminabad, was besieged for a month but the garrison commanded by Dahir's son, Fofi, held out believing that Dahir was still alive and would eventually come to their rescue. Having been convinced by the Arabs that Dahir was indeed slain, the leading citizens were inclined for a negotiated settlement. The garrison, fully aware of its fate in case of surrender, escaped at night and negotiations were commenced. The Arabs entered the gates now thrown open to them and took possession of the city.⁹⁸

The twin-city of Sekkah-Multan, the last stronghold of the Sindian kingdom and actually lying two hundred and fifty miles north of Alor in present-day southern Punjab was the next target for victorious Arab armies.⁹⁹ After reducing minor forts on the way, Muhammad besieged Sikkah for three weeks. Every day when the Arab army approached the fort, the garrison came out and fought with them.¹⁰⁰ Two hundred and thirty-five Arab warriors fell before the city's wall, twenty of

⁹⁷The Chachnamah, p. 171.

⁹⁸Ibid., pp. 175-80; Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 221, "He besieged its inhabitants some months, but finally reduced the city by capitulation, the terms being that he should not put anyone to death, nor interfere with their temples"; Athir, op. cit., Vol. IV, 426; Yaqubi, op. cit., Vol. II, 289; Khayyat, op. cit., Vol. I, 300.

⁹⁹Sikkah was situated on one side of the river Ravi and Multan on the other. For a discussion of Multan's location, see Lambrick, op. cit., pp. 163-64.

¹⁰⁰The Chachnamah, p. 188.

them being "noteworthy companions of Muhammad Kasim."¹⁰¹ In anger and sorrow the Arab commander vowed to raze the town to the ground after its capture. Soon the garrison commander abandoned the fort, crossed the river and went to Multan, whereupon the city surrendered.

The siege of Multan lasted for two months, the Arab artillery as usual making no impression on the city walls. Eventually a traitor "pointed out a spot on the northern side of the fort, bordering on the bank of the river. From that spot the soldiers burrowed onwards, and made a breach."¹⁰² The city was taken, six thousand military men were slaughtered and a huge ransom collected from the citizens at large. The renowned temple was entered and the huge gold idol was removed together with other valuables. Hajjaj apparently considered the capture of Multan as the final stage of the campaign, for he now estimated the overall cost of the conquest of Sind and was able to affirm that he had spent sixty million dirhams and made twice that amount in the process. "We have appeased our rage and obtained revenge," said the exuberant viceroy, "and have made a profit of 60,000,000 dirhams plus the head of Dahir."¹⁰³ In a letter to Muhammad, received at Multan these figures were revealed and the young commander commended for his courage and wisdom. This was Hajjaj's last letter

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 189.

¹⁰²Ibid. According to Baladhuri the traitor, "guided them to the place where the water of which the people drank entered. It was water flowing from the Basmad river, and was collected in reservoir like the Pool in al-Madinah. They call it al-Balah. He shut it off, and when they became thirsty they surrendered at discretion." Op. cit., p. 222.

¹⁰³Quoted in Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 223.

for he died in June 714 A.D., followed by Caliph al-Walid in February in 715 A.D. Muhammad's movements between these two dates are difficult to follow, uncertain as the identification of the localities mentioned.¹⁰⁴ That he was at Kiraj when the emissaries of the new Caliph Sulaiman caught up with him is attested by Baladhuri.¹⁰⁵ Sulaiman (715-717 A.D.), an inveterate enemy of the house of Hajjaj, imprisoned Muhammad at Wasit in Iraq and there had him tortured to death.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴The Chachnamah, pp. 192-93; Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 223.

¹⁰⁵Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 223.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., pp. 224-25. The Chachnamah relates somewhat different circumstances leading to the death of Muhammad. Two captured daughters of Dahir's were sent as gifts to the Caliph by Muhammad. The princesses managed to embitter Walid against the young hero, whereupon the Caliph had Muhammad sewn into the fresh hide of an ass and then had the hide and its contents sent to him, pp. 193-96. The story, no doubt a product of the fanciful imagination of the author of The Chachnamah or its translator has been discredited by all major historians. For a discussion on the point, see Baloch, "Muhamad ibn al-Qasim," Islamic Culture, Vol. XXVII (1953).

CHAPTER VI

ARAB ADMINISTRATION IN SIND

Arab administrative policies in Sind as they gradually evolved between 712 and 715 A.D. were brought about by two realizations--an unshakable Arab faith in their own religious mission and the force of necessity which exerted a moderating influence in supplanting Islamic institutions in Sind. For whatever reasons Sind might have been added to the caliphate, once the Arabs were there, the effective government of that remote area became their paramount consideration. What were the Islamic institutions which had been developing over the past century and which the Arabs had now brought with them, and what factors in Sind, a land dominated by Hindu-Buddhist culture, would influence the new rulers in their administrative capacity?

Islamic Institutions

After the rise of Islam it is no longer possible to speak separately of Arabic and Islamic institutions, for Islam is at once a religion and a whole way of life. It proclaimed the absolute unity of God and the brotherhood of all believers. The "Umma" or God's community on earth was to be governed according to the precepts as

¹For pre-Islamic Arab Society see De Lacy O'Leary, Arabia Before Muhammad.

revealed to the Prophet Muhammad and set forth in the Qur'ān. The secular and the divine, therefore, became one and the same. Unlike the communities of India and China, membership in whose ranks could only be gained by birth, a prospective member of the Muslim community had merely to proclaim the unity of God and the divine mission of His Prophet to be admitted as a member of the "Umma" on par with the others. The mission of the Prophet was to be proclaimed to all, Arabs and non-Arabs alike and became a potent factor in Islamic expansion. The egalitarian teachings of Islam immediately plunged it into a struggle with the Meccan aristocracy whose social order the former threatened to wipe out.² The sword of Islam was now drawn in defense of the "Umma" and the concept of "Jihad" or the Holy War was thus born. No one can deny that the teachings of Islam fired within its adherents a spirit so dynamic that it enabled the simple desert dwellers to overthrow the mighty empires of the Persians and the Byzantines. It must be admitted, at the same time, that economic causes of expansion were not altogether lacking. The rich lands lying north of Arabia were a perpetual temptation to a people constantly struggling for their survival against an inhospitable and cruel terrain.

As the process of empire building gained momentum, institutional developments were forced to keep up with it. At the head of the community stood the Caliph or successor to the Prophet Muhammad

²For the Islamic-Meccan conflict, see Montgomery Wall, Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953).

as the divinely ordained ruler of the "Umma." He was selected by all believers to enforce the Holy Law but not to fine it himself.³ Failure to perform his duties could result in his deposition by the electorate at large.⁴ The Umayyads (661-750 A.D.) to be sure, utilized religious sanctions to obtain political ends for the aggrandizement of the office of the Caliph so that "The Caliphate thus recognized was a despotism which placed unrestrictive power in the hands of the ruler and demanded unhesitating obedience from his subjects."⁵

The few guidelines provided in the Qur'ān were wholly inadequate to govern conquered territories of vast size and substantial populations. The burden of administration, therefore, fell on Caliph Umar I (634-644 A.D.) under whose rule the first phase of Islamic expansion was actually effected. The resultant "Constitution of Umar," promulgated between 635 and 644 A.D., envisioned an Arabia purged of all non-Islamic elements and an empire dominated by the Arab martial classes. Consequently by 636 A.D., Jews and Christians of the Arabian peninsula were either expelled or exterminated.⁶ The Arabs were now

³Thomas Arnold, The Caliphate, chapter ii, "Origins," pp. 19-41. There were two other titles used by the Caliph, "Amir ul-Mu'minin" or commander of the faithful, and "Imam" meaning leader of the faithful in prayer.

⁴E. I. T. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline (Cambridge: University Press, 1958), pp. 121-126.

⁵Arnold, The Caliphate, pp. 47-48.

⁶Phillip Hitti, A History of the Arabs, p. 169; Sir William Muir, Annals of the Early Caliphate, pp. 215-20.

organized "into a complete religio-military commonwealth with its members keeping themselves pure and unmixed--a sort of martial aristocracy--and denying the privilege of citizenship to all non-Arabians."⁷ Accordingly, all Muslim Arabs were organized into a regular militia. To facilitate this enormous task a general census was taken and all men of military age were entered on army rolls by tribe and by clan. Each tribal contingent fought under its own banner and its own chief.⁸ Great military centers or "amsārs" were established throughout the occupied territories, reminiscent of the British cantonments in India. From these centers subject races were kept under surveillance.⁹ The commanders of the garrisons were at the same time not only the Caliph's first governors, "but also since the army and the religious community were co-extensive, the prayer leaders and the Friday preachers."¹⁰ In short it was a complete martial as well as religious law at one and the same time.

The Byzantine and Persian administrative machineries with their staffs were retained intact--the Arabs having neither experience nor sufficient manpower to replace them.¹¹ Formal imperial currencies

⁷Hitti, op. cit., p. 169.

⁸Carl Brockelmann, A History of the Islamic People, p. 61; Julius Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 25. The office of the "Diwan" or treasury was created to handle army payroll.

⁹Wellhausen, op. cit., p. 25; Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History, p. 74; Brockelmann, op. cit., p. 61. Some of these "amsars" included Fustat in Egypt, Qairowan in North Africa and especially Basra and Kufa in Iraq.

¹⁰Brockelmann, op. cit., p. 61.

¹¹Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History, pp. 57-58.

were kept in circulation and no attempt was made to supplant Arabic as the official language for some time yet to come.

The Arab land settlement was geared to assure the state of a continuous flow of revenue from occupied territories. Byzantine and Persian crown lands were taken over by the state and so were the estates vacated by their owners fleeing before the advancing Arab forces.¹² The rest of the property fell in two categories and was treated accordingly. The term "dār al-Sulh" applied to those areas where capitulated without offering resistance. In such areas the inhabitants retained life and property, but paid tribute, the terms of which were agreed upon at the time of surrender. A land tax or "kharāj" was levied upon all such estates.¹³ If the territory was captured by force ('unwatan) then it came under the law of the war, that is, its inhabitants forfeited every right. A fifth of the movable property or "ghanīmah" was reserved for the state, the rest divided up among the warriors.¹⁴ Land was considered as "fa'y" or usable property. Theoretically it was also to be divided up. In practice, however, land was considered solid capital and was administered by the state. Since Caliph Umar had forbidden the Arabs to buy or to settle on land outside Arabia, it was handed back to its former owner as fief and rent was duly collected, part of which was then paid as pension to the

¹²Brockelmann, op. cit., p. 62; Lewis, op. cit., p. 57.

¹³Wellhausen, op. cit., pp. 30-32; Hitti, op. cit., pp. 170-72; Brockelmann, op. cit., pp. 62-63; Lewis, op. cit., p. 57.

¹⁴Wellhausen, op. cit., p. 31; Shareef al-Majāhid, "Muslim Finance," Islamic Culture, Vol. 40 (1952).

Arab warriors and their heirs.¹⁵ On conversion to Islam landowners of "dār-al-Sulh" were exempt from "kharāj." The same, however, did not apply to the cultivators of "fayy" estates who continued to pay this tax. All Muslim landowners paid poor tax or "zakāt" (tithing).¹⁶

The very nature of Islamic political thought barred the non-Muslims from entering into the ranks of the "Umma."¹⁷ Christians, Jews and the Sabians (interpreted to include the Zoroastrians) were considered as "Ahl al-Dhimmah" or the people of the covenant and were allowed to retain their lives and property.¹⁸ This protection was gained at a price in the form of poll tax or "jiziah" and this varied according to one's station in life.

The Islamic judicial system under the Umayyads was still passing through elementary phases of its development.¹⁹ Army commanders were invariably leaders in prayers as well as judges or "qādis." During the later period of the Umayyads "the first judicial officials

¹⁵Ibid., p. 30; Hitti, op. cit., p. 171; Lewis, op. cit., p. 57; Shareef al-Mujāhid, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

¹⁶Shareef al-Mujāhid, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

¹⁷For detailed discussions of "Umma" see Maurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Muslim Institutions, Translated from French by John MacGregor (London: Allen and Unwin, 1950), chapter ii, "The Muslim Community;" Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guillaume (editors), The Legacy of Islam, pp. 284-310; David S. Margoliouth, The Early Development of Muhammadanism (London: Williams & Norgate, 1914), pp. 5-30.

¹⁸David S. Margoliouth, The Early Development of Muhammedanism (London: Williams and Norgate, 1914), chapter iv, "The Status of the Tolerated Cults."

¹⁹The great era of Islamic jurisprudence was yet to come. Under the Abbasids four main schools were developed. These were the

in the provinces received their appointments from the governors.²⁰ Non-Muslims were allowed the jurisdiction of their own canon laws. Fully realizing that the Islamic concepts of brotherhood and equality ran contrary to their interests the Arab ruling classes proceeded to treat the non-Arab Muslims or the "Mawālī" as second-class citizens. The "Mawālī" pay scale in the army was appreciably lower than that of the Arabs. Such soldiers fought only in infantry ranks--cavalry being exclusively reserved for the master race.²¹ Only the Arabs received pensions for life. Even after their conversion to Islam the Mawālī cultivators of "fayy" estates were required to pay rent to the state. In theory, the Mawālī landlords in non-fayy areas were exempt from the "kharāj." In reality, however, this privilege was rarely granted.²² High bureaucratic ranks of civil service and the judiciary were mostly an Arab monopoly.

Hanafite founded by Abu Hanifa (d. 767 A.D.), the Malikite founded by Malik ibn Anas (715-795 A.D.), the Shafiite founded by Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafii (767-820 A.D.) and the Hanbalite founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855 A.D.). For an excellent account of Muslim jurisprudence see Noel J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: University Press, 1964). According to Coulson a major reason behind "the diversity in Umayyad legal practices was the simple fact that the power of the individual judge to decide according to his own personal opinion (ra'y) was to all intents and purposes unrestricted. No real unifying influence was exerted by the central government and there was no hierarchy of superior courts whose binding precedents might have established the uniformity of a case law system. Nor can it be said that the qur¹anic laws provided a strong unifying element." Ibid., p. 30.

²⁰Hitti, op. cit., p. 228.

²¹Lewis, op. cit., p. 70.

²²Ibid.

The rapidly swelling ranks of the Mawālī resulted in a proportional increase of their grievances. Following the death of Caliph Umar in 644 A.D. the injunction barring Arabs from holding land outside Arabia was relaxed.²³ A land-grab movement was now underway which threatened the empire's financial structure since Arab landholders paid no "kharāj." In desperation al-Hajjaj, viceroy of Iraq from 697-715 A.D., attempted to drive the "Mawālī" out of towns and back to their lands while demanding "jiziah" from them, arguing that this measure was a poll tax payable by all subject people and not only by the non-Muslims.²⁴ Conversion was now actually discouraged.

The "Mawālī" reaction to this new tendency was not slow to come. The eastern parts of the empire rose in rebellion, in 700 A.D., throwing their support behind 'Abd-ar-Rahman ibn al-Ash'ath, one-time Arab commander in Sijistan. The rebellion was mercilessly crushed, though not without considerably difficulty and alarm.²⁵

It was only after the occupation of Sind that the attempt was made to alleviate some "Mawālī" grievances. By a decree of the year 719 A.D. Muslim landowners were exempted from paying the "kharāj." On the other hand, it was forbidden to transfer tribute-paying lands to the Muslims in an effort to protect the state revenue from deple-

²³Hitti, op. cit., p. 173.

²⁴Lewis, op. cit., p. 55; Wellhausen, op. cit., pp. 243-44.

²⁵For a detailed account of this rebellion see Wellhausen, op. cit., pp. 232-47 and Al-Tabari, Tarikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk, Edited by De Goeje, Second Series, Vol. II, 1042-1132.

tion. The hated "jizyah" was now payable only by non-Muslims. The "Mawālī" warriors were placed on the same pay scale as the Arabs but only in Khurasan.²⁶ The reforms were nevertheless late in coming and the "Mawālī" discontent became a potent factor in the overthrow of the Umayyads in 750 A.D.

Umar's rudimentary administrative machinery was gradually improved upon by his successors. Caliph Muawiya (661-681 A.D.) divided the empire into five provinces with a viceroy at the head of each province.²⁷ The province of Iraq with headquarters at al-Kūfa included all the parts of the caliphate lying east of the Euphrates River. Central Asia and Sind were placed under its jurisdiction. An imperial chancery was created to handle official correspondence, while the office of the financial controller of the state became the most important position next to the supreme command of the army.²⁸ Foundations were also laid for a postal service which later developed into a well-organized system under Caliph 'Abd-al-Malik (685-705 A.D.). By 705 A.D. Arabic began to replace Greek and Persian as the official language of administration and accountancy. Arabic coinage were minted from 696 A.D. onward.²⁹

²⁶Wellhausen, op. cit., chapter v, "Umar II and the Mawali," pp. 266-311.

²⁷Hitti, op. cit., p. 195.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Arab historians call this change "organization and adjustment." See Lewis, op. cit., p. 75; Amir Ali, A History of the Saracens, pp. 101-12; Wellhausen, op. cit., pp. 217-21. The Arabs were procuring the gold dinars from the Byzantines who threatened to write an inscription on them offensive to the Prophet. Thereupon 'Abd al-Malik decided to have his own coins minted at Damascus. See Brockelmann, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

Islam, a struggling embryo in Arabia at the beginning of the seventh century could, by the end of the same century, look with pride on its achievements. It had overpowered the Persian empire altogether and rolled back the frontiers of the Byzantine empire to the very gates of Constantinople. The opening years of the next century witnessed the Islamic arms cross over into Europe on the one hand where the fate of Christian Europe hung in the balance at Tours (732 A.D.), and on the other wrest the control of Central Asia from the Turks and the Chinese. Sind was also annexed to the caliphate. Territorial and institutional achievements proceeded side by side, lending support to each other. Main concepts of religious, social, political and economic structures were drawn up, flexible in design and tolerant in spirit. To be sure the task of whipping the infinite varieties of regional and local manifestations into the "miracle of the Arab mind" was left to the Abbassids (750 - 1258 A.D.). Yet the Umayyads, great empire builders and administrators in their own right, had left behind them a legacy the greatness of which has so shamefully been minimized by those writers labouring under the hostile influence of their Abbassid successors.

Hindu Institutions

For almost two thousand years prior to the Arab invasion, Sind had formed a part of the Indian cultural tradition. This tradition has never been dependent on political unification of the sub-continent

or the geographical limitations thereof. Yet through all the ethnic, linguistic, geographical and political diversity, there runs an underlying unity. "The conception of a national religion, it has been said, is the only germ to be found in ancient times of the idea of Indian nationality....The fundamental principles of the Hindu religion hold their immemorial sway over the vast majority of the population. These may be summed up as the almost universal belief in the authority of the Vedas and the sacredness of the cow, the worship of the great gods Siva and Vishnu in their innumerable aspects, and the institution of caste. Caste, perhaps, more than any other feature, distinguishes India from the rest of the world."³⁰

One of the functions of religion was to pave the way for a well-organized society which in turn would assure the pre-eminence of the religious élite--the Brahmins. Elaborate religious sanctions were sought and occasionally invented for functions political, social and economic in nature and scope. An enormous body of literature was produced, almost entirely by the Brahmins to maintain and indeed to petrify the status quo of the various elements of the community. Though the Indians never created a truly national state, and though they quarrelled and fought with one another, they felt strongly that they were all Hindus, men who worshipped the same gods and obeyed the same religious and social customs--and in all these respects

³⁰H. G. Rawlinson, India: A Short Cultural History (New York: Frederick Preager, 1952), p. 4.

they saw themselves as vastly superior to other races and nations whom they contemptuously called "barbarians."³¹

The celebrated casts system provides a remarkable illustration of the degree of regimentation to which the Indian society was subjected for the sake of "perfect harmony." The four main castes, in descending order, were the Brahmins or priests, the Kshatriyas or nobles, the Vaishyas or the bourgeoisie, and the Sudras or serfs. Below these yet economically tied to them were a number of "excluded" or "untouchable" castes whose members performed impure duties such as scavenging and disposing of the dead. As early as the fifth century B.C. the caste system had become so petrified and consequently the Indian society so static that movements from within such as Buddhism rebelled against its growing formalism. So entrenched was the caste system in India, however, that the major contributions of the "rebellion" were forced into artistic, literary and missionary channels.³² Though some of India's greatest monarchs gave Buddhism imperial patronage,³³ by the end of the third century A.D. Buddhism

³¹The actual terms used to denote non-Indians and hence barbarians were the yavanas, the tajikas and the mlechas. The term yavana originally applied exclusively to the Greeks, but later on came to denote all foreigners.

³²De la Vallee Poussin, "Some Remarks on the Disappearance of Indian Buddhism," in Traditional India, Edited by O. L. Chavarria-Aguilar (Englewood, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964). Rawlinson, op. cit., Chapter VI, "The Second Contact with the West: The Rise of Mahayana Buddhism," pp. 89-105.

³³The Mauryan emperors of the third and second centuries B.C. and the Kushan monarchs of the second and third centuries A.D. professed Buddhism as their personal religion. North Indian emperor Harsha Vardhana (died 640 A.D.) was also converted to Buddhism, though this religion had long since been in decline.

was definitely in decline and a reaction against it was forthcoming in the form of imperial policies of the Guptas (320-480 A.D.).³⁴ Sind, however, together with other portions of the Northwest including Kashmir, Punjab and the Hindukush country was not subject to Gupta political hegemony and a Buddhist dynasty continued to rule the area as late as 622 A.D. when it was replaced by the Brahmin dynasty.³⁵ That substantial portions of Sindian population were Buddhist on the eve of the Arab invasion is attested by various sections of the Indian Chachnamah and the Arabic 'Futuh ul-Buldan by Baladhuri.

The highest administrative authority was vested in the person of the king who was invariably a member of the Kshatriya caste, though Sind in this case was an exception to the rule. "Although the early rulers were elected, kingship in the course of time became hereditary,"³⁶ the crown descending from the father to the oldest son. Where the regulation and prosperity of an ordered society was considered to be the prime function of the monarch, the right to oust an unrighteous king was emphasized, though seldom exercised in practice.³⁷

³⁴The Gupta duration was known as the Golden Age of Hinduism. Popular Hinduism as it is known today is the product of this period.

³⁵Kashmir, Punjab, Kabul and Sijistan, however, had their Hindu dynasties.

³⁶S. K. De, U. N. Ghoshal and others (ed.), The Cultural Heritage of India (Bombay: Hind Kitab, 1954), Vol. II, 499-500. Also see U. N. Ghoshal, A History of Hindu Political Theories (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), Chapter iii, Appendix D, "On Kautilya's Theories of Kingship" and Chapter IV, Appendix F, "On the Hindu Theories of Kings Divinity."

³⁷The king who failed to carry out his duties "should be killed by his subjects in a body like a rabid dog." From the great Indian epic, Mahabharata. Quoted in The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. II, 501.

The central bureaucracy was headed by ten "ministers appointed by the ruler and directly responsible to him, roughly corresponding to our present cabinet system."³⁸ Provincial governors, frequent members of royal family, were held responsible for the area under their jurisdiction.³⁹ Among their varied duties, the collection of revenue was given the highest priority. Provinces were divided into districts, each headed by an official who combined judicial and administrative functions and was usually appointed by the provincial governor. He was generally assisted by a council, purely advisory in nature and composed of leading residents of the area including the chief banker, the chief craftsman and the chief scribe.⁴⁰ The most important element in the city administration was the nagarak or the governor who was also assisted by a council. His chief responsibilities were revenue collection and the preservation of law and order, often by repressive police methods.⁴¹ Troops were always stationed in chief towns under a captain who could be the governor himself. The village headman, usually the wealthiest peasant, was looked on as the king's representative. He was responsible for the defense of the village,

³⁸These included the chaplain, always a Brahmin; the deputy; the premier, the commandant; the judge; the scholar; the economic advisor; the minister; and the ambassador. Theodore de Bary (ed.), The Sources of Indian Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 254-57.

³⁹See A. S. Altekar, State and Government in Ancient India From Earliest Times to c. 1200 A.D. (Banaras: Motilal Banarsidass, 1949), chapter x, "Provincial, Divisional, District and Town Administrations," pp. 156-70.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 102-64.

⁴¹Basham, op. cit., p. 103.

mostly against bands of roving bandits and wild tribesmen of hill and hungle. Together with the village council, he represented the last link in the chain of government control. The council, composed of five or six property holders, was not subject to royal control and often negotiated assessment of land with royal representatives only. It also arbitrated disputes, collected taxes and undertook various public works.⁴²

All Indian lawgivers stress the importance of a full treasury for successful government, and India had evolved a regular system of taxation even before the Greek invasion of 330 B.C. The basic tax at all times was the tax on land and was generally one sixth of the crop, although in time of crisis the figure could be raised to one fourth.⁴³ Land newly brought under the plough was not taxed for five years and in time of bad harvest the tax might be wholly or partially omitted. Numerous grants of tax-free land were made to Brahmins and temples, and in Sind prominent Buddhist ecclesiastical leaders had virtually become powerful feudal lords on the strength of successive tax-free land grants.⁴⁴ In addition to the basic land tax, several other taxes fell upon the cultivator, including fixed

⁴²For village administration see Altekar, op. cit., chapter xi, "Village Administration," pp. 171-88.

⁴³Govinda L. Adhya, Early Indian Economics (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966), p. 32.

⁴⁴Ram S. Sharma, Light on Early Indian Society and Economy (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1966), pp. 109-15; U. N. Ghoshal, Contributions to the History of the Hindu Revenue System (Calcutta: The University Press, 1929), Chapter vii, "Classes Exempted From Taxation-Untaxable Property," pp. 136-41.

annual cash payments, dues for the use of water from a canal or tank owned by the king and taxes on livestock and dairy products.⁴⁵ Mines and forests were directly under the state control.⁴⁶

All craftsmen were expected to devote one or two days' work per month to the king but this tax was often commuted to a tax on average daily earnings.⁴⁷ Tolls were levied on incoming merchandise at the city gates. Merchants had to pay five percent or more on profit and not on capital outlay.⁴⁸ The masses were under liability to periodical forced labor. As a rule women, children, students, learned Brahmins and ascetics were exempt from any form of taxation.⁴⁹ So comprehensive a system of taxation was a constant demand on the people's purse and consequently assured a full treasury. Much of the state income was stored and enormous wealth of even small kingdoms was attested by foreign travellers and by the booty obtained by Muslim invaders.

An enormous body of legal literature had grown up in India providing the jurists with substantial material in the dispensation

⁴⁵Ghoshal, Contributions to the History of the Hindu Revenue System, pp. 59-63.

⁴⁶Ibid., Chapter v, "The Sources of Revenue (concluded): Income from Mines, Gardens, Forests and Herds--Miscellaneous Receipts of the King."

⁴⁷Basham, op. cit., p. 105.

⁴⁸Adhya, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

⁴⁹Ghosal, Hindu Revenue System, pp. 139-41.

of justice.⁵⁰ In effect it strengthened the caste barriers while discouraging any tendencies egalitarian in nature. The composition of the courts varied with time and place, but "ancient India displayed a distinct preference for a bench of magistrates rather than for a single judge."⁵¹ The king's court was reserved for appeals and serious crimes against the state. Courts were set up for provinces, districts and groups of villages and were generally composed of four or five justices presided over by a chief judge who combined judicial and administrative functions.⁵² In the countryside the decisions of village councils bore the force of law, and the same was true of caste and guild councils.⁵³ In serious criminal cases evidence might be accepted from all sources; in civil law cases, however, only certain witnesses were qualified.⁵⁴ Generally women, learned Brahmins, government servants, minors, debtors, ex-criminals and persons with physical defects could not be called on to give evidence. The evidence of a low-caste person could not be valid against a person of higher caste. Brahmins, children and the aged were also exempt from torture to elicit confessions. The equality of all

⁵⁰Julius Jolly, Hindu Law and Custom, Translated from German by Batakrishna Ghosh (Calcutta: Greater India Society, 1928), Chapter i, "The Sources," pp. 1-101.

⁵¹Basham, op. cit., p. 110.

⁵²Jolly, op. cit., Chapter v, "Judicial Procedure," pp. 286-319.

⁵³"The right of making law for their corporations and composing disputes had been given to farmers, craftsmen, cowherds, money-lenders, members of a sect, robbers, actors, artisans, etc." Jolly, op. cit., p. 293.

⁵⁴Jolly, op. cit., pp. 260-81.

before the law was never admitted in India. Thus a Brahmin slandering a Kshatriya was fined fifty panas while slandering a Vaisha or a Sudra the fines were only twenty-five and twelve panas respectively.⁵⁵

For centuries prior to the Arab invasion, India had exerted a peculiar enchantment over the imagination of men, drawing foreign merchants, scholars, religious pilgrims and invaders within its borders. The composite pattern of the Indian civilization, as it appeared at the beginning of the eighth century, had much to commend itself. It is to be regretfully noted, however, that cultural achievements of great magnitude were not matched by a proportional political unity which in effect exposed the Indian civilization to the mercy of outside forces, often destructive in nature.

Arab Administration

With the coming of the Arabs, Indian history took an entirely new direction. For though alien rule was a phenomena very familiar to the Indians, never was an attempt made by outsiders to create a military theocracy so unbending in its beliefs yet compromising in its policies. To the Arabs as to the Indians, the experience and the challenge was entirely new. Eventually a climate of opinion was created which was at least partially acceptable to both. Initial difficulties and reservations had to be overcome. To the Arabs the

⁵⁵Basham, op. cit., p. 111.

Indians were first and foremost infidels who did not even qualify as "The people of the Book"; to the Indians the Arabs were unclean barbarism unworthy of association, who had by brute force occupied part of their sacred land. Realities of the moment, however, were sufficiently strong to override pre-conceived prejudices and to prepare the way for a unique Indo-Arab culture.

The general direction which the Arab policies assumed in Sind was a product of the imagination of al-Hajjaj, and bear witness to his understanding and administrative genius. Where the distance was great, communications haphazard and the general mood of an alien population hostile, a note of caution was judicious. The great viceroy had recognized that while his warriors' lust for revenge and plunder was to be satisfied, the forces of destruction must be overcome and a workable plan evolved guaranteeing to some degree the security and well being of both the victors and the vanquished. As the Arabs proceeded north from Daybul, the outlines of this plan became more and more visible.

There is a striking similarity between the Arab administration in Sind and the British administration in India a thousand years later; they were both based upon the primacy of their respective military establishments, "amsārs" in the case of the former, and the cantonments in the case of the latter. Nor could it have been there any other way, popular consent in the form of Hindu religious sanctions being denied to both of them.

The Arab "amsar" for all practical purposes assumed a form of a state within a state:

From these points where they made their headquarters the Arabs kept the provinces in obedience.... The Emirs, under whose leadership a land was taken, were the first "stattholders" and their successors were first and foremost military commanders. But just as the army was at the same time the "Umma," the leader of the service in the mosque, especially on Friday, where he preached. He was "ala" lharb wal salat. Warfare and worship both came into his department. Along with this he possessed naturally the executive power and consequently also the judicial supremacy in which lies the power of commanding peace.⁵⁶

In the amsar "the Arabs were settled in quarters according to their tribes."⁵⁷ That the warriors were not accompanied by their families in the case of Sind can be deduced by three references in The Chachnamah. Only one baggage camel was allowed to every four men on the march from Shiraz and it argues for itself that no families could be accommodated on so limited a ration.⁵⁸ Before engaging the Indian army under Dahir, any Arab soldier was allowed to withdraw from the battle lines and depart for home, provided he had a compelling reason to do so. Of the three who stepped forward to claim their discharge, two pointed out that in case of their deaths no one would be left to provide for their families in Syria.⁵⁹ Commenting

⁵⁶Julius Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 26.

⁵⁷Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in Hisotry, p. 74.

⁵⁸The Chachnamah, p. 77. The British garrisons together with the administrative staff were stationed outside of major Indian cities. These military administrative areas eventually developed into substantial towns in their own rights and were known as "the contonements."

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 78.

on the settling of Kardail, a remote outpost in the neighborhood of Siwistan, The Chachnamah informs us that the "Arabs married and begat children and completely subjugated and tamed the Jats."⁶⁰ There was, however, no dearth of female companionship. Repeated references to large numbers of female captives reflect the newcomers' desires to intermarry freely and settle down in their newly acquired possessions so that there was "perhaps, among the descendants of the Sindian colonists, less infusion of the real blood of Arabs than in any other province subjected to their dominion."⁶¹

The amsārs with their mixed Arab-Sindian population were self-contained areas complete with barracks, government offices, hospitals, commissariates, courts of justice and shopping centers.⁶² They were usually carved out of captured strongholds, Daybul being a prime example of this type. The construction of new amsārs at strategic points is attested by such sites as Qairawan in Tunisia, Fustāt in Egypt, Basra in Iraq and Mansūrah in Sind. Actually by the end of the Umayyad rule the amsārs were already undergoing some substantial changes:

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 173. In this respect the Arab amsār dwellers differed radically from the British in India who steadfastly and often contemptuously maintained their aloofness from the ranks of the Indian society.

⁶¹Henry Elliot, The History of India As Told by Its Own Historians, Vol. V, 64.

⁶²Syed Hashimi, "The Arab Rule in Sind," Islamic Culture, Vol. I (1927), 199.

From this time on the Arab tribesmen began to abandon the Amsar, some reverting to the nomadism which they had never completely abandoned, others settling on land. The Islamic town changed in character from the garrison city of an occupying army in a conquered province to a market and exchange, where the merchants and artisans began to organize themselves in guilds for joint aid and defense.⁶³

In Sind the main amsars were located at Daybul, Nirun, Siwistan, Mansurah, Alor, Multan, Qasdar, Qandabel, Baizah, Mahfuzah and Jandour. The strength of the garrison no doubt varied with each misr. The stationing of four thousand troops at Daybul testifies to some degree the note of caution against a possible general uprising.⁶⁴ It is to be noted that such caution was not with certain justification; at Siwistan the Arab garrison was expelled while the main army was preparing to cross the Indus.⁶⁵ When the necessity of maintaining substantial troops in Sind was forced upon the Arabs, the recruitment of native auxiliaries increased correspondingly. At Multan we are told that no less than 50,000 cavalry was stationed.⁶⁶ The number might be an exaggeration, but even if one-fourth of it may be accepted at its face value, it still remains an impressive figure and we can preclude the possibility that all these horsemen came from the Arab ranks.

⁶³Lewis, op. cit., p. 92.

⁶⁴The Chachnamah, p. ; Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 218.

⁶⁵The Chachnamah, p.

⁶⁶Ibid. As pointed out previously, 4,000 Jats had been recruited following the second conquest of Siwistan.

The civil administration of the country, as it gradually evolved between 712 and 715 A.D., was largely dependent upon the on-the-spot realities. It was accompanied by numerous conciliatory gestures extended to facilitate the organization of government. The senseless massacre at Daybul, inspired by the collective forces of revenge, greed, religious fanaticism and lust, could lead to a hideous reaction by the Sindian population at large or could frighten them into unconditional submission. Except for Nirun, circumstances leading to whose surrender are unclear at best, nowhere do we find the latter phenomena taking place.⁶⁷ The Sind hinterland, moreover, was studded with strongly fortified cities⁶⁸ and the main Sindian army under Dahir was yet to be reckoned with. Arab lines of communication were to be safeguarded. The advance up the river could be vastly facilitated if the initial policy of ruthless massacres was replaced by one benevolent and conciliatory in design. The first steps in this direction were taken by al-Hajjaj, soon after the surrender of Daybul:

When you have conquered the country and strengthened the forts, endeavour to console the subjects and to soothe the residents so that the agricultural classes and artisans and merchants may, if God so wills, become comfortable and happy, and the country may become fertile and populous.⁶⁹

⁶⁷See chapter iii, pp. 16-17.

⁶⁸See chapter II, pp. 32-35.

⁶⁹Letter of Hajjaj to Muhammad dated 20th of Rajjib 93 A.H., The Chachnamah, p. 90.

Following the surrender of Nirun instructions were received from Hajjaj:

Whoever seeks mercy and protection from you, let him have it. Those of the nobles and great men who take your side and join you, honour them by giving them robes of honour and make them grateful to yourself. Give proper rewards to them, and respect them according to their rank. Make reason and discretion your guide so that the chief men of the place and notables of the neighborhood may repose complete trust in your word.⁷⁰

In accordance with the newly instigated policy, wholesale massacres of civilians were done away with and the lives, liberties and properties of inhabitants were generally guaranteed.⁷¹ Prisoners of war were, however, systematically slaughtered, their families enslaved and property confiscated. In an effort to win over the ranks and file of the nobility and to solicit their assistance, proclamations of general amnesty were issued and occasional secret negotiations entered into by the Arabs which in effect confirmed the positions of the former, in certain cases actually enhancing them. Evidence of at least partial success of this new policy is borne out by the fact that a few men of high ranks and noble birth did not show the slightest hesitation in exchanging their overlords. Among the more exalted new Arab "allies" we may note Siyakar, the prime minister of Dahir, exchanging not merely his allegiance but his religion as

⁷⁰Letter of Hajjaj to Muhammad, Undated, The Chachnamah, p. 92.

⁷¹Major cities of Sind seem to have been controlled by the Buddhist ecclesiastical leaders or by corporate mercantile interests. Accordingly their major concern in negotiations with the Arabs centered around non-injury to the non-combatants as well as protection of property.

well, and receiving in turn his new position--Wazir of the new state under the viceroy Muhammad.⁷² Feudal levies under Sindian chiefs assisted the newcomers against the royal forces, at one point actually saving Muhammad's life in the midst of the battle against Dahir.⁷³ That by far a greater number of nobles remained loyal to their royal master can be seen by the steady resistance to Arab arms from Daybul to Multan. The defection of a few albeit influential men to the enemy ranks can be dismissed either as a result of personal grudge against Dahir, as in the case of Mokah Basayah,⁷⁴ or a superstitious belief that the end of the Hindu rule had been foretold by learned men of the realm.⁷⁵

Where general economic prosperity and religious freedom had been enjoyed by the Sindians, any attempts by the Arabs to appear as liberators of an oppressed people was doomed to failure. Neither were they led into the folly of advocating such pretentious claims. Moved by practical considerations, the new rulers simply endeavored to maintain the status quo while trying to adjust themselves to the new milieu in the mainstream of Indian economic and administrative

⁷²The Chachnamah, pp. 157-58.

⁷³The forces of the Sindian chief Mokah Basayah, an Arab ally, protected Muhammad with their own lives when the latter was isolated and surrounded by enemy forces at the height of the battle against Dahir. The Chachnamah, p. 142.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 125.

⁷⁵The Arabs first encountered this superstition on the part of the Hindus outside the walls of Daybul when the same Brahmin who revealed the secret of the flag post also informed the Arabs of this prevalent belief which was subsequently repeated on numerous occasions.

currents. The highest administrative authority, formerly invested in the Sind monarchy, was now replaced by the caliph at Damascus and represented in Sind by a governor appointed in turn by the viceroy of Iraq. A controller-general or "sāhib al-Kharāj," independent of the governor's authority and responsible directly to the viceroy, was placed in charge of all matters dealing with provincial finance. Administrative division of the pre-conquest era appear to have been maintained where lieutenant governors, invariably reputable military commanders, were stationed with sizeable bodies of troops.

Beyond the amsars the administrative details were left in the hands of Indian officials, in most cases royal civil servants of the Brahmin Dynasty. The move was a wise one. Inheriting a competent bureaucratic system, the Arabs saw no need to alter or replace it. Neither could it be any other way. The newcomers simply lacked the manpower to effect a change so enormous in scope. Large sections of Sind in reality were never completely subjugated; many local chiefs had managed to maintain their independence in the midst of all turmoils. From their strongholds at or near the urban centers, the Arab garrisons were constantly engaged in operations of various scales, requiring men and material.⁷⁶

⁷⁶Some of the nobles were in treaty relations with the Arabs in exchange for aid rendered to the newcomers and were allowed to keep their fiefs intact. Others, including one of Dahir's sons, Jaisiah, had retreated before the Arabs but later had instigated a guerrilla type action against them. A few had ostensibly accepted Islam, thereby managing to preserve their prior strengths but later had taken up arms against the Arabs.

With these considerations in mind and the future of Arab dominion in Sind momentarily assured, Muhammad in high-level policy-making decisions laid down the guidelines for the future framework of government. Brahminabad was subdivided into four separate zones and each one was placed under an Indian prefect whose varied functions included the collection of taxes, dispensation of justice and general welfare of the populace.⁷⁷ He no doubt was assisted by a council composed of prominent citizens, mostly large property holders and businessmen. Pre-Arab urban defense complex had included the stationing of sizeable bodies of troops at strategic points. This practice was maintained by the newcomers with slight variation; the troops and their commanders were all Arabs, subject to the commandant at the amsar headquarters rather than to the Indian prefects.

Since it was to their own advantage to keep the cities secure and prosperous, the Arabs showed great talent in doing so. From the outset Hajjaj and Muhammad appear to have identified urban interests with commercial interests which in turn were linked to those of the Arabs. The strength and development of this policy was inspired by the major mercantile houses which had invariably facilitated the newcomers in their march through the valley. Simultaneously the policy also reflects the precarious hold exercised by the Arabs on a countryside remaining largely in the hands of powerful Hindu feudal lords of the previous dynasty. Given these conditions the military-

⁷⁷The Chachnamah, p. 165.

commercial alliance could be applied beyond the urban centers with results haphazard and uncertain at best. The source of Arab strength, military as well as fiscal, consequently lay within the walled cities and their immediate surroundings. The monied interests were soon to feel the benevolent effects of the newcomers' policies. One thousand members of their class were selected and a capitation tax (jiziah) of merely twelve dirhams per annum was imposed upon each one of them.⁷⁸ This amount was considerably lower than the one generally levied upon the public at large inasmuch as twelve dirhams was the amount payable by the lowest income group and twenty-four and forty-eight dirhams by the next two successive higher levels.⁷⁹ The general public was given a distinct impression that this apparent concession was in lieu of the damage inflicted on property by the entry of somewhat excited Arab troops into the city.⁸⁰ In reality it was the first sign of an emerging alliance between two groups, mutually dependent upon one another.

Initially Muhammad toyed with the idea of by-passing the Brahmins in administrative affairs, possibly due to the latter's close connections with the previous dynasty. Accordingly, prominent non-Brahmin citizens, notably merchants as well as village headmen were placed in charge of procuring taxes from their respective

⁷⁸The Chachnamah, p. 165.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰"Muhammad Kasim ordered a capitation tax of twelve dirams of silver in weight only to be fixed on each of them as they had already lost their property by plunder." Ibid., p. 165.

areas, a task formerly performed by the Brahmins.⁸¹ This deviation from an established practice was not entirely successful. The Brahmins, who believed themselves especially qualified for the task of looking after public finances now launched a formal protest with the Arab commander.⁸² So entrenched was the practice of Brahmin domination in fiscal matters that their claims were actually substantiated by high-powered delegations of Brahminabad citizenry.⁸³ Realizing that Brahmin goodwill could benefit the Arab cause, Muhammad now effected a change in his earlier policy, confirming the Brahmins in their earlier posts as chief royal revenue collectors.⁸⁴

Unfortunately, all precise information about public revenue in Sind under the Arabs is lacking. An investigation of this point calls for four basic considerations. The first of these relates to the faith of the conquered people who continued to profess their ancestral religion and accordingly became liable to the "jiziah" or poll-tax paid by all non-Muslim subjects of the Caliph. In terms of numbers of people assessed, this form of taxation had the widest base. It was progressive in design; the wealthiest paying forty-eight dirhams annually while the poorest only twelve.⁸⁵ In the second place, the Kharaj lands in Sind far exceeded the zakat

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Ibid., pp. 165-66.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 166.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 165.

estates, thus contributing to the treasury sums far greater than would have been possible had the reverse been true. The reason was simple. Except for a few isolated cases, the Arab advance through the lower Indus Valley was facilitated through negotiated settlements with various segments of the population which in effect technically qualified the latter as the residents of "dar al-Sulh."⁸⁶ Such members of society within the caliphate were permitted to retain their lands on the payment of kharaj, a land assessment considerably higher than zakat which was paid by the Muslim landed gentry.⁸⁷ While the latter in all probability seldom exceeded ten percent of the crops or its equivalent in cash, the former fluctuated perpetually, varying anywhere from one-fifth to two-fifths of the crop:

The land-tax was usually rated at two-fifths of the produce of wheat and barley, if the fields were watered by public canals; three-tenths, if irrigated by wheels or other artificial means; and one-fourth, if altogether unirrigated. If arable land were left uncultivated, it seems to have paid one dirham per jarib, and one-tenth of the probable produce....Of dates, grapes, and garden produce, one-third was taken, either in kind or money; and one-fifth (khums) of the yield of wines, fishing, pearls and generally of any product not derived from

⁸⁶See above, pp.

⁸⁷Zakah was levied at the rate of ten percent if the land was watered by rain or stream and at five percent if watered by a bucket. Shareef al-Mujahid, "Muslim Finance," Islamic Culture, Vol. 40 (1952), 9.

cultivation, was to be delivered in kind, or paid in value, even before the expenses had been defrayed.⁸⁸

The third consideration is the rather impressive number of urban centers throughout the lower Indus Valley. The ports of Sind had served as major outlets for the products of Northwestern India and to a lesser degree for Central Asian commodities bound for the sea.⁸⁹ The resultant growth of mercantile centers along the Indus had provided a major source of income for local rulers who steadfastly protected and encouraged this overland and maritime commerce within their realms. The fortified cities had wholly passed into Arab hands, providing not merely excellent bases of military operations and surveillance but corporate wealth of great magnitude as well.

Finally we must mention every conceivable means devised by the Indian lawgivers to squeeze money out of the public purse which were now retained by the Arabs. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, such means had included assessment on livestock, charges for the use of state lands and facilities such as highways, wells and canals, as well as periodic forced labor--all this in addition to the basic tax on land and commerce.⁹⁰ Reference to the payment

⁸⁸Elliot, op. cit., Vol. V, 74. These figures especially apply to the reign of Caliph al-Mamun, 813-833 A.D.

⁸⁹See Chapter VIII, pp. 188-191.

⁹⁰See above, pp. 131-132.

of "usual tax" by the Hindu population to their new masters is indicative of Arab determination to reap the fruits of their predecessors' evil genius in bleeding their subjects.⁹¹

Historical sources are curiously silent about the total assessment on Sind during the Umayyad period. Ibn Khaldun, late fourteenth-century reputable Arab historian who does provide a glimpse of the caliphate's revenue from Sind during the Abbassid period, does so in a most unsatisfactory manner. For he contends himself by merely stating that the "revenue" from Sind amounted to eleven and a half million dirhams.⁹² He fails to elaborate on whether this sum embraced the various modes of taxation or was simply meant to be the land tax. Nineteenth century British Indologist, Sir Henry Elliot, commenting upon this uncertain aspect of Arab dominion over Sind summed up his conclusions admirably:

But after giving due weight to all these considerations, the sum set down against some of the provinces are so large...that we must conceive them to embrace the entire collections of every kind, and must be allowed the liberty of construing kharaj in its enlarged sense of tribute, than its limited one of "land-tax,"...The assessment upon Sind and Multan--being 11,500,000 dirhams,

⁹¹The Chachnamah, p. 174.

⁹²Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, Translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal, Bollingen Series, XLIII (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), Vol. I, 362. Comparative figures for some other eastern provinces of the caliphate are as follows. Makran at four hundred thousand dirhams, Sijistan at four million six hundred thousand dirhams; Kirman at four million two hundred thousand dirhams; Tukharistan at one hundred and six thousand dirhams; Kabul at one and a half million dirhams; Bamian at five thousand dirhams; and Fars at twenty-seven million dirhams. See Alfred von Kremer, Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen (Wien: W. Braumuller, 1875), Vol. I, 356-70.

or about £270,000--must be considered moderate, if it is intended to comprise the land-tax, the poll-tax, the customs duties and all miscellaneous items into the bargain; but it is not an improbable amount....Under the Talpurs (eighteenth century local dynasty) notwithstanding that many large and productive tracts were afforested by them, Sind is said to have occasionally yielded £400,000, and under the Kolhoras (early nineteenth century dynasty), tradition represents the revenue at the exaggerated amount of £800,000. At present (1870's) with security on all its borders, and tranquillity within them, it does not pay to the British Government more than £300,000, and the expenses have been hitherto more than double that sum. This deficiency, however, cannot last long, for its cultivation and commerce are rapidly on the increase.⁹³

According to Baladhuri, the Sind campaign had cost the caliphate sixty million dirhams.⁹⁴ Twice that amount was remitted to the central government at Damascus. This sum is most certainly exaggerated "since the country could not by any possibility have yielded such a booty even with the exercise of the utmost Arab violence and extortion to enforce its collection...We...find it difficult to believe...that Sind and Multan together could at that time have yielded two million and three quarters sterling."⁹⁵ The Chachnamah gives the figure of sixty thousand dirhams as the cost of expedition and we might accept this as a more reliable number.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Al-Baladhuri, Kitab Futuh ul-Buldan, p. 223.

⁹⁵Elliot, op. cit., Vol.V., 70.

The religious composition of the Caliph's new dominion presented the Arabs with a dilemma. The overwhelming majority of Sindians were Hindu-Buddhist by faith and thus by definition did not qualify as the "people of the Book." On the other hand, wholesale forced conversions or extemination of so large a population was well beyond the grasp of reality. The solution that followed was perhaps inevitable. The policy statement on religious affairs issued at Brahminabad and subsequently repeated at Alor, called for the recognition of Hinduism and Buddhism on equal footing with Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism, whose followers previously enjoyed the status of dhimmis and were tolerated as protected subjects.⁹⁶ The concession was remarkable. Its pronouncement no doubt was largely facilitated by a lack of any rigid schools of jurisprudence in Islam at this date. As mentioned above⁹⁷ such schools were to rise in the following century and consequently colored the religious outlook of later Turkish hordes which poured across the Sulaiman mountains into North India, beginning with the eleventh century. For the Ghaznavid

⁹⁶The Chachnamah, p. 168. "With regard to the request of the chiefs of Brahminabad about the building of Budh temples, and toleration in religious matters, I do not see (when they have done homage to us by placing their heads in the yoke of submission and have undertaken to pay the fixed tribute for the Khalifah and guaranteed its payment), what further rights we have over them beyond the usual tax. Because after they have become zimmis (protected subjects) we have no right whatever to interfere with their lives or their property....No one is prohibited from or punished for following his own religion...." Letter of Hajjaj to Muhammad received at Brahminabad, undated.

⁹⁷See above, pp. 122-123.

and the Ghorid Turks of the Afghan highlands brought havoc on the Hindu population, indeed justifying their very presence in India on the pretext that the destruction of the heathens was their prime motive.⁹⁸

The concession was followed by the recognition of the legitimate Brahmin interests. The confirmation of their position as chief revenue officials has been commented upon. Under the previous dynasty the populace was forced to pay three percent of its income to the Brahmins.⁹⁹ This payment was apparently not through the state agencies, but otherwise, we are in the dark as to its enforcement. This practice was maintained

⁹⁸Throughout the medieval Muslim period, theologians continued to discuss the status of the Hindus under the Islamic rule. Fourteenth-century Indian Muslim scholar Seikh Hamadani was clearly shocked at the somewhat tolerant religious attitude of the Delhi sultans:

If Mahmud (Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna, died 1030 A.D.)...had gone to India once more he would have brought under his sword all the Brahmins of Hind who, in that vast land, are the cause of the continuance of the laws of infidelity and the strength of idolators, he would have cut off the heads of two hundred or three hundred thousand Hindu chiefs. He would not have returned his "Hindu-slaughtering" sword to the scabbard until the whole of Hind had accepted Islam. For Mahmud was a Shafiite, and according to Imam Shaffi, the decree for Hindus is "either death or Islam" -- that is to say, they should either be put to death or embrace Islam. It is not lawful to accept "Jizia" from Hindus as they have neither a prophet nor a revealed book.

Quoted in Theodore de-Bary, Sources of the Indian Tradition, p. 479, from Hamadani's Treasures of Kings.

⁹⁹The Chachnamah, p. 169.

by Muhammad to the great satisfaction of the Brahmins.¹⁰⁰ As a further gesture of good will, the religious or mendicant Brahmins, entirely dependent on begging for their physical needs, were not to be molested by the Arab soldiery whose high-handed methods in certain cases had prompted the request for the former's protection.¹⁰¹ Damaged temples could not be repaired and new ones constructed. Within this policy perimeter then, the Sindians enjoyed a measure of religious freedom, the existence of which is conceded, though somewhat grudgingly, even by Sir Henry Elliot, otherwise generally hostile to the Arab cause:

The toleration which the native Sindians enjoyed in the practice of their religion, was greater than what was usually conceded in other countries; but it was dictated less by any principle of justice or humanity, than the impossibility of suppressing the native religion by the small number of Arab invaders. When time had fully shown the necessity of some relaxation in the stern code of Moslim (sic) conquest, it was directed that the natives might rebuild their temples and perform their worship and that the three per cent which had been allowed to the priests under the former government, should not be withheld by the laity for whom they officiated.¹⁰²

The recognition of their status as "dhimmis" entitled the Sindians to the jurisdiction of their own personal laws. Actually the legal status of non-Muslim subjects in Islam was "modeled largely on the position of non-citizen groups in the Eastern Roman empire. By the contract of "dhimma" which embodied the notion of "fides" in Roman law, the Jewish and Christian communities or dhimmis paid a poll tax in

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Elliot, op. cit., Vol. V, 69.

in return for the guarantee of protection and the preservation of their own personal law administered by their rabbinical and ecclesiastical tribunal.¹⁰³ The dhimmis in fact were left in "complete legal freedom provided no Muslim, and this includes the tribunal of the kadi; freedom in matters of religion is guaranteed explicitly."¹⁰⁴ Public and political affairs and cases involving Muslims were tried before the Kadis, but in "all suits for debts, contracts, adultery, inheritance and the rights of property, and the like the Hindus...had to accommodate their own differences and therefore maintained their panchayats or arbitration committees in full efficiency."¹⁰⁵ In effect then the non-Muslims "follow the rules of their own religions with regard to what is lawful for them."¹⁰⁶

Among the discriminatory legal measures against the dhimmis the following were perhaps most offensive : a dispute involving a Muslim and a dhimmi was decided by a Muslim judge; the testimony of a dhimmi against a Muslim was invalid; the children of a Muslim and a dhimmi woman were to be raised as Muslims; a dhimmi could not marry a Muslim woman; a dhimmi could not own a Muslim slave; a dhimmi could not enter into a full partnership (business) with a Muslim.¹⁰⁷

The Arab framework of government as it emerged fully by 715 A.D. in Sind was largely shaped by two considerations: the caliphate's

¹⁰³Coulson, op. cit., p. 27.

¹⁰⁴Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 133.

¹⁰⁵Elliot, op. cit., Vol. V, 79.

¹⁰⁶Schacht, op. cit., p. 131.

¹⁰⁷Schacht, op. cit., p. 132.

administrative experience over the past eighty years, and the impact of the Indian environment as it exerted itself upon their experience. The very nature of the Islamic government, instituted as it was to ensure solely the happiness of the Umma in this world and hereafter, reduced the non-Muslim subjects to second-rate citizens at best. Experienced administrators like Hajjaj, and political realists like Muhammad ibn al-Qasim, wisely recognized the need to include the Hindu-Buddhist population in the category of dhimmis. Yet it was no great indulgence; religious toleration, one of the civilizing forces of the Hindu society, had been enjoyed by the Indians for hundreds of years prior to the Muslim conquest. A similar aroma of religious discrimination also permeated the bureaucracy, the upper levels of which were mainly staffed by the Arabs who otherwise do not seem to have contributed any redeeming features to an already competent administrative machinery. Initially the Arab economic legacy in Sind, an inevitable consequence of their administrative policy, became suspect on three accounts--the destruction of life and property caused by the Arab arms from 712 to 715; annual drain of eleven and a half million dirhams on the Sind treasury in the form of assessment remitted first to Damascus and later to Baghdad, and a lack of political unity in Sind, characteristic of the entire Arab episode which seriously impaired the economic progress of the area. As the wounds of destruction healed and as Sind began to feel the benevolent impact of world-wide Arab trade, the economy of the area no doubt gradually improved. It must be admitted, in all fairness to the Arabs, that a concerted effort was made by them to gain the confidence of the people they had conquered, yet they were severely handicapped

in this noble endeavor by the very ideology which had brought them to
Sind in the first place.

CHAPTER VII

WAR AND POLITICS IN SIND TO THE YEAR 1026 A.D.

The total duration of Arab rule over Sind was three hundred and fourteen years--from the fall of Daybul in 712 A.D. to the sack of Mansura by Sultan Mahmood of Ghazna in 1026 A.D. Of these, the years 712-750 A.D. were covered by the Umayyad administration and the years 750-871 A.D. by the Abbassid control, the latter half of which was fairly ineffective. The brief Saffarid interregnum lasted for almost twenty-five years, during which the Arab ruling element was replaced by the Persians from Sistan. The Saffarids in turn were replaced by two independent local Arab dynasties, established at Multan in the north and Mansura in the south, both of which succeeded in maintaining their somewhat precarious hold over the area until their final overthrow by the Ghaznavids forces by 1026 A.D.¹

The clannish rivalries within the Umayyad bureaucracy soon exerted their evil influence upon Sind. As mentioned earlier, Muhammad ibn al-Qasim along with other prominent members of

¹The rulers of Multan and Mansura continued to recognize the Caliph at Baghdad as the nominal head of the Islamic world. In all other matters they exercised complete freedom of action. Even this nominal allegiance was shifted to the Fatimid Caliphs during the latter part of the tenth century.

Al-Hajjaj's clique had fallen victim to Caliph Sulaiman's wrath in 715 A.D.² Unfortunately Muhammad's successors rivaled him neither in talent nor in wisdom. Salih ibn Abd ar-Rahman, the viceroy of Iraq appointed Yazid as-Saksaki as the governor over Sind, but the latter died merely eighteen days following his arrival there.³ In the meantime the Sindians had successfully overthrown their Arab overlords at numerous strongholds. The new governor-designate Habib ibn al-Muhallab had to fight his way through to Alor which was invested by the Arabs. Brahminabad and Multan, however, continued to remain in the possession of Jaisimaha, son of the late Sindian monarch.⁴ During the caliphate of Umar II, 717-720 A.D., Islamic missionary activities were stepped up especially in North Africa, Spain and Sind.⁵ Consequently the Caliph wrote to the independent Sindian chiefs "inviting them to become Moslems and to be subject to him agreeing to let them continue on their thrones and have the same privileges and obligations as the Moslems."⁶ Accordingly, some members of Sindian nobility including Jaisimaha accepted Islam. The move might have been prompted by *raison d'etat*, for Jaisimaha was

²See above, Chapter V,

³Al-Baladhuri, Kitab Futuh al-Buldan, p. 224.

⁴Ibid.

⁵William Muir, The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline and Fall (Edinburgh: J. Grant, 1915), p. 371.

⁶Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 225.

confirmed in his possessions of northern Sind by the Caliph.⁷ The death of Umar II was followed by a brief civil war in the Islamic world as Yazid ibn al-Muhallab, a protegee of Caliph Sulaiman, challenged the authority of the new Caliph Yazid II.⁸ The insurrection was crushed and its leader killed.⁹ However, prior to his death Yazid ibn Muhallab had acquired sufficient support to appoint governors over Ahwaz, Fars, Kirman, Makran and Arab-controlled portions of Sind. Following his death some of Muhallab's brothers along with their families fled to the fortress of Kandabil in western Sind, but the commander of the garrison, Wadda ibn Hamid al-Azdi, treacherously put them to death.¹⁰

Upon the death of Yazid ibn Muhallab and his brothers Junaid ibn Abd ar-Rahman had been appointed as lieutenant over the "frontier of as-Sind," and his appointment was confirmed by Caliph Hisham (724-743 A.D.). Junaid proceeded to Sind but was challenged by Dahir's son Jaisimaha who pointed out with considerable justification that he had accepted Islam and accordingly had been entrusted with the affairs of Sind by Umar II. The ensuing battle of lake Ash-Sharki

⁷Ibid.

⁸Caliph Yazid's wife was the niece of al-Hajjaj and so a sworn enemy of the Muhallabites.

⁹Carl Brockelman, A History of the Islamic People, Translated from German by Joel Carmichael and Moshe Perlman (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960), p. 93.

¹⁰Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 226.

resulted in Jaisimha's defeat and death.¹¹ The slain ruler's brother proceeded to Iraq to present the case before the Caliph. He was, however, treacherously murdered by Junaid's agents notwithstanding the promise of safe conduct.¹²

Under Junaid and his successor Tamim ibn Zaid, the greatest expansion of Arab armies in India was effected.¹³ Following the consolidation of their rule in Sind the Arabs struck in a southeasterly direction. The Arab "blitzkrieg" around 726 A.D. swung through Rajputana, overwhelming numerous petty states in the process.¹⁴ At Chitor, in southeastern Rajputana, the Arab armies were turned back by Bappa, a vassal to the Mori Raja Man, ruler of Mewar.¹⁵ The second invasion of Rajputana was undertaken around 733 A.D. under the command of Tamin ibn Zaid. All Rajput resistance was rendered ineffective, the whole of Gujarat was overrun and the cities of Valabhi and Broach were destroyed.¹⁶ The Arabs now appeared on the

¹¹At the height of the battle the boat carrying Jusimaha capsized and he was taken prisoner and subsequently executed. Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 226.

¹²Ibid.,

¹³Junaid was summoned to Central Asia in 430 A.D. to relieve the hard-pressed Arab garrisons there. He died there in 734 A.D. See H. A. R. Gibb, Arab Conquests in Central Asia (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923), pp. 72-77.

¹⁴Baladhuri, op. cit., pp. 227-28; M. L. Mathur, "Early Rulers of Mewar and Their Fights with Arabs," The Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. XXIX (Dec. 1953), 327, 328.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 329.

¹⁶Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 228; Rama S. Avasthy and Amalananda Ghosh, "Reference to Muhammadans in Sanskrit Inscriptions in Northern India - A.D. 730 to 1320," Journal of Indian History, Vol. XV (1936), 162-63.

borders of present day Bombay state. A cavalry column had previously been detached from the main army and sent against the city of Ujjain in Central India. The Arab lines of communication were over-extended. Bombay frontier was approximately six hundred miles from Daybul while Ujjain was even further. At Navasiri, in the southern extremity of Gujarat, Indian contingents of various rulers were hastily gathered and placed under the command of Prince Pulakesin, ruler of the state of Lata, vassal to the Chalukyas of the Deccan and himself a member of the imperial house. At the Battle of Navasiri, the Arabs were hurled back and pursued across Gujarat.¹⁷ This celebrated victory was duly recorded in the Navasiri copper plates struck five years following the event:

The illustrious king Avanijanasraya Pulakesin Sarajha, the great lord and the great devotee of Mahesvara, whom the illustrious king Vallabha, appreciating his valour, favoured with the four following titles, "the solid pillar of the Deccan," "the ornament of the Chalukika (Chalukya) dynasty," "the lord of the earth," and "the repeller of the unrepelled (Arabs)," when the Tajika army, which vomited forth arrows and maces, which destroyed by its brightly glittering sharp swords the prosperous Saindhava (Sind), Kacchela (Cutch), Saurashtra (Gujarat), Chavotaka, Maurya and Gurjara kings and others, and which wishing to enter the Deccan with a view to conquering all the southern kings, came in the first instance to reduce the Navasarika country.¹⁸

¹⁷It is of some significance to note that the battle of Navasiri was fought merely a few months after that of Tours in 732 A.D. Both engagements ended the Arab threats to India and Western Europe respectively. The comparison is even more striking when it is recalled that the conquest of Sind in 712 A.D. followed that of Spain by less than a year.

¹⁸Avasthy, op. cit., pp. 162-63.

The flying column against Ujjain shared a similar fate. Here the Pratihara ruler Nagabhata I routed the Arabs outside the walls of the city. The Indian victory has been recorded in the Gwalior inscription of Bhoja:

He shone with four arms brilliant with glittering and terrible weapons as he crushed the army of the Valaca (Baloch) Mleccha lord, the destroyer of virtue.¹⁹

The march of the Arab armies across Rajputana and Gujarat caused considerable oppression among the two major powers of North India, Kashmir and Kanauj. As noted above, both these states were previously engaged in hostilities against each other.²⁰ The Arab "blitzkrieg" momentarily brought about a new era in the Kanauj-Kashmir relationship. We learn from the Chinese sources that in 736 A.D. a Kashmirian embassy appeared at the Tang court to solicit aid against the Arabs.²¹ The Kashmirian monarch Lalitaditya-Muktapida (725-756 A.D.), in sending the embassy to China, "probably referred to Yasovarman (of Kanauj) as an ally."²² The practice of soliciting Tang aid against the Arabs was not altogether new, for there is some evidence to show that Yasovarman of Kanauj had dispatched a similar embassy to

¹⁹Ibid., p. 163.

²⁰See above, Chapter III.

²¹Kalhana, Rajatarangini, Translated from Sanskrit, edited by M. A. Stein, Vol. I, 67.

²²R. C. Majumdar (ed.), The Classical Age, Vol. III in the series The History and Culture of the Indian People (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1955), p. 130.

China as early as 731.²³ The Kashmir court and Ratbil of Sijistan had taken similar actions in 713 and 710 A.D. respectively.²⁴ With the exception of an abortive expedition into Rajputana in 836 A.D., which was hurled back by the Pratihara ruler Nagabhata II, the greatest momentum of Arab thrust in India was clearly over by 760 A.D.²⁵ The consolidation of the Pratihara and Rashtrakuta empires in northern and central India respectively had begun by 760 A.D. as well.²⁶ The date also marks the final conclusion of hostilities between the Arabs and the Chinese in eastern Central Asia and the establishment of the former's supremacy in that region.²⁷ Sijistan and Kabul, though occasionally accepting a nominal Arab hegemony, remained sufficiently strong to thwart any further Arab expansionist designs south and east of the Kindukush. A political situation had now begun to prevail along the entire Indo-Arab frontier which re-

²³According to Majumdar, "It is now generally recognized that Yasovarman is possibly identified with Yi-sha-fu-mo, king of Central India who sent his minister, the Buddhist Monk Pu-ta-sin (Buddahasena) to the Court of China in 731." Majumdar, The Classical Age, p. 130.

²⁴For Kashmir embassy of 713 A.D., see above, Chapter I, p. 6. For Sijistan see H. A. R. Gibb, Arab Conquests in Central Asia (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923), pp. 41-42.

²⁵For this expedition, see D. C. Ganguly, "A Forgotten Moslem Invasion," Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. XIV (1928), 816.

²⁶See R. C. Majumdar (Ed.), The Age of Imperial Kanauj, Vol. IV, in the series History and Culture of the Indian People, Chapter I, "The Rashtrakuta Empire," pp. 1-16 and Chapter II, "Rise and Fall of the Pratihara Empire," pp. 19-39.

²⁷See Gibb, Arab Conquests in Central Asia, Chapter V, "The Reconquest of Transoxiana," pp. 88-98.

mained essentially unaltered for more than a century. When it did change, it was due to no initiative on the part of the Arabs, but by the Persians in Sijistan and Kabul.²⁸

In Sind itself Junaid's successor Tamim found the impressive sum of eighteen million dirhams in the treasury part of which was doubtlessly spent on the expeditions already alluded to. The military disasters apparently placed heavy burdens upon the State finances.²⁹ Meanwhile, the indigenous population of Sind rose in arms so that "In the days of Tamim the Moslems withdrew from the land of al-Hind and abandoned their headquarters, and they have not returned so far as that since."³⁰ Following the death of Tamim at Daybul, al-Hakim bin Awanah al-Kalbi was appointed to take charge of operations in Sind.³¹ He was accompanied by Amr bin Muhammad ibn al-Qasim, son of the conqueror of Sind. Together they immediately constructed the Misr of al-Mahfuthah near Nirum, since "A place of refuge to which the Moslems might flee was not to be found."³² Hakim was killed in action against the Indians,³³ but not before "he had won back from the hands of the

²⁸In 870 A.D. Yakub ibn Laith al-Saffar, a Persian from Sistan and the founder of Saffarid dynasty of eastern Persia (860-1002 A.D.) annexed Sijistan, Zabulistan and Kabul to his domains. See Theodore Noldeke, Sketches From Eastern History, Translated from German by Charles Black (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1892), Chapter VI, "Yakub the Coppersmith, and His Dynasty," pp. 176-206.

²⁹Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 228.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

³³Al-Yaqubi, Tarikh al-Yaqubi (Bairut: Dar Sadar, 1960), Vol. II, 389-90.

enemy all that they had conquered from him."³⁴ A contest now developed for the governorship of Sind between Amr and Ibn Arar, a protege of al-Amir Walid, later Walid II. The governor-general of Iraq, Yusuf ibn Umar, decided in favor of Amr.³⁵ It was Amr who constructed the amsar of al-Mansurah "where the governors reside today."³⁶ The newly constructed site was soon besieged by the Indian forces who withdrew only after four thousand Arab troops arrived to relieve the besieged garrison.³⁷ Walid II became Caliph in 743 A.D. and immediately replaced Amr with ibn Arar who engaged the Indians on eighteen occasions with dubious results.³⁸ Marwan II appointed Yazid ibn Umar ibn Hubayrah as governor-general of Iraq in 744 A.D.,³⁹ whereas Mansur ibn Jamhur, Yazid III's appointee over Iraq, escaped to Sind, killing his relative ibn Arar and establishing his control over the area.⁴⁰ Thus it was that by 750 A.D., the date marking the fall of the Umayyad dynasty, Sind was controlled by a ruler owing no allegiance to Damascus.

³⁴Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 229.

³⁵Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 229.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Yaqubi, op. cit., Vol. II, 390.

³⁸Ibid., Vol. II, 399-400.

³⁹William Muir, The Caliphate Rise: Its Rise, Decline and Fall, p. 406. Yazid III and Marwan II were mortal enemies. Yazid was the son of Caliph Walid I, during whose reign the occupation of Sind was effected. Marwan II was the grandson of Caliph Marwan I (684-685).

⁴⁰Yaqubi, op. cit., Vol. II, 407, under the year 131 A.H.

Abbassid Administration 750-871 A.D.

With the inauguration of the Abbassid Caliphate in 750 A.D. steps were immediately undertaken to bring Sind under the effective control of the central Arab government. The first endeavours in this direction were, however, unsuccessful. The Abbassid forces, dispatched from bases in Khurasan, were routed and their commander, Mughallis al-Abdi killed.⁴¹ A second force under Musa ibn Ka'ab wrested the control of Sind from Mansur who perished of thirst in the desert while a fugitive.⁴² Caliph al-Mansur (754-775 A.D.) appointed Hisham ibn Amr governor over Sind. He launched a vigorous expansionist policy so that within a few years the triumph of Abbassid armies in the area was complete:

He conquered what was left unsubdued and sent Amr ibn Jamal with a fleet to Narind. He also sent to the regions of al-Hind and conquered Kahsmir, obtaining many prisoners and slaves. He conquered al-Multan and cleared out a faction of Arabs which was in Kandabil. He went to al-Kunduhar with the fleet and conquered it, throwing down the "Budd" and building a mosque in its place.⁴³

From this statement, it will appear that both land and naval operations were carried out. The places stated cannot be identified with certainty. Narind and Kunduhar were most probably sea ports on the

⁴¹Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 230.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 230-31.

coast of Gujarat.⁴⁴ The reference to Kashmir does not apply to the Vale of Kashmir but rather to the areas of northern Punjab controlled by the Kashmir monarchy.⁴⁵ The faction of Arabs cleared from Kandabil could conceivably have been the Kharijites who were numerous in the neighbourhood of Sijistan.⁴⁶ Hisham was succeeded by Umar ibn Hafs Hazarmand whose term in office probably lasted until 771 A.D.⁴⁷ We are now confronted with a blank of approximately ten years in the list of successive Abbassid governors of Sind. Arab historians are curiously silent about this period. However, a hint of dubious value is provided by an eighteenth-century Indian historian who states that a certain Abu Turab, prefect of Sind, died in 787 A.D.⁴⁸ The date of his death is not altogether reliable unless one is to believe that he died out of office, for according to al-Tabari, Ruh ibn Hatim took over the office as governor of Sind in 787 A.D.⁴⁹ The next eighteen

⁴⁴Henry Elliot, The History of India as Told by its Own Historians (Calcutta: Sisir Gupta, 1956), Vol. V, 42, note 108.

⁴⁵The Vale of Kashmir was never conquered by the Arabs nor, for that matter, by Islamic armies until the late sixteenth century when Grand Mughal Akbar (1556-1604) annexed it to his empire. The Muslim dynasty which was established over Kashmir in the fourteenth century was of local origin. For the geography and topography of Kashmir which enabled it to enjoy relative security, see above, Chapter III,

⁴⁶See H. A. R. Gibb, "Chinese Records of the Arabs in Central Asia," Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, Vol. II (1921-23), 616-17.

⁴⁷Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 231. According to Tabari, however, the appointment of Umar preceded that of Hisham. He further points out that in 151 A.H. (77. A.D.), Umar was transferred to Africa. See Tabari, op. cit., Third Series, Vol. I, 351.

⁴⁸Ali Kani, Tahafat al-Kiran, Translated from Persian by J. Postans (Calcutta: Bishops College Press, 1843), p. 27.

⁴⁹Tabari, op. cit., Third Series, Vol. I, 482.

years were covered by Ruh's administration, but we are unaware of any details regarding this long period. In 800 A.D. Da'ud ibn Yazid ibn Hatim succeeded Ruh⁵⁰ whose term in office cannot be substantiated with any degree of reliability. That he was out of office by 822 A.D. is evident from the outbreak of rebellion by Bishr ibn-Da'ud the then governor of Sind.⁵¹ It was only after the dispatch of Ghassan ibn 'Abbad, a trusted lieutenant of Caliph al-Ma'mun to Sind that the rebel was persuaded to lay down his arms and seek the Caliph's pardon.⁵² The timely action prevented any serious military confrontation but the crisis demonstrated with some force the difficulty which beset the government at Baghdad in exerting political control over distant areas. Ghassan's appointee, Musa ibn Yahya al-Barmak, felt sufficiently secure and perhaps arrogant enough to nominate his own son 'Imran at the time of his death in 836 A.D.⁵³ 'Imran's reign was marked by the loss of Sindan, a naval outpost in the present-day Cutch area of Gujarat.⁵⁴ Military campaigns were waged against the Jats of al-Kikan though their outcome is unknown. Sindian navy also engaged the

⁵⁰Yaqubi, op. cit., Vol. II, 409; Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 231.

⁵¹Yaqubi, op. cit., Vol. II, 458.

⁵²Ibn Khaldun, Tarikh ibn Khaldun (Bairut: Daral-Kitab al-Lubnani, 1957), Vol. III, 539-41.

⁵³Yaqubi, op. cit., II, 458; Khaldun, op. cit., III, 541; Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 231.

⁵⁴The main mosque of Sindan was spared by the enemy after the fall of the city. Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 233.

pirates off Cutch with some success.⁵⁵ In 842 'Imran fell victim to the Arab tribal feuds within Sind.⁵⁶ The manner of his accession and death illustrates in no common measure the decay to which the Abbassid government was now subjected. For in the absence of a strong guiding hand from Baghdad, the Arabs in Sind degenerated with various tribal groupings reminiscent of pre-Islamic Arabia. The unsettled state of Sindian politics following the death of 'Imran in 841 lasted for nearly thirty years. In this respect, Sind suffered the nemesis which overtook most of the outlying Abbassid territories. We hear nothing of Sind for three decades.

The rise of the local Persian and Turkish dynasties in Kirman, Sijistan and Khurasan created a physical barrier between the Arabs of Sind and those of Iraq and other Arabic-speaking lands. In effect, this exposed the Arab tribes of Sind to the ambitions of Persians and Turks, men who were alien in language, manners and to some degree in intellectual constitution.

As early as 821 A.D., with the appointment of Tahir ibn al-Husayn as governor of Khurasan, the eastern provinces of the Caliphate were independent for all intent and purposes.⁵⁷ Tahir promptly omitted the name of the Caliph in the Friday prayers and his Tahirid descendants maintained their power in the area for almost half a century. The Tahirids were in effective control of Khurasan as late

⁵⁵Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 233.

⁵⁶Ibid.; Yaqubi, op. cit., II, 489.

⁵⁷Vasillii Barthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion, Second Edition (London: Messrs. Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1958), p. 208.

as 862, but thereafter their power declined.⁵⁸ After 821 A.D. Sind was physically cut off from Iraq by the intervening Tahirid domains. It appears, however, that the government of Khurasan made no serious effort to prevent Baghdad from exerting some degree of political control over Sind prior to 841 A.D.⁵⁹ Beyond this date there is no evidence to indicate that the Baghdad government exercised any political control over the area in terms of gubernatorial or related appointments. Was Sind incorporated into the Tahirid dominions after 841 A.D.? We do not know with certainty. What we do know is the inability of the Tahirids to subdue neighboring Sijistan, an area contingent on Sind.⁶⁰ On the basis of this information, it is reasonable to suggest that Sind remained relatively free of Tahirid intervention.

The Tahirid episode was nearly a prelude to the weakening of Arab hold on Sind. It was the Saffarids who, from their bases in Sijistan, succeeded in extending their sway over Sind and in so doing became the first non-Arab Muslims to subordinate Arab interests in the region to their own. Sijistan was one of the strongholds of the Kharijite heretics. Here "as in other desert lands, a Kharijite was often little more than a polite name for bandit. We thus understand how it was that in the midst of this vigorous population, as the

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 216.

⁵⁹See above, p. 167.

⁶⁰Theodore Noldeke, Sketches From Eastern History, Translated from German by C.K. Black (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1892), p. 177.

power of the state dwindled, volunteer bands were formed for defence against the Kharijites."⁶¹ Yakub ibn al-Layth al-Saffar, a Persian and a native of Sistan, was the leader of a band of such volunteers. By 861 A.D., he had consolidated his position in Sijistan, evicting the Tahirid governor and subjugating the Kharijites.⁶² By 867 A.D. Kabul, Makran and Sind had fallen in his hands, and by 873 A.D. Kirman, Balkh, Tukharistan and Khurasan were added to his domains. The zenith of the Saffarids was attained when the Caliph extended recognition to Yakub's control over the territories which the latter had acquired, and simultaneously appointed him military governor of Baghdad.⁶³ Yakub died in 879 A.D. and his authority descended to his son, 'Amr bin al-Layth, who rivaled his father neither in force of personality nor in talent. 'Amr's control was successfully challenged by the rising power of the Samanids of Transoxiana.⁶⁴ In 900 A.D. the Samanids inflicted a crushing defeat upon 'Amr, wresting the control of Khurasan and dispatching the Saffarid monarch to Baghdad where he ended his days as a prisoner of the Caliph in 902 A.D.⁶⁵

⁶¹Noldeke, op. cit., p. 177.

⁶²Barthold, op. cit., pp. 216-17.

⁶³Noldeke, op. cit., p. 190. For a detailed account of Yakub's campaigns, see Tarikh-i-Sistan. A Persian work compiled between 1053 and 1324 A.D. and edited by Bahar Khurasani (Tehran: Kitabkhana Zaddar, 1935), pp. 190-233.

⁶⁴For the Samanid-Saffarid conflict, see Barthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion, pp. 235-40.

⁶⁵Noldeke, op. cit., pp. 202-04.

Independent Dynasties to 1026 A.D.

For the following one hundred years Sind enjoyed a respite from the Turko-Persian interference. Historical works on Sind during the last century of Arab rule are fragmentary in most cases and erroneous in some. We must therefore rely upon the brief but highly valuable accounts of medieval Muslim travellers and geographers who visited Sind and recorded their impressions on its state for posterity. In order of their appearance they included al-Mas'udi in 915 A.D.; al-Istakhri in 951 A.D.; Ibn Hauqal in 976 A.D.; and al-Muqaddasi in 985 A.D.⁶⁶

Al-Mas'udi recorded his remarks about Sind in his famous book Muruj al-Zahab (Meadows of Gold).⁶⁷ He observed two independent principalities in Sind, Multan in the north and Mansura in the south. The former was ruled by a Quraishite and a descendant of Usamah ibn Lawi ibn Ghalib who probably arrived in the area with Muhammad ibn

⁶⁶Major Arabic geographical works were collected and edited by De Goeje in Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1870-1906), 8 Vols. Portions of Arab geographical works dealing with India were rendered into English by Sir Henry Elliot and can be found in The Arab Geographers, Vol. I in the series, The History of India as Told by its Own Historians, Second Edition (Calcutta: Sisir Gupta, 1956).

⁶⁷Elliot, op. cit., Vol. I, 23-33. Portions of Mas'udi's work were translated into English by Aloys Sprenger under the title El-Masudis Historical Encyclopedia (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1841), Vol. I. All reference to Mas'udi are from Sprenger unless otherwise stated.

al-Qasim.⁶⁸ Lower Sind, including Mansura, Alor and Daybul was held by another Quraishite Arab "who is descended from Habbar Ben al-Aswad."⁶⁹

The territory dependent upon Multan included "one hundred and twenty thousand towns and villages" while "the estates and villages dependent on Mansura amount to three hundred thousand."⁷⁰ Both these estimates are preposterous, particularly when we consider that during the British administration, with one of the most extensive irrigation systems in the world, the total number of towns and villages in Sind did not exceed four thousand and five hundred.⁷¹ Hence "Masudi does not mean 'towns and villages' but 'farms and hamlets,' that is farms,

⁶⁸According to Mas'udi, "the crown of el-Multan has been hereditary in the family which rules at present, since ancient times and nearly from the beginning of Islam," p. 234. The "crown" of Multan, however, was not hereditary in any family prior to the Saffarid interregnum as already noted. It is probable that members of this family had held prominent positions in the affairs of Multan since the early eighth century. Arab historian Ibn Rustah mentions the ruling family of Multan as early as 900 A.D. in his book, Kitab al-A'Alak an-Nafisa. De Goege, op. cit., Vol. VII, 135. Mas'udi, however, was the first writer to have actually visited Sind.

⁶⁹Mas'udi, op. cit., p. 234. The origins of these two local dynasties are shrouded in obscurity. They were, no doubt, prominent in local political affairs and utilized their positions with considerable skill after 845 A.D., as a corollary to consolidating their hold over the area once the Saffarid hold over Sind deteriorated. For a brief but valuable account on this point, see Nadvi, "Muslim Colonies in India Before the Muslim Conquest," Translated from Urdu and published in the Islamic Culture, Vol. VIII (1934), 611-14 and Vol. IX (1935), 151-55.

⁷⁰Mas'udi, op. cit., pp. 384, 386.

⁷¹Shahpurshah Hodivala, Studies in Indo-Muslim History: A Critical Commentary on Elliot and Dowson's History of India: As Told by Its Own Historians (Bombay: Hodivala, 1939), Vol. I, 26.

estates or holdings given on military tenure to Musalman soldiers and villages occupied and cultivated by the indigenes."⁷² Mas'udi's observation does indicate that Mansura commanded larger jurisdictional territory as well as the vital outlet to the sea. Multan, however, enjoyed one decided advantage over Mansura. It contained a magnificent temple which housed an idol renowned throughout North India.⁷³ Pilgrims flocked to it unceasingly. "The greatest part of the revenue of the King of Multan is derived from the rich presents brought to the idol." States Mas'udi, "When the unbelievers march against Multan and the faithful do not feel themselves strong enough to oppose them they threaten to break the idol and their enemies immediately withdraw."⁷⁴ Considered as a measure of domestic policy, this step was perhaps remarkable but Mas'udi's statement serves to expose the precarious position the Arabs found themselves in once the Saffarid garrisons were withdrawn from the area for duty elsewhere.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³The idol was first noticed by the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang approximately seventy-five years prior to the Islamic conquest. The idol was "dedicated to the Sun which was very magnificent and profusely decorated, to which the kings of high families of the five Indies never failed to make their offerings and to which men from all countries came to offer up prayers." Hiuen Tsiang, Si Yu Ki: Buddhist Records of the Western World, Translated by Samuel Beal (London: Trubner and Company, 1900), Vol. II, 274. According to The Chachnamah, pp. 190-191, the idol was made of gold with two red rubies for eyes and "it was so like a living man that Muhammad Kasim mistook it for one." The idol was spared by the youthful Arab commander. But al-Biruni informs us that Muhammad Kasim hung a piece of cow's flesh on its neck. See Alberuni's India, Translated by Edward Sachau (London: Trubner and Son, 1888), Vol. II, 116.

⁷⁴Mas'udi, op. cit., I, 384.

By the time of Mas'udi's visit, the politics of India had assumed a new aspect. The Arabs of Sind were now on the defensive against the rising power of the Pratiharas of Kanauj who dominated northern India during the ninth and tenth centuries.⁷⁵ On the other hand, the Rashtrakutas of the Deccan, implacable enemies of the Pratiharas held sway over most of Central and Southern India from the middle of the eighth to the end of the tenth century and as a matter of policy cultivated friendly relations with the Arabs. It was the Rashtrakuta monarchs known to the Arab geographers as "Balhara" (Vallabha Raja) a title borne by all members of the dynasty. Thus, it was that while the Arabs were assured of Rashtrakuta goodwill, they simultaneously brought upon themselves the intense hostility of the Pratiharas. As early as 851 A.D. the Arab-Pratihara-Rashtrakuta relations had assumed somewhat of a diplomatic quiescence. An unknown Arab merchant visiting India in 851 A.D. was able to record it:

The Balhara is the most eminent of the princes of India...The inhabitants of the Balharas country say that if their kings reign and live for a long time, it is solely in consequence of the favor shown to the Arabs. In fact among all the kings there is no one to be found who is so partial to the Arabs as the Balhara; and his subjects follow his example.⁷⁶

⁷⁵R. C. Majumdar (ed.), The Age of Imperial Kanauj, Vol. IV, in the series The History and Culture of the Indian People (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1955), 19-40.

⁷⁶Silsilatu-l-Twarikh, Translated into English by Eusebius Renaudot, 1733 and subsequently published in Vol. I of Robert Kerr, A General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels (London: William Blackwood, 1824). Under the title of "Travels of Two Mahomedans in India and China in the Ninth Century," p. 56. The authorship of this account had traditionally been attributed to a certain merchant Sulaiman. See Elliot, History of India as Told by its Own

The Prathihara emperor "has very numerous forces, and is stronger in cavalry than all the other princes of the Indies. He is an enemy to the Arabs, neither is there a-y prince in India who has a greater aversion to the Mahomedans (sic)."⁷⁷

More than fifty years later, Mas'udi confirms the same status quo, "of all the kings of Sind and India; there is no one who pays greater respect to the Musulmans than the Balhara. In his kingdom Islam is honoured and protected." On the other hand, the Prathihara emperor "has four armies, according to the four quarters of the wind. Each of them numbers 700,000 or 900,000 men. The army of the north wars against the Prince of Multan, and with the Musulmans....The army of the south fights against the Balhara."⁷⁸

Approximately forty years after Mas'udi's visit, Sind was visited by Abu 'Ishaq al-Istakhri.⁷⁹ He found the idol of Multan

Historians, Vol. I, "The Arab Geographers," 1-3. In 1948 French scholar J. Sauvaget argued with considerable strength that the authorship of the said account remains dubious at best. See J. Sauvaget, Relation de la Chine et de l'Inde redegee en 851 (Paris: Societe d'edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1948), p. 3.

⁷⁷Kerr, op. cit., Vol. I, 56-57.

⁷⁸Elliot, History of India as Told by its Own Historians, Vol. I, 30-32. Sprenger's translation of this section is inadequate. He confuses the Balharas with the Prathihara emperors.

⁷⁹For Arabic account, see DeGoeje, Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, Vol. II. All references to Istakhri in this work are taken from Elliot, The History of India as Told by its Own Historians, Vol. I, 33-39, "Kitab-Akalim of Abu Ishak al-Istakhri." The observation of Arab voyagers, relating to the non-political aspects of Sind would be subsequently dealt with.

playing the same vital role in the defense mechanism of the city which Mas'udi had observed. His account also reveals the friendly intercourse prevailing between the Arabs and the Rashtrakutas. Multan and Mansura were independent of each other and ruled by the same dynasties which Mas'udi had noted. Ibn Hauqal was in Sind on two different occasions, 951 A.D. and probably in 976.⁸⁰ On the former occasion, he actually met Istakhri in Sind and exchange observations. The political scene had maintained essentially the same features as had existed during the preceding half century. During his visit, the traveler came upon at least four tiny but independent principalities west of Mansura. These included Kusdar, Makran, Muski and Turan.⁸¹ Like their larger neighbors, Mansura and Multan, all four deferred to the spiritual authority of the Caliph.

The observations of these traveler-scholars are of vital interest. What emerges from it all, on the political level, is the general atmosphere of hostility between the Arabs and the Pratiharas dating back to the middle of the ninth century. The friendly intercourse between the former and the Rashtrakutas is amply testified. The threat of Turko-Persian intervention had been minimized following the Saffarid episode. Mansura and Multan, now replacing a united Sind, were independent of Baghdad though acknowledged the spiritual

⁸⁰For Ibn Hauqal's account, see De Geoe, op. cit., Vol. II. Unless otherwise stated, all references to Ibn Hauqal are taken from Elliot's History of India as Told by its Own Historians, Vol. I, 39-51, "Ashkalu-l Bilad or the Kitabu-l Masalik Wa-l Mamalik of Ibn Haukal."

⁸¹De Geoe, op. cit., Vol. II, 231-35.

authority of the Caliph. On the whole, both principalities had been physically cut off from Arabic-speaking lands by the intervening Iranian element and were beset by constant threats of local Hindu chiefs. In extent of territory, they had been appreciably reduced since the days of the conquest. There is no evidence to indicate that both the successor states to a united Sind were mutually hostile to one another.

Ibn Hauqal completed his work around 976 A.D. Eighty years later, Sind was again visited by an Arab scholar, Muhammad ibn Ahmad Bashari al-Muqaddisi. His statement on the political affairs of Multan provides a striking theme for the historian. "In Multan the people mention in the Khutbah the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt and everything is managed according to his orders. Presents are always sent from this place to Egypt."⁸² Did the change of allegiance from Baghdad to Egypt occur prior to Muqaddisi's visit and did this change involve a corresponding change in the ruling house? According to reliable Ismailian sources predating ibn Hauqal's account Ismailian control over Multan was consolidated between 957 and 962 A.D. Moreover, this political takeover was largely facilitated by winning over the ruling family to the Ismailian cause.⁸³

⁸²Al-Muqaddisi, Ahsanu'l-Ta'asim, quoted in Sulaiman Nadvi, "Muslim Colonies in India Before the Muslim Conquest," Islamic Culture, Vol. VIII (1934), 613. Muqaddisi's statement has been substantiated by an independent source. A Persian geographical treatise by an unknown author, completed around 985 A.D., tells us that at Multan "the Khutba is read in the name of the Western one." Hudud al Alam, Translated and edited by V. Minorsky (London: Messrs. Luzac and Company, 1937), p. 89.

⁸³For more details see Chapter VIII, pp. 218-219.

During the final quarter of the tenth century, the Turko-Persian threat, dormant for almost seventy years, was renewed. The main steps in this process can be followed in a series of successive events, which commence with the establishment of the Ghaznavid dynasty in the highlands of Afghanistan by 962 A.D. The Ghaznavids had formed a plan to reduce the Hindu Shahis of eastern Afghanistan and northern Punjab to vassalage. As early as 963 A.D. this plan had assumed menacing proportions.

By 970 A.D. the Pratihara empire, once the dominant power of north India, had collapsed. Its successor states rivaled it neither in extent of territory nor in military power.⁸⁴ The Rashtrakutas of the Deccan, long-time Arab allies, disappeared from the scene by 973.⁸⁵

The border states in the northwest were now hard pressed by the Ghaznavids. Of these, the Shahis had to bear the first impact of Turkish hordes. Lesser states, at this juncture, realized the imminent danger and seemed to have acted together with cordiality. Thus it was that as early as 963 A.D. a defensive alliance was concluded between the Shahis, the Arabs of Multan and the ruler of Bhatinda, a state lying west of the Satlaj river in the Punjab.⁸⁶ The formation

⁸⁴R. C. Majumdar, The Age of Imperial Kanauj, Vol. IV, in The History and Culture of the Indian People, 82-131.

⁸⁵H. G. Rawlinson, India: A Short Cultural History (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967), p. 164.

⁸⁶Muhammad Qasim Farishta, The History of the Rise of the Mohemedan (sic) Power in India, Translated from the Persian by John Brigg (Calcutta: S. Dey, 1966), Vol. I, 6. According to Farishta,

of this alliance forced the Ghaznavids to relinquish all thoughts of subjugating northwestern India for the time being.

In 977 A.D., with the accession of Subuktagin as the ruler of Ghazni, the events took a dramatic turn. Subuktagin's first concern was to break the Multan-Shahi-Bhatinda alliance. This he was able to accomplish by winning over the ruler of Multan, though by what means he did so, we do not know.⁸⁷ By 978 A.D. all the states lying west of Sind, including Kusdar, were swallowed up by the Ghaznavids.⁸⁸ The long-awaited Ghaznavid-Shahi contest was now underway. By 990 A.D., the Shahis were defeated and forced to cede substantial portions of their western territories to the Ghaznavids.⁸⁹ The territorial ambitions of the Ghaznavids were such to excite sufficient alarm among the Arabs of Multan. Consequently, a second defensive alliance was concluded between Abul Fatah Dawood, the ruler of Multan, and Anandpal, the Shahi monarch who succeeded his father Jaipal in 1002 A.D.⁹⁰

the ruler of Multan who concluded this alliance was a Seikh Humeed who was the grandson of Abul Fatah Dawood, the last Arab ruler of Multan. Ghaznavid historians confirm the rule of Dawood but are silent on his Pedigree. Hence Farishta, writing five hundred years after the Ghaznavid historians, probably fabricated the myth of Seikh Humeed.

⁸⁷Farishta, op. cit., Vol. I, 6.

⁸⁸Muhammad Nazim, The Life and Time of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1931), p. 29.

⁸⁹Abu Nasr Muhammad al-Utbi, Kitabul-Yamini, Translated into Persian by Nasir al-Jurbadghani in 1206 A.D. (Tehran: n. p., 1855), p. 33.

⁹⁰Farishta, op. cit., Vol. I, 23.

Sultan Mahmud (997-1030 A.D.), the most illustrious of the Ghaznavid monarchs, now decided to pursue the territorial ambitions of his father. A pretext was easily found. Multan, which a few years earlier had professed friendship with the Ghaznavids, now had deserted them. Such an act could not go unpunished. A punitive expedition must therefore be conducted against Multan. The route pursued in that campaign lay across Shahi territories and the Shahis refused permission for such a passage. The second Shahi-Ghaznavid contest had begun. In 1006 A.D. the Shahi forces were routed near Peshawar.⁹¹

Ghaznavid forces now marched against Multan and carried the city following a week's siege. A dreadful massacre of the Karmatians followed.⁹² A sudden rebellion in Khurasan, however, compelled the Sultan to return to Central Asia. In 1010 A.D., Mahmud decided to complete the subjugation of Multan. In October of that year he set out for Central Punjab. Multan was wrested from its feeble ruler Dawood, who was carried away in captivity, the Karmatians were once more massacred, and Multan annexed.⁹³

⁹¹Utbi, op. cit., pp. 290-91; Abu Sa'id Muhammad Gardizi, Kitab Zainul Akhbar, Edited by Muhammad Nazim (Cambridge: E. G. Brown Memorial Fund, 1928), p. 67; Nazim, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

⁹²Utbi, op. cit., pp. 290-91. According to one account so many Karmatians were slaughtered that "a stream of blood flowed from Lohari gate which was on the western side of the town" and "the hand of the Sultan was stuck fast to the hilt of the sword on account of congealed blood, and had to be immersed in a bath of hot water before it could be loosed." Quoted in Nazim, op. cit., p. 9 from Adabu'l-Muluk Wa Kifayalu'l-Mamluk, a medieval work of uncertain authorship.

⁹³Gardizi, op. cit., p. 70; Farishta, op. cit., Vol. I, 29; Nazim, op. cit., p. 99.

As pointed out earlier, Kusdar had been annexed by Amir Subuktagin as early as 978 A.D., but Mansura, lying immediately to the east of it, was spared.⁹⁴ Mansura enjoyed another forty years of respite. On the return journey from the Somnath expedition in Gujarat in 1025 A.D., Sultan Mahmud passed through lower Sind and annexed Mansura. The name of its last ruler is mentioned only by Farrukhi, one of the Sultan's court-poets. It was Khafif.⁹⁵

Thus ended the authority which the Arabs had exercised over Sind since the passage of their triumphant armies through the Valley of the Indus from 712 to 715 A.D. To be sure, Muslim dominion over Sind was never challenged until February 1843 when, on the battlefield of Miani, Sir Charles Napier inflicted a crushing defeat upon the motley host of the native amirs.⁹⁶ But the Arabs had passed away from the Indian scene as effective rulers of any particular section. The task of subjugating all north India for Islamic arms was left for the Turkish horsemen, who from their bases in the Hindukush mountains descended upon the plains of the Indus and Ganges with frightful fury.

The Arab dominion over Sind, though of over a relatively small portion of India, was not without significance. Through long

⁹⁴See above, p. 179.

⁹⁵Farrukhi Sistani, Diwan, Edited by Muhammad Dabir Siaqi (Tehran: Sharqat-i-Nisbi, 1957), p. 82.

⁹⁶Percival Spear, The Oxford History of Modern India, 1870-1947 (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 165.

standing in the area, the Arabs indeed left their permanent marks on its heritage. In lifting the frontier barriers between Sind and their western empire across Persia, their primary contribution enlivened international commerce in that distant region. Furthermore, the cultural exchanges which percolated in this new and exotic terrain became visible. It is to these contributions that we should devote our discussions in the following chapter since they helped in the creation of a peculiar civilization, neither altogether Arab nor completely Indian.

CHAPTER VIII

COMMERCE AND CULTURE IN SIND

For three centuries the Arabs dominated the politics of the lower Indus Valley, though seldom with any marked degree of efficiency. Perhaps the most profound impact of this political upheaval was exerted over the commerce of the area which was now diverted to new channels. For Sind was now drawn into the whirlpool of Islamic maritime activities stretching from Canton in the east to Spain in the west. Cultural exchanges grew side by side with those of politics and commerce, so that by the beginning of the eleventh century an Indo-Arab culture was clearly visible in the area.

Commerce

Arab commercial activities in the Indian Ocean date back to the first milenium B.C. That trade was mainly doncuted via the Red Sea and the Persian Bulf. The South Arabian kingdoms of the Minaeans and the Sabaeans were the chief beneficiaries of that traffic.¹ Through-

¹"The first major kingdoms discernible through the mists of South Arabian antiquity were the Sabaeen and the Minaean which during a considerable part of their history were contemporaries." Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 52. The Minaean kingdom in north Yemen extended its greatest influence between the eighth and the third century before Christ. "The Sabaeans were the most distinguished branch of the entire South Arabian family...Their original homeland

out the next seven centuries the riches of those states were rapidly increasing though by the third century before Christ the Minaeans had been reduced to vassalage by the Sabaeans. South Arabian prosperity was duly noted in 113 B.C. by Agatharchides, president of the renowned Alexandria library:

These are the nations which have enriched the Syria of Ptolemy; these are the nations that furnished the most profitable agencies to the industry of the Phoenicians and a variety of advantages which are incalculable. They possess themselves every profusion in luxury..., far superior in degree to anything that is seen in Europe. Their expense of living rivals the magnificance of princes.²

The results of this unprecedented prosperity were not always gratifying. In order to secure a foothold in this lucrative trade, the Roman Emperor Augustus dispatched Aelius Gallus to South Arabia in 24 B.C. The expedition was a complete failure.³ Rome, however, was determined, by means fair or foul, to share in the wealth of South Arabia. Eighty years after the abortive attempt to subdue the area by force, we find Rome in alliance with the Himyarite prince

lay South Najran in the Yemen district." Hitti, op. cit., p. 53. "The 'Phoenicians' of the south, the Sabaeans, developed a highly profitable re-export business and carrying trade for the frankincense, cloth and silks of China, the pearls from the Persian Gulf and the fabrics of India, as well as for their own home-grown spices and perfumes..." Anthony Nutting, The Arabs (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., 1964), p. 6. Also see De Lacy O'Leary, Arabia Before Muhammad (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1927), pp. 86-106 and George Hourani, Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Medieval Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 11.

²Quoted in William Vincent, Commerce and Navigation of the Ancients in the Indian Ocean (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1807), Vol. II, 33-35.

³A. Sprenger, "The Campaign of Aelius Gallus in Arabia," The Journal of Royal Asiatic Society (1872), pp. 121-41; O'Leary, op. cit., pp. 74-79.

Zafar in present-day Yamen, where the tribe of Himyar was replacing the Sabaens as the leading power of South Arabia.⁴ The fear of Roman intervention "put whole fear with the hearts of the Arabs and this with the sufficient policing of the Red Sea, very soon produced good results so that the trade around Arabia revived and increased beyond its proportions in Ptolemaic times."⁵

The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, a handbook of the coast of the Indian Ocean for use by merchants and pilots, compiled by an unknown Greek merchant of Egypt around 50-60 A.D., describes vividly the post of Muza, located at the southern end of the Red Sea:

The whole place is crowded with Arab shipowners and seafaring men and is busy with affairs of commerce; for they carry on a trade with the far-side coast (east Africa) and with Barygaza (Gulf of Cambay) sending their own ships there.⁶

The port of Cane was situated roughly four hundred miles east of present-day Aden. Here "all the Frankincense grown in the country is brought to it as a mart on camels and local skin-rafts and boats. And this place too has a trade with the far-side market towns, with Barygaza and Scythia (Sind) and Omana."⁷ The island of Socotra lying

⁴The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, translated and edited by Willfred Schoff (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), Chapter 23. In 115 B.C. the Sabaeans had been succeeded by the Himyarites, a highland tribe from the southwest, who established a kingdom that was to last six hundred years.

⁵O'Leary, op. cit., p. 79.

⁶The Periplus, Chapters 20-34.

⁷Ibid.

approximately four hundred miles southeast of Cane and commanding some degree of traffic, between the Red Sea ports and India, had a substantial population of Arabs, Indians and Greek traders.⁸ In the Persian Gulf, located close to the present-day Shatt al-Arab region, were two flourishing commercial centers, Charax and Apologus, both mainly Arab in character and engaged in lucrative overseas trade with India on the one hand and with South Arabia and the Red Sea regions on the other.⁹

The navigational complexities involved in the great East-West trade were greatly facilitated by the discovery that the Monsoons followed a set pattern. They blew steadily for six months from east to west and then for the same duration in the opposite direction.¹⁰ The date of this revolutionary discovery is a matter of some dispute and it has been placed as early as 90 B.C. and as late as 45 A.D., but we do know that the wind movements were recorded by a Greek pilot named Hippalus.¹¹ Vessels could now sail directly to the Indus delta from South Arabian ports and Greek ships soon instituted direct sailing to Malabar in South India. The Periplus does not mention Arab ships sailing south of Barygaza in Gujrat region of Western

⁸Ibid.

⁹Hourani, op. cit., p. 16.

¹⁰The Periplus, Chapter 57; Pliny, Natural History, Translated by H. Rackham, No. 352 in Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), Vol. II, Book VI, 415.

¹¹O'Leary places it in 45 A.D., p. 79, while Hourani dates it around 90 B.C., p. 27.

India "but it is very probable that they had been sailing to Malabar for centuries to fetch the timber of which their own ships were built."¹²

By 200 A.D. the Greek mariners had successfully rounded Ceylon and were engaged in commercial intercourse with ports on the Ganges delta on the one hand and those of South China on the other.¹³ Chinese annals speak of an embassy dispatched by An-Tun (Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antonius) to the court of Emperor Huan-ti in 166 A.D. It arrived at Tongkin and proceeded overland to the imperial court.¹⁴ Roman trade with the Far East and India was indeed impressive, but so was the trade deficit against the realm of the Ceasars. Pliny laments that "in no year does India drain our empire of less than five hundred and fifty million of sesterces, giving back her own wares in exchange, which are sold among us at fully one hundred times their own prime cost."¹⁵ Judging from the level of general prosperity enjoyed by the Arab kingdoms we may fairly infer that the Arab middlemen in many cases were responsible in no mean degree for the rise in prices, lamented by Pliny.

¹²Hourani, op. cit., p. 33.

¹³Ibid., p. 35. As early as 45 A.D. a Ceylonese embassy had visited Rome. See H. A. Hulugalli, Ceylon of the Early Travellers (Columbo: Multi-Packs, Ltd., 1965), Part I, "Ceylon Envoys in Rome (45 A.D.)," p. 29.

¹⁴Friedrich Hirth, China and the Roman Orient (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1966), p. 42. The text contains both the Chinese and the English versions. According to Hourani, "The 'embassy' probably consisted of merchants crossing from East Africa," p. 35.

¹⁵Pliny, op. cit., Vol. XII, 34.

The prosperity which this trade had created for the coastal Arab kingdoms was itself dependent upon certain items flowing mainly from the East to the West. Of these, pepper commanded the highest places. This product was mainly concentrated in the South Indian coastal area of Malabar. It was the importance of pepper trade which brought about direct sailing from the West to the Malabar coast as previously pointed out.¹⁶ Cinnamon, another Indian product, was carried in the Indian vessels up to Socotra or Guardafui whence it was supplied to Rome through the Nile route by the Arabian traders.¹⁷ The Periplus informs us that costs was exported from Barbaricum on the Indus and from Barygaza on the Gulf of Cambay.¹⁸ It was the product of Kashmir and was used by the Romans as a spice, perfume and ointment. Indigo was exported to the West from Barbaricum.¹⁹ It was used in Western Asia, Egypt and the Mediterranean countries as a dye and as medicine.²⁰ Wheat was mainly the product of northwestern India. In his travels through the Indus Valley in the middle of the seventh century, Hiuen Tsiang refers to the abundance of wheat.²¹ Barygaza was the main outlet for its export.²²

¹⁶See also Haripada Chakraborti, Trade and Commerce of Ancient India (C. 200 B.C.-C. 650 A.D.) (Calcutta: Academic Publishers, 1966), p. 227.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 228.

¹⁸The Periplus, Chapters 39, 49.

¹⁹Ibid., Chapter 39.

²⁰Pliny, op. cit., Vol. XXXV, 25-27.

²¹Si-Yu-Ki, Buddhist Records of the Western World, Translated by Samuel Beal (London: Truebners and Co., 1900), Vol. II, 272.

²²The Periplus, Chapter 14. Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang refers to abundance of wheat in lower Indus delta in the middle of the seventh century. Beal, op. cit., Vol. II, 272.

Other articles of export to the West included highly prized Indian muslin for which Barygaza was one of the main outlets.²³ Various kinds of wood was in great demand, such as ebony, teakwood, blackwood and sandalwood. The Periplus records that large naval vessels were dispatched with ebony and other kinds of precious timber from Barygaza to the marts on the Persian Gulf.²⁴ In fact, the entire Western coast of India, including Gujarat and the Malabar regions, engaged extensively in maritime commerce in rare timber.²⁵ Diamonds were exported from the ports of Muziris and Neleynda.²⁶ Ivory constituted one of the main articles of trade. The main outlets for this item were the ports of Barygaza, Muziris and Neleynda.²⁷

Such then were the main Indian exports to the West. Their traffic created a favorable balance of trade in favor of India. In the process, the Arab middleman, presenting a formidable challenge to his Greek and Indian rivals, accumulated vast fortunes. To be

²³The Periplus, pp. 48, 51.

²⁴Ibid., p. 36. Also see Pliny, op. cit., Book XII, pp. 8, 9.

²⁵Teakwood is the most important building timber of India since it resists action of water. It is found in the forests of Malabar, Travancore and Gujarat. Sandalwood is a native of South India. Eminent travelers such as Cosmos Indicopleustes, sixth-century Christian monk, and Hiuen Tsiang, seventh-century Chinese Buddhist monk, take note of the production and export of Indian timber. See Cosmos Indicopleustes, The Christian Topology of Cosmas, an Egyptian Monk, Translated from the Greek and edited by J. W. McCrindle (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1897), p. 366; Beal, op. cit., Vol. II, 232; The Periplus, p. 36.

²⁶The Periplus, p. 56; Beal, op. cit., Vol. I, 178 and Vol. II, 229, 265 and 277.

²⁷Ibid., p. 218. Also see Pliny, Natural History, Book VIII, p. 4.

sure, the same middlemen also brought merchandise to India from areas as far as Italy. These items can be enumerated briefly. The Periplus speaks of slave trade which was carried on from Omana to Barygaza. In general, slave trade was not restricted to Omana but various ports indulged extensively in human traffic. According to one authority, the "Arabs were inveterate slave-traders."²⁸ Arabian and Egyptian horses were greatly in demand in India.²⁹ In Ceylon the horses were exempt from import duty.³⁰ Flax and linen were imported at Barbaricum, Muziris, Neleynda and Barygaza, mainly from Egypt.³¹ Other items arriving at Indian ports from the West included wine, chiefly from Omana, and Apologus;³² frankincense from South Arabia;³³ gold coins and plates from Rome;³⁴ antimony from eastern Arabia and Carmania.³⁵ Amber, glass, copper and coral arrived from various parts of the West.³⁶

The maritime state of affairs described above lasted to the end of the second century A.D. Thereafter followed a period of re-

²⁸See Schoff's commentary on The Periplus, p.161.

²⁹The Periplus, pp. 24, 28.

³⁰Cosmos, op. cit., p.

³¹The Periplus, p. 27. Also see Pliny, op. cit., Book XIX, pp. 1-3.

³²The Periplus, p. 29.

³³Pliny, op. cit., Book XII, p. 30.

³⁴The Periplus, p. 49.

³⁵Ibid., p. 49.

³⁶The Periplus, p. 49 and Chakraborti, op. cit., p. 280.

traction by the Arab commercial enterprise lasting for four centuries.

George Hourani has summed it up admirably:

The commercial situation at this period was as follows. Ceylon was the entrepot for sea trade between China, and the Near East. Ships of the Chinese and other Far Eastern nations used to sail as far west as Ceylon, and from here west-ward. The trade was in the hands of the Persians and Axumites. Greek merchant ships used to sail as far as Adulis or occasionally a little beyond Bab al-Mandab. Of Arab navigation we hear nothing at all.³⁷

The main agency which effected this change was the rise of the Sassanids in Iran who were determined to gain control of the maritime commerce between India and the West. In so doing, they reduced the Arab commercial activities to a mere trickle. The South Arabian kingdoms were not able to withstand the foreign pressure, so that toward the end of the fourth century the kingdom of Axum undertook an invasion of the coast of Hijaz and by 350 A.D. annexed Himyar (al-Yaman).³⁸ Axumite authority dwindled during the following two centuries so that in 522 A.D. a second invasion of South Arabia was undertaken.³⁹ The somewhat ineffectual Axumite authority lasted until 575 A.D., when South Arabia was annexed to the Persian

³⁷Hourani, Arab Seafaring, p. 40.

³⁸O'Leary, Arabia Before Muhammad, p. 102. "Before the Axumite invasion, therefore, all kingdoms of the south-west were united under the Himyarites and thus later writers, both Greek and Arab, use 'Himyarites' as a general name for all the people of South Arabia." O'Leary, Ibid.

³⁹Cosmos was actually present at Adulis when the Axumite naval forces were being dispatched to South Arabia. Cosmos, op. cit., p. 55.

empire.⁴⁰ The political conditions of South Arabia vividly illustrate the economic rivalries prevalent in the Indian Ocean. The Axumite invasion of South Arabia was undertaken on the urging of the Byzantine emperor, the naval vessels of Byzantine actively rendered aid to the Axumite forces on their way to South Arabia.⁴¹ Byzantine interests had been stimulated in the enormously profitable silk trade almost exclusively controlled by the Persians. Emperor Justinian (483-565 A.D.) had entered into negotiation with the Axumites in 530 A.D. with the proposal that:

By purchasing silk from the Indians and reselling it to the Romans (they) would themselves gain much money and cause benefit to the Romans in this respect alone that they would be no longer compelled to pay their money to the enemy...But it was impossible for the Ethiopians to buy silk from the Indians because the Persian merchants always established themselves at the harbours where the Indian ships first put in because they inhabit the adjoining country and buy up the entire cargo.⁴²

The Byzantine-Abbysinian pressure, however, failed to break the Persian hold on the Indian Ocean, and by the time of the Prophet's death in 632 A.D. the Persian naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean was

⁴⁰Procopius, History of the Wars, Translated from Greek by H. B. Dewing, No. 48 in the Loeb Classical Series (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), Vol. I, Chapter XX, Sec. 9-12; Tabari, Tarikh al-Rusul Wa al-Muluk, Edited by De Goeje, Prima Series, Vol. II, 898, 957-58; Hadi Hassan, A History of the Persian Navigation (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1928), p. 72.

⁴¹O'Leary, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

⁴²Procopius, op. cit., Vol. I, Chapter XX, Sections 9-13.

fairly unchallenged.⁴³ There is strong evidence to show that even prior to the rise of Islam the Iranians had succeeded in rounding the Malaya Peninsula and had begun to arrive at Canton.⁴⁴

With the overthrow of the Persian empire by the rising forces of Islam, the Arabs inherited a maritime traffic the importance of which they were quick to realize. For almost four centuries the Sassanids had successfully subordinated Arab commercial interests to their own. The newcomers were now anxious to step into the well-established sea routes and marts. The Byzantines had managed to maintain their northern territory intact and were thus able to present a formidable barrier to the Arab naval activity on the Mediterranean. So helpless were the Arabs on the sea that in 645 A.D. a Byzantine naval task force succeeded in wresting Alexandria out of Arab hands for a brief period.⁴⁵

⁴³For a detailed account of Sassanid paramountcy in the Indian Ocean, see Hadi Hassan, A History of the Persian Navigation, pp. 59-62.

⁴⁴Hourani, op. cit., Appendix to Chapter I. "Direct sailing between the Persian Gulf and China in Pre-Islamic Times," pp. 46-47. This evidence is based upon the record of a Chinese traveller I-Ching who sailed on a Persian vessel from Canton to Sumatra in 671 A.D. See I-Ching, A Record of the Buddhist Religion, translated by J. Takakusu (Oxford: The University Press, 1896), pp. xxviii-xxx. Though the voyage took place almost four decades after the overthrow of the Persian empire by the Arabs, Hourani believes that "it does not seem likely that the Persians began these enterprising voyages immediately after their defeat by the Arabs; it is far more credible that they date back to the Sassanid period." See Hourani, op. cit., p. 47.

⁴⁵Aly Muhammad Fahmy, "The Muslim Navy During the Days of the Early Caliphate," Islamic Review (March 1952), p. 25; Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs: From the Earliest Times to the Present, tenth edition (New York: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1970), p. 166; A. J. Butler, The Arab Conquest of Egypt (Oxford: At the University Press, 1902), pp. 121-125.

The Arab naval might, however, was quick to assert itself in a remarkably short period so that Cyprus was occupied in 649 A.D. and in 655 A.D., a joint Syrian-Egyptian fleet destroyed a Byzantine armada of roughly five hundred ships at the naval battle of Phoenix.⁴⁶ Byzantine naval supremacy in the Mediterranean was threatened but never completely destroyed. In fact, "in the following centuries the Arabs were always held in check in the Eastern Mediterranean by the Byzantine navy; indeed, its raids on the coasts of Syria, Palestine and Egypt were long a cause of alarm."⁴⁷ Following the Arab advance in the lands surrounding the eastern and southern Mediterranean, a vital change had taken effect in the economic life of the area. For "after the seventh century two rival faiths supported by the organization of empires stood facing each other across the narrow waters. Instead of a highway the Mediterranean became a frontier, a sea of war--a change which ruined Alexandria."⁴⁸

Arab naval achievements in the Indian Ocean were more spectacular than in the Mediterranean. Their interests in the lucrative commerce of the region having been stimulated once more, a policy now rapidly evolved which aimed at establishing maritime supremacy over the eastern waters. The fall of the Sassanids rendered this development less difficult to be carried out. Initial attempts in the execution of this policy were discouraging. A naval task

⁴⁶Hitti, op. cit., p. 167.

⁴⁷Hourani, op. cit., p. 56.

⁴⁸Hourani, op. cit., p. 52.

force dispatched against southern Persia in 638 A.D. met with complete failure.⁴⁹ Three years later, Caliph Umar (634-644 A.D.), in order to ward off attacks on fellow Muslims on the coast of Abyssinia, dispatched naval vessels under Alqama ibn Mijazziz. The entire force was wrecked.⁵⁰ A more daring act was undertaken in 636 A.D. by the Arab governor of Bahrain who promptly but unsuccessfully attempted to capture three Indian coastal strongholds more than a thousand miles away.⁵¹

With the fall of the Sassanids before the middle of the seventh century, however, the Indian Ocean was wide open for Arab commercial penetration. The process was remarkably swift. By 660 A.D. the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf had become Arab lakes, and Arab vessels could roam a greater part of the Indian Ocean unchallenged. The west coast of India was to feel the full impact of Arab commercial enterprises for the next three centuries. Initial attempts to gain a foothold on India's west coast were military in design. Hence the attacks on Broach, Tana and Daybul, which have been previously alluded to. By 715 Sind and Daybul therewith were in Arab hands. Further attempts aimed at extending Arab hegemony over the coastal

⁴⁹Al-Alaa ibn al-Hadrami, the governor of Bahrain crossed the Persian Gulf and landed on the coast of Southern Iran, proceeding thence to Persepolis. He was cut off from the sea by the Persians and his forces trapped. A relief column sent overland rescued the trapped governor. See Tabari, op. cit., Prima Series, Vol. V, 2545; Fahmy, op. cit., p. 24; Hassan, op. cit., p. 95.

⁵⁰Fahmy, op. cit., p. 24.

⁵¹See above, Chapter V, pp. 84-85.

areas of Gujarat failed when an Arab fleet was destroyed off the coast of Kathiawar Peninsula in 756 A.D.⁵² A similar attempt met with disaster twenty years later.⁵³ On both occasions, the naval power of the Saindhavas, feudatories of the Pratiharas, acted as the main deterrent to the expansionist schemes of the Arabs.⁵⁴

The year 776 A.D. is significant. It marks the end of any further Arab military exploits on the Indian Coast. Henceforth Arab penetration became purely commercial and peaceful. We have no written record touching the existence of post-Islamic mercantile Arab communities on the Indian coast prior to the fall of Sind. However, such settlements in Ceylon anti-date the establishment of Arab dominion over Sind.⁵⁵ Such a consideration suggests that perhaps Arab merchants had simultaneously settled along the Malabar coast before the end of the seventh century. The point can be further strengthened by the existence of pre-Islamic Persian settlements on India's west coast, for "the Persians established churches in the ports of Male in Malabar and Calliana near Bombay..."⁵⁶

⁵²K. Sridharan, A Maritime History of India (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1965), p. 24.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴According to R. C. Majumdar, "the credit of saving India from Arab invasion by sea justly belongs to the Saindhavas, who are chiefly remarkable as being one of the few powers in ancient India with a distinguished record of naval exploits." See R. C. Majumdar, Ancient India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1960), p. 360.

⁵⁵As previously pointed out, the capture of the relatives of deceased Arab merchants in Ceylon by the pirates off Daybul had provided the pretext to extend Arab control over Sind. See above, Chapter III, pp. 11-12.

⁵⁶Hourani, op. cit., p. 41.

The Arabs, following the destruction of the Persian empire, accommodated themselves within the Persian commercial channels and in so doing might have conceivably planted mercantile colonies along with the Persians.⁵⁷

The greatest era of Arab maritime enterprises, however, commence with the fall of Sind. Contacts with the Far East were rapidly increased. By 758 A.D. the number of Arab and Persian traders at Canton had swollen appreciably. In that year, for some reason unknown to us, these dissatisfied traders pillaged the city, setting it on fire and then fled to their vessels.⁵⁸

Canton was reopened in 792 to foreign trade.⁵⁹ Internal upheavals of China, however, interrupted this trade in 879 A.D. when the forces of the rebel Huang Ch'ao sacked Canton and slaughtered the foreign settlers before they had time to escape.⁶⁰ Beyond this date,

⁵⁷According to the native traditions of Malabar Muslims, known as Moplas, the Arab traders settled in the area during the seventh century and intermarried with the native population. See Tara Chand, Influence of Islam on Indian Culture (Allahabad: The Indian Press, Ltd., 1946), p. 32.

⁵⁸E. Bretschneider, On the Knowledge Possessed by the Ancient Chinese of the Arabs and Arabian Colonies and Other Western Countries (London: Trubner and Co., 1871), p. 10; Henry Yule, Cathay and the Way Thither (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1866), p. ixix; Chau Ju-Kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, entitled Chu-fan-chi, Translated from the Chinese and annotated by Friedrich Hirth and W. W. Rockhill (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1966), pp. 14-15; Edward H. Schafer, The Golden Peaches of Samarkand: A Study of T'ang Exotics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1963), pp. 15-16.

⁵⁹Hourani, op. cit., p. 66. From 758 to 792 A.D., foreign vessels called at Hanoi instead of Canton.

⁶⁰Abu Zaid, Silsilatu'l-Tawarikh, in Robert Kerr, A General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels (London: William Blackwood, 1824), Vol. I, 69. According to Abu Zaid, "there perished one hundred and twenty thousand Mahomedans, Jews, Christians and Parsees";

the trade with the Far East rapidly declined. However, the Arab and Chinese merchants continued to meet at Kalah on the west coast of the Malaccan peninsula.⁶¹ These contacts lasted at least through the first quarter of the tenth century.⁶²

The western emporia of this far-flung eastern trade were the Persian Gulf ports of al-Basrah, al-Uballah and Siraf. The former two were located at the delta of the Tigris while Siraf was situated on the coast of Iran and approximately three hundred miles southeast of Basrah.⁶³ Treacherous shallows and whirlpools created navigational difficulties for Basrah and Uballah, and consequently Siraf gained a position of pre-eminence as the chief headquarter of Eastern trade by 850 A.D.⁶⁴ Hence the Sirafi merchants had amassed fabulous sums of money on account of Eastern trade. Both Istakhri and Ibn Hauqal were impressed by the wealth and splendour of that city.⁶⁵

Mas'udi, Muruj al-Zuhab, Vol. I, 325-25. Mas'udi puts the number of foreign merchants slain at two hundred thousand.

⁶¹Chan Ju-Kua, p. 18; Hourani, op. cit., p. 78; Muhammad Husayn Nainar, Java as Noticed by Arab Geographers (Madras: The University of Madras Press, 1953), p. 2.

⁶²Mas'udi, op. cit., p. 328.

⁶³On Uballah and Basrah, see Hassan, op. cit., pp. 62;73; Le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, Third Impression (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1966), pp. 43-46, 47; Hourani, op. cit., p. 69; Mas'udi, op. cit., pp. 258-59; Istakhri, Kitab Masalik al Mamalik, in De Goeje, op. cit., Vol. I, 32.

⁶⁴Akhbar as-Sin Wal-Hind: Relations de la Chine et de l'Inde redeggee en 851, Section 13; Robert Kerr, op. cit., Vol. I, 52.

⁶⁵According to Istakhri, numerous houses were constructed of teakwood and consisted of several stories. The city rivaled Shiraz in splendour. A friend of Istakhri, engaged in Eastern trade, had

Two alternate routes could be followed on the way to Canton. Both have been described in considerable detail by Arab authors. In Akhbar al-Sin Wal-Hind can be found the various stages between Siraf and Canton if one was to cut across to South India rather than coast the entire western seaboard of India.⁶⁶ Cargo was loaded at Siraf and it included goods received from Basrah, Oman and other places. The vessels then set sail for Masqat and obtained fresh supply of water. Cutting across the Indian Ocean, they called at Kulam-Mali on the Malabar coast, "a month's voyage from Masqat with the wind aft." From here, the next stop was Langabalus (Nicobar Islands) where "the men wear no clothes and neither understand Arabic." The next main calling stations were Kalah-bar on the western coast of the Malaya peninsula, Tiyyuma, an island off the east coast of that peninsula, Kundranj and Sanf, both on the eastern coast of Viet Nam, the land of Sundur-fulat and finally Canton. The total number of days required to negotiate the distance from Masqat to Canton amounted to one hundred and twenty, excluding stops. The route from the Persian Gulf to Canton "was the longest in regular use by mankind before the European expansion in the sixteenth century and it merits attention as a remarkable achievement."⁶⁷ The alternate route required the

spent thirty thousand dinars on a new house. See Istakhri, Kitab Masalik al Mamalik, in De Goeje, op. cit., Vol. II, 128. Ibn Hauqal informs us that a Sirafi merchant had gained sixty million dirhams from oversea commerce. Ibn Hauqal, Kitab al Masalik wal Mamalik, in De Goeje, op. cit., Vol. I, 206.

⁶⁶ Akhbar al-Sin Wal-Hind, Sections 11-16.

⁶⁷ Hourani, op. cit., p. 61.

coasting of the entire western and eastern seaboard of India or just the western section and then cutting across the Bay of Bengal. The Arab geographer ibn Khurdhabah provides the names of fourteen ports of call between Basrah and Ceylon.⁶⁸ Of these, the more important ones included Tez in Makran, Daybul in Sind, Khambayat and Tana in Gujarat and Kolam Mali in Malabar. By far the greater number of ships cut across the Bay of Bengal from Ceylon on their way to the Far East.⁶⁹ Main Arab exports to China included costly fabrics of linen, cotton or wool including rugs, metal work, iron ore and bullion.⁷⁰ At Canton, cargoes of silk fabrics, camphor, musk and spices were loaded.⁷¹ This list is not exhaustive by any means. We must bear in mind that Arab vessels acted as main carriers of trade in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and in so doing were constantly transporting goods of many regions.⁷²

As a natural consequence of this vast maritime activity, numerous Arab mercantile colonies had sprung up along the whole

⁶⁸Ibn Khurdhabah, Kitab'l Masalik wa'l Mamalik, in De Goeje, op. cit., Vol. III, 61-64.

⁶⁹The Bay of Bengal was known to the Arab mariners as al-Ranj. See S. M. Yusuf, "Al-Ranj: The Route of Arab Mariners Across the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Siam in the 3rd and 4th Centuries A.D." Islamic Culture, Vol. XXIX (1955).

⁷⁰Hourani, op. cit., p. 70.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 73.

⁷²For an exhaustive treatment of articles of trade between China and the Islamic lands, see Chau Ju-Kua, General Index, pp. 243-267. Also, consult Schafer, Golden Peaches of Samarkand: A Study of T'ang Exotics, pp. 13-26, 169-174, 185-189, 198-199.

western coast of India and as far away as Canton. At the latter place, dissatisfaction with existing regulations had led to the pillaging and burning of the city by the foreigners, the majority of whom were Arabs and Persians.⁷³ Prior to the massacre of 879 A.D. already alluded to, the Imperial Chinese authorities had deemed it prudent to appoint a Muhammadan judge or "Qadi" from amongst the foreigners to exercise jurisdiction over his fellow co-religionists according to the "Sharia" or the Quranic precepts of Islamic law. On Friday, the judge cited the name of the reigning Caliph in the "Khutba."⁷⁴ The Arab settlements in the Rashtrakuta dominions fared well. "In fact, among all the kings there is no one to be found who is so partial to the Arabs as the Balhara; and his subjects follow his example."⁷⁵ Mas'udi, who visited India in 915 A.D., was impressed at the flourishing Muslim communities:

In 304 A.H., I went from Lar in the kingdom of Bilhara to Cheymur. The name of the ruler of this town was "Janch." At that time there was a population of ten thousand Muslims which was composed of those who were born in India, in Seyraf, Oman, Basrah, Baghdad and other places, and who had settled down here. Among them there are respectable merchants like Musa bin Ishag of Sandalun. Abu Sa'id Ma'ruf bin Zakarya filled the post of

⁷³See above, p.

⁷⁴Akhbar as-Sin Wal-Hind, Section 11; Also, Kerr, op. cit., p. 52.

⁷⁵This quotation is taken from Elliot, History of India as Told by its Own Historians, Vol. I, 5; in Kerr, it reads slightly different, "for there are no princes more heartily affectionate to the Arabs, and their subjects profess the same kindness for us." p. 56.

"Hunarmand." Hunarmand means the Sirdar of Muslims and the Rajah selects one of the Muslim nobles to whom are entrusted all matters concerning the Muslims. Beyasarah means the Muslims born in India.⁷⁶

The mosques in Rahtrakuta dominions were "large and splendid."⁷⁷

Ibn Hauqal visiting India in 977 A.D. confirms Mas'udi's impressions.

"There are Jama Masjids at Famhal, Sindan, Saimur and Kambaya, all of which are strong and great cities and the Muhammadan precepts are openly observed."⁷⁸

Thus it was that for three centuries following the subjugation of Sind, Arab commercial energies continued to assert themselves relentlessly over a vast area, stretching from Basrah to Canton. The prosperity which they had created was particularly marked in Sind. The strategic strength of the lower Indus Valley was obviously enormous. It was, after all, the sole portion of India the Arabs had most successfully occupied, and it commanded the trade routes leading from Central Asia and northwest India to the Indian Ocean on the one

⁷⁶Al-Mas'udi, Muruj al-dhahab (Egypt: Al-Azhar, 1885), Vol. II, 85-86. Neither Elliot nor Sprenger contain this section in their English translations. The above translation is taken from Suleyman Nadvi, "Muslim Colonies in India Before the Muslim Conquest," Islamic Culture, Vol. VIII (1934), 488.

⁷⁷Mas'udi, op. cit., p. 389.

⁷⁸Ibn Hauqal, Ashkalu-l Bilad, in Elliot, op. cit., Vol. I, 49. Buzurg ibn Shahriyar, a Persian mariner, compiled his work, Ajaibu'l-Hind either at the close of the ninth or the beginning of the tenth century. He refers to the prosperous Muslim communities in India on a number of occasions. For English translation, see The Book of the Marvels of India, translated by Marcel Devic (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1928), pp. 30, 42, 51, 60 and 71. This work, however, has not commanded a respectable position as a work of historic authenticity.

hand, and participated in the maritime coastal trade on the other. As part of the Caliphate, Sind enjoyed the security and prestige which is derived from association with a vast and well-established empire. The Sind dinar was widely used as a medium of exchange in the international transactions.⁷⁹ Daybul was a bustling seaport. "It is a large mart," reports Ibn Hauqal, "and the port not only of this but neighboring regions...It is famous for the manufacture of swords. The inhabitants generally maintain themselves by their commerce."⁸⁰ Multan was on the main route from Khurasan to Daybul and consequently "the caravans for Khurasan assemble here."⁸¹ Kandabil, lying on the high road to Sijistan, was also a flourishing trade center.⁸² The Abbassids, from their bases in Khurasan, were fully aware of the strategic position enjoyed by Sind in controlling the outlet for Central Asian goods bound for sea. This explains their anxiety and their determination to force open this route even before their rule was consolidated over the Caliphate.⁸³ At a later date, the Fatimidis, implacable enemies of the Abbassids, executed a series of maneuvers in Sind, aimed at diverting the commercial channels to Egypt. This they were able to accomplish by a massive

⁷⁹Abu Zaid, Silsilatu'l Twarikh, in Robert Kerr, op. cit., I, 95.

⁸⁰Ibn Hauqal, op. cit., p. 49.

⁸¹Mas'udi, op. cit., in Elliot, History of India, Vol. I, 27.

⁸²Ibn Hauqal, op. cit., p. 49.

⁸³See above, pp. 113-114.

missionary propaganda followed by a political stroke which eventually delivered Multan in their hands.⁸⁴ The possession of Multan was merely a part of the vast Fatimid scheme to undermine the Abbassids:

The concentration of their (Fatimids) propagandist efforts on the Sea and land route to India and on India itself; the vast development of their trade with the East and the growth of the Red Sea ports to the detriment of those of the Persian Gulf--all these, considered in the light of the known Ismaili capacity for detailed long-range planning create, to say the least, a strong supposition that they are the result of a deliberate policy, conceived and executed as part of the grand Fatimid plan to destroy the power of the Abbassids and replace them as sole sovereigns of Islam.⁸⁵

In studying the Arab maritime activities in the Indian Ocean after the rise of Islam, we may fairly infer that of all the advantages Sind derived from Arab connections, those involving commerce stand out pre-eminently. Sind was drawn into the whirlpool of frantic economic energies unleashed by a new faith and supported by the might of an empire stretching from France to the borders of

⁸⁴On this aspect of the Fatimid politico-economic strategy in Sind, see Bernard Lewis, "The Fatimids and the Route to India," Extract de la Revue de la Facuete Des Sciences Economiques Des L'Universite D'Istanbul, 11e annee, No: 1-4 (1953).

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 5. Egyptian commercial ties with western India in general and with Gujarat in particular continued to remain strong. As the Portugese naval might threatened this trade at the beginning of the sixteenth century, schemes for joint naval actions for this European intruder were worked out. Thus a combined Egyptian-Gujrati fleet destroyed the Portugese war vessels at the battle of Chaul, near present-day Bombay, in 1508 A.D. A year later, however, the Portugese avenged this defeat by eliminating the allied fleet, thus finally ending the Egyptian commercial contacts with India for centuries to come. See Donald F. Lach, India in the Eyes of Europe: The Sixteenth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1968), p. 393.

China. As the Arab hold over the eastern portions of the Caliphate weakened, and as the land-oriented Turks, Afghans and Mughuls extended their successive sways over Sind, a lull came over the maritime display which once was so visible. It was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century when Sind was annexed to the British empire in India that the lower Indus Valley once more began to play an impressive role in the commerce of the region.

Cultural Achievements

The close political contacts with the Caliphate established after 715 A.D. enabled Sind to experience a healthy cultural exchange with the areas outside India. This exchange in many ways is the most striking and in a sense most significant aspect of Arab authority over the area. From the Arab cultural point of view, the years 750-900 A.D. have been classified as "The Age of Translation," signifying the wealth of material accumulated from areas as far apart as Spain and Central Asia and then rendered into Arabic.⁸⁶ The years 900 to 1100 A.D. have been called "The Golden Age." During this age the Muslims "begin to rely upon their own resources and to develop from within."⁸⁷ Throughout the first period and during the second half of the latter, Sind continued to maintain commercial as well as cultural contacts with the Arab world.

⁸⁶Arnold, The Legacy of Islam, p. 160.

⁸⁷Ibid.

Arab historians repeatedly have admitted the debt owed by their fellow kinsmen to the Sindian men of letters and science. Two periods stand out during which the impact from India was most profound--the reigns of Caliphs al-Mansur (753-774 A.D.) and Harun al-Rashid (786-809 A.D.). We learn from al-Biruni that no fewer than four missions arrived at Baghdad from Sind between 753 and 778 A.D., and included in their entourage Hindu scholars of outstanding reputation.⁸⁸ It was with the embassy of 771 A.D. that a certain Indian brought with him a treatise on astronomy in Sanskrit called Siddhanta (Arabic Sindhind).⁸⁹ Twenty-five years later the work was rendered into Arabic by Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Fazari who subsequently became the first astronomer in Islam.⁹⁰ "The astronomical data so derived were assimilated into Islamic Science and became accessible to Latin Christendom in the twelfth century through the translation of the work of Al-Battini."⁹¹

The introduction of Hindu numerals doubtlessly came about through these scholars. The practice was revolutionary: The influence which the decimal system of reckoning dependent on those figures has had not only on mathematics, but on the progress of civilization in general can hardly be over-estimated. During the eighth

⁸⁸Sachau, Alberuni's India, Vol. II, 15, 67, 313.

⁸⁹Ibid. Also see Mas'udi, op. cit., pp. 153-55.

⁹⁰Sa'id ibn Ahmad al-Andalusi, Tabaqat al-Umam (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1912), pp. 49-50; J. J. Winters, "Formative Influence in Islamic Science," Internationales d'Histoire des Science, Vol. 32 (1953), 185; Hitti, op. cit., p. 307; Arnold, The Legacy of Islam, p. 380.

⁹¹Winters, op. cit., p. 185.

and ninth centuries the Indians became teachers in arithmetic and algebra of the Arabs, and through them of the nations of the West.⁹²

During the Caliphate of Harun al-Rashid (786-809 A.D.) the Barmakides had acquired ministerial influence over the court at Baghdad. This family traced its origins to pre-Islamic Balkh (Bactra), which had been a flourishing center of Buddhist learning, and was consequently peculiarly liable to Indian influence even after their conversion to Islam. It was through their interest and influence that Indian medical lore and wisdom literature arrived at the Abbassid court. Among the former type we can count the Charaka, the Susruta, the Ninda and the Ashtanga of Vagbhata, all medical treatises.⁹³ The last named was rendered into Arabic by an Indian physician, Mankah, who so impressed Harun al-Rashid by curing him of some serious illness that the Caliph appointed him as head of the Royal Hospital.⁹⁴

By far the most outstanding example of Indian wisdom literature arriving at Baghdad was the fables of Bidpai, Kalilah Wa-Dimnah,

⁹²Arthur Macdonell, History of Sanskrit Literature (New York: Appleton and Co., 1900), p. 424. Arab mathematician al-Khwarizmi was the first advocate of Hindu numerals including zero. His work on Indian methods of calculation, written at the first half of the ninth century, was translated by Abelard of Bath in the twelfth century under the title De numero indico. Hitti, op. cit., p. 573.

⁹³Majumdar, The Age of Imperial Kanauj, p. 450.

⁹⁴Muwaffiq uddin ibn Abu-Usaibiah, 'Uyun al-Anbiah fi Tabaqat al-Attiba (Foundations of information respecting the classes of physicians). Extract concerning Indian physicians at Baghdad, translated in English by Rev. W. Cureton and published in The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. VI (1841), 105-119; Ibn Nadim, Al-Fahrist (Cairo: Al-Kutba al-Tajarat al-Kubri, 1929), pp. 342, 378, 421.

which entered the Arab world via Persia where it had been rendered into Pahlavi during the reign of Khusrow Anushirwan (531-578 A.D.).⁹⁵

It is commonplace to say that foreign armies occupying India for any length of time have in turn been culturally Indianized. We find this phenomenon very clearly exerting itself upon the Arabs in Sind, though the Arab occupation did manage to give that country some degree of Arabian culture. Arab visitors to the area convey a fairly balanced assessment of prevailing social and cultural trends. To the very end of Arab rule, Arabic was used as the language of the bureaucracy though Sind remained the lingua franca of all.⁹⁶ In time, except for religious purposes, however, the use of Arabic began to give way to the native tongue until it was eliminated altogether.⁹⁷ The pre-Islamic Sindian alphabet, derived from Sanskrit, was permanently replaced by Arabic alphabet with slight modifications.

The Arab nobility had begun to copy their Indian counterparts and thus we are informed by Istakhri that "the dress of their kinds resembles that of the kings of Indians in respect of the hair

⁹⁵Nadim, op. cit., pp. 423-25.

⁹⁶Ibn Hauqal notes that Arabic and Sindi were both understood, but Istakhri found that Persian was widely used side by side with Sindi. The difference in their observations lies in the linguistic background of the two visitors. Ibn Hauqal, as any Arab perhaps did not understand Persian, whereas the mother-tongue of Istakhri was Persian. See Ibn Hauqal, op. cit., p. 50; Istakhri, op. cit., p. 36.

⁹⁷This change was probably brought about during the Ghaznavid interregnum. For although the Ghaznavid were Turk, they utilized Persian as court language. The Sumras and the Sammas were Indian by origin and most certainly discarded the use of Arabic in favor of Persian, the use of which was universal in Islamic lands east of the Euphrates including India.

and the tunic."⁹⁸ The resemblance of dress between the Iraqis and the Sindians is noted by both Istakhri and ibn Hauqal, though neither of them elaborates on the subject any further.⁹⁹

Perhaps the most visible and, in a sense, most tragic aspect of this Indianization was the reliance on elephants in battle formations. Mas'udi took special note of this. "The king of Mansura has eighty war elephants, every one of which is supported by five hundred infantry in battle, as we have already remarked; and these elephants oppose thousands of horses."¹⁰⁰ The Indianized Arab war machine was rendered helpless against fast cavalry maneuvers of the Saffarid and the Ghaznavid armies and ultimately the Arabs fell victims to the imperial expansions of Central Asian monarchs.

Unlike the Turks, the Afghans and the Mughuls, who erected splendid architectural monuments as part of their legacies, we look in vain for similar Arab achievements. It is not to suggest that the latter were wholly devoid of any such undertakings; but natural calamities combined with destructive dispositions of later invading hordes have eradicated any signs of Indo-Arabic architecture. Whole cities, flourishing during part or whole of the Arab period have so completely disappeared that their probable locations is a matter of conjecture. Among these we may count Daybul, Alor and Mansura.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸Istakhri, op. cit., p. 35. According to Ibn Hauqal, "the dress of the sovereigns of the country resembles in the trousers and tunic that is worn by the kings of Hind," op. cit., p. 45.

⁹⁹Istakhri, op. cit., p. 35; Ibn Hauqal, op. cit., p. 45.

¹⁰⁰Mas'udi, op. cit., p. 386.

¹⁰¹For an excellent and comprehensive account of probable locations of these sites, see Henry Cousens, The Antiquities of Sind,

Of religious aspects of Islamic culture, the spread of Isma'ilism in the area was the most profound. Isma'ilism was one of the offshoots of Shi'ism which, in turn, was one of the major sub-divisions of Islam. The Shi'ite doctrine differed from the Orthodox Sunni beliefs appreciably:

Unlike the Sunnite Caliph the Shi'ite imam (leader) had inherited from Muhammad not only his temperol sovereignty but the prerogative of interpreting the law. In that capacity he was an infallible teacher and to his infallability he added the divine gift of impeccability. Contrary to the Sunnite and Sufi doctrine the Shi'ites maintained that religious certainty could be gained only from the instruction of such an imam divinely protected against error and sin.¹⁰²

Ali, their first Imam and the fourth Orthodox Caliph (656-661 A.D.) was theoretically succeeded by his son al-Hasan and then in 669 A.D. by his second son al-Husayn. The latter was assassinated by a handful of Sunnite followers of the Umayyad Caliphate on the tenth of October 680 A.D. at Karbala in Iraq together with a number of his companions. "The blood of al-Husayn, even more than that of his father, proved to be the seed of the Shi'ite 'church.' Shi'ism was born on the tenth of Muharram. From now on the imamship in Ali's progeny became as much of a dogma in the Shi'ite creed as that of the prophethood of Muhammad in Islam."¹⁰³

Vol. XLVI, in the Archaeological Survey of India, Imperial Series (Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1927), pp. 48-80, 110-31.

¹⁰²Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 440.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 191.

A large majority of the Shi'ites swore allegiance to twelve imams in all, the last nine of whom were the descendants of al-Husayn and are consequently called the "Twelvers" (Ithna 'Ashariyah). The last of these imams is said to have disappeared in 878 A.D. without leaving any offspring. He is presently in a temporary state of occultation, whence he will appear again as the Mahdi or divinely guided one to restore true Islam. He is variously referred to as the "hidden" or the "expected" imam. A branch of the Shi'ites refuted the change of succession instituted by the sixth imam Ja'far al-Sadiq who designated his son Isma'il as his successor but later nominated his younger son Musa as his heir. That selection of the Shi'ite community, considering Isma'il as the rightful imam, is accordingly called the Isma'ilians or the "Seveners." To this group Isma'il became the hidden Mahdi.¹⁰⁴

Three distinct elements can be distinguished in the Isma'ilian sect:

- (i) the philosophical element which is one of the results of Greek philosophy and especially of the teaching of Aristotle as interpreted by the neo-Platonists and presented in an oriental dress after passing through a Syrian and Persian median... (ii) The definitely Shi'i

¹⁰⁴W. Ivanow, "Ismailis and Qaramatians," Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay, New Series, Vol. XVI (1940, 50-65. Also see Bernard Lewis, The Origins of Ismailism: A Study of the Historical Background of the Fatimid Caliphate (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd., 1940), Chapter I; Reuben Levy, "The Account of the Ismai'li Doctrines in the Jami' al-Tawarikh of Rashid al-Din Fadlallah," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1930), Part III, pp. 510-36.

doctrine of the incarnation of the divine spirit in the Imam passed on by transmigration from Ali to his descendants. And (iii) the purely political element which cared nothing about philosophical speculation or Shi'i doctrine, but saw in the sect promising elements of a conspiracy against the Abbasid Khalifate.¹⁰⁵

The Isma'ilians "organized one of the most subtle and effective means of politico-religious propoganda that the world of Islam ever experienced."¹⁰⁶ The chief instrument in this propoganda machine was the "da'i" or missionary:

The Ismaili da'i, i.e., accredited agent of the Imam, is ordained. In addition to the position of ordinary Islamic mulla, he has spiritual authority, commission, received either directly from the source of the religious authority, the Imam, or indirectly, through those who themselves received it from him, together with the right of transferring it to others. The Sacrament which he is commissioned to perform is not only teaching, i.e., distributing the sacred wisdom of the Imam, but also accepting, on their behalf, the oath of allegiance of the followers.¹⁰⁷

A number of extraordinary qualities were combined in the "da'i":

As elusive and omnipresent as the 'Scarlet Pimpernel,' as malicious, ruthlessly cruel, and unscrupulous in far fetched diabolical schemes as the leader of a criminal gang in any detective best seller, as superhumanly clever, brave, persevering, and daring as any detective hero of the best American cinema film--the da'i appears as the chief 'villain of the

¹⁰⁵DeLacy O'Leary, A Short History of the Fatimid Khalifate (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1923), pp. 257-58.

¹⁰⁶Hitti, op. cit., p. 443.

¹⁰⁷W. Ivanow, "The Organization of the Fatimid Propoganda," Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. XV (1939), 6.

plot,' responsible for many failures and defeats which the corrupt and incapable Abbasid administration had to suffer.¹⁰⁸

By the third quarter of the ninth century the Islamic world was feeling the full impact of Isma'ilian "da'is." From their headquarters in Basrah and later in northern Syria, the "da'is" let loose a torrent of propaganda the like of which the Islamic world has not often witnessed. The mastermind behind this movement was a certain Abdullah, a native of Ahwaz in present-day Iran. Yemen fell to the Isma'ilians by 910 A.D., mainly due to the tireless efforts of a "da'i" known as Ibn Hawshab, surnamed Mansuru'l-Yaman.¹⁰⁹ It was from the bases in Yemen that efforts were directed against North Africa with astonishing success so that by 909 A.D. Tunisia was effectively in Isma'ilian hands. Sixty years later, Egypt passed into their hands as well.¹¹⁰

This phenomenal success was not achieved without serious challenges from within. Of these, the most formidable was the Karmatian (Qaramitah) sect. The origins and beliefs of this sect are obscure at best and so are its historic connections with the

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. I.

¹⁰⁹W. Ivanow, Brief Survey of the Evolution of Ismailism (Leiden: Ismaili Society, Najm Ad-din, 1952), pp. 12-13. Also see Omarah al-Hakami, Yaman: Its Early Medieval History: Also the Abridged History of its Dynasties by Ibn Khaldun and an Account of the Karamathians of Yaman by Abu 'Abd Allah ad-Din Al-Janadi, Translated and edited by Henry C. Kay (London: Edward Arnold, 1892), pp. 191-211.

¹¹⁰O'Leary, History of the Fatimid Caliphate, pp. 93-114.

larger body of the Isma'ilians.¹¹¹ It is generally believed that its founder was a pupil of a certain Hamadan Qaramat, a pupil of Abdullah who was "chosen to act as head of the branch founded near Kufa, and he seems to have been diligent in sending out missionaries throughout the whole district of Sawad (Southern Iraq), where success was easy as the oppressed Nabataean villagers were still groaning under the tyranny of the Arab colonists of the two camp-cities, Kufa and Basra."¹¹² Non-Arab peasantry as well as several dissatisfied Arab tribes were won over to the new cause and the Abbasid control over the area threatened. Beyond this point a system of communism was established where the community supported itself from a common fund:

Then it is said the da'i assembled men and women together on a certain night, and encouraged them to indulge in promiscuous intercourse. After this, assured of their absolute obedience, he began to teach them the more secret doctrines of the sect, and so deprived them of all beliefs in religion and discouraged the observance of external rites such as prayer, fasting, and the like.¹¹³

¹¹¹For a comprehensive study of the origins and beliefs of this sect, see Bernard Lewis, The Origins of Ismaili, Chapter III, "The Qaramatians of Bahrain," pp. 77-89; L. Massignon, "Qarmatians," Encyclopedia of Islam, edited by M. Th. Houtsma and T. W. Arnold (Leyden: E. J. Brill, Ltd., 1913), Vol. II, 766-72; W. Ivanow, "Ismailis and Qarmatians," Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay, New Series, Vol. XVI (1940), 43-85; Joseph DeSomogyl, "A Treatise on the Qarmatians in the Kitab Al-Muntazam of Ibn Al-Jauzi," Rivista Degli Studi Orientali, Vol. XIII (1932), 248-58; O'Leary, Short History of the Fatimid Kalifate, Chapter III, "The Qarmatians," pp. 34-50.

¹¹²O'Leary, Short History of the Fatimid Kalifate, p. 43.

¹¹³O'Leary, A Short History of the Fatimid Kalifate, p. 44.

Historical references are silent about the existence of imams among the Karmatians. This is easily explainable:

As Muhammad b. Isma'il was the ultimate Apostle of God, the Messiah, etc., the new Shari'a which was given to the world was obviously complete, containing both the ordinary and the hidden parts. It therefore no longer required the Imam, in the Shi'ite sense, whose chief function was to keep and to convey to the masses the un-revealed portion of the original Divine Revelation, received by Muhammad the Prophet, and entrusted by him to Ali and his successor in order to disclose it gradually.¹¹⁴

Accordingly, "This hypothesis excellently explains that fierce anti-Islamic spirit which is manifested in all the terrible exploits of the Qarmatians."¹¹⁵ The Islamic world was to receive a rude shock in 930 A.D., when the Karmatians seized the holy city of Mecca and carried off the Black Stone (Ka'aba), the most sacred object in the Muslim view.¹¹⁶

It is difficult to trace the origins of Fatimid-Karmatian conflict which resulted in an open break in 971 A.D. It has been suggested that the Karmatian State of Bahrain was shaken by severe internal crises around 968 A.D. "As a result of this struggle of factions, a new leadership emerged, which was hostile to the N. African Caliphs."¹¹⁷ By 977 A.D., however, the breach seemed to

¹¹⁴Ivanow, "Ismailis and Qarmatians," op. cit., pp. 81-82.

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 82. The stone was restored on orders of the Fatimid Caliph in 950 A.D.

¹¹⁶Hitti, op. cit., p. 445.

¹¹⁷Lewis, Origins of Ismailism, p. 85.

have been mended and "ibn Hauqal mentions in 977 that they (Karmatians) sent an annual tribute to the Imam."¹¹⁸

Our knowledge concerning the establishment of Karmatian rule in Multan is very limited. What we do know with certainty is the fact that missionary activities in Sind were carried out by the "da'i" dispatched from Yemen. For this information, we are indebted to the Isma'ilian writer and judge al-Qadi al-Nu'man who completed his work Iftitah al da'wa in 957 A.D. According to this source, Mansuru'l-Yaman "sent his cousin, al-Hasan, as a 'da'i' to the country of Sind; the latter converted many of its inhabitants and his da'wa (mission) still survives in Sind."¹¹⁹ In another work of his, Kitab al-Majalis Wa-l-Musayarat, completed in 962 A.D., al-Qadi al-Nu'man furnishes us with additional insight into Isma'ilian affairs in Sind. These have been summarized by Stern in his article "Isma'ili Popoganda and Fatimid Rule in Sind":

In the time of al-Mu'izz, there was in charge of the mission of Sind a da'i whose views and whose conduct were utterly at variance with the Ismai'li orthodoxy taught by the Imam and his close associates. Not only did he adopt a latitudinarian attitude towards those members of his flock who had made a direct passage from their old religion to Isma'ilism--whom he allowed to keep many of the un-Islamic practices of their former religion--but he even relaxed certain statutes of Islam for those who had been Muslims before joining Isma'ilism...As far as political success was con-

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 89.

¹¹⁹Quoted in S. M. Stern, "Isma'ili Propoganda and Fatimid Rule in Sind," Islamic Culture, Vol. XXIII (1949), 299.

cerned, the da'i of Sind had an important achievement to his credit: he succeeded in winning over to the Fatimid cause one of the rulers of Sind. The sovereignty of al-Mu'izz was openly proclaimed, and the Khutba read in his name. With the help of the princely convert, the Isma'ilis of Sind were able to defeat a coalition of the rulers of the country which attacked them and to consolidate their position; the fortress which the Isma'ilis made their capital and dar hijra is probably no other but the city of Multan.¹²⁰

The Caliph al-Mu'izz was advised by his court to replace the heretical "da'i." While these proceedings were going on, an unfortunate accident removed the said "da'i" from the scene. He was succeeded by Halam ibn Shaiban, whose first concern was "to do away with the religious abuses of his predecessor...Not only was he intent on enforcing a strict Islamic orthodoxy in the conduct of the da'wa, but also went out of his way to destroy the famous idol of Multan."¹²¹ For his acts, Halam was duly congratulated by the Caliph:

Referring to what you have written: that God has granted you a victory over those who had attacked you and wanted to oust you from your place; that terrible battles have been fought between you, till God gave you the victory, by His help and assistance and you have exterminated them completely; that you destroyed their idol and built a mosque on its sight--what a great favour,...We would be very much pleased if you could send us the head of that idol...¹²²

From the above epistle, it appears that the change of command in Multan involved considerable bloodshed. We are now in a position

¹²⁰Ibid., pp. 299-300.

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²Caliph al-Mu'izz to Halam bin Shaiban, dated Sunday, the 19th of Ramadan, 354 A.H. Quoted in Stern, op. cit., pp. 301-302.

to date the Isma'ilian cause in Sind with some accuracy. The Iftitah al-da'wa of al-Qadi al-Nu'man was completed in 957 A.D. and refers to the Isma'ili propaganda in Sind but does not mention the fall of Multan. The Kitab al-Majalis wa-l-Musayarat was completed in 962 A.D. and refers to the capture of Multan on the one hand and the appointment of Halam bin Shaiban on the other. Clearly, then, the Isma'ilis succeeded in establishing their control over Multan between 957 and 962 A.D. In this instance, it is puzzling as to why Ibn Hauqal, an Isma'ilian himself, and visiting Sind after the establishment of the Fatimid rule in Multan, fails to mention it at all. Ibn Hauqal's statement that "The Governor is of the tribe of Kuraish, of the sons of Samah, the son of Lawi, who first occupied the place. He owes no allegiance to the chief of Mansura. He, however, always reads the Khutba in the name of the Khalifa," throws some light on the affairs of Sind.¹²³ It confirms al-Qadi al-Nu'man's account that it was with the help of the "princely convert" that Isma'ilian rule was established over Multan. Thus the change in allegiance from Baghdad to Egypt did not involve a corresponding change in the ruling house. The "Khalifa" of Ibn Hauqal is obviously the Fatimid and not the Abbassid.

As previously mentioned, Mansura was annexed to the 'Ghaznavid realms in 1026 A.D. Only a few years prior the Isma'ilians had succeeded in extending their political control over the area.¹²⁴

¹²³Elliot, op. cit., Vol. I, 47.

¹²⁴Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fi-Tarikh (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1867), X, 201.

This was obviously accomplished between 985 and 1025 A.D., for Muqaddisi visiting the area at the former date found the ruling house owing allegiance to Baghdad. It is entirely possible that following the political bloodbath at the hands of the Ghaznavidis the Isma'ilians of Multan struck in the southerly direction and in so doing overran Mansura. It is equally possible that intensive missionary work was carried out in the area prior to the Ghaznavid annexation of Multan.

The commencement of Isma'ilism in Sind was to exercise significant impact on the population as a whole. By the very nature of their missionary activities the Isma'ilians were better suited and consequently more successful among the non-Muslim population than their Sunni rivals:

In those days the Ismailis had a tradition of posing as adherents of the faith within which they worked... There are several instances on record where an Ismaili missionary posed as a Brahmin or a Hindu priest and instead of flatly contradicting the doctrines of the faith he sought to subvert, he accepted its basic assumptions and introduced some of Ismaili beliefs in a disguised form and thus slowly and gradually paved the way for total conversion...Very often Ali was depicted as an incarnation of Vishnu among the Vishnavites. In short, after some personal loyalty had been created, the disciple was taken through various stages into full-fledged belief in the teachings of Ismaili Islam. The Ismailis were here at an advantage compared to the Sunnis because the latter insist upon total conversion right from the beginning and are not willing to make the least compromise in the matter of doctrine.¹²⁵

¹²⁵Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent (610-1947) (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1962), p. 45.

Islamic orthodoxy was now hard-pressed. In an effort to meet the Isma'ilian challenge, it finally found a champion in Sufism. Sufism in Indian environment was better suited to confront the formidable challenge to Isma'ilian heterodoxy than Sunnism.¹²⁶ It is to be admitted that the orthodoxy could and did indeed lean upon the military power of the Ghaznavids. However, the Ghaznavid garrisons had been evicted by the Sumras, champions of Isma'ilism and recent converts from Hinduism.¹²⁷ The Isma'ilian-Sufi rivalry colored the entire subsequent medieval period of Sind history which is properly speaking, well beyond the chronological limits of this paper. In the fourteenth century the Sumras were won over to the cause of the orthodoxy by Sufi efforts. The Sammas, who invested Sind from the Sumras by the middle of the fourteenth century, were mainly of Sunni persuasion at the height of their power.¹²⁸

The Isma'ilian-Sufi antagonism gave a tremendous boost to Islamic missionary activities in the area. As it was both sides competed frantically to win over the non-Muslim population to their

¹²⁶For a discussion of Sufism in Indian environment see Tara Chand, Influence of Islam on Indian Culture, pp. 65-83. For a general discussion of Sufism see Nicholson's article, "Mysticism," in Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guillaume (eds.), The Legacy of Islam (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1931), pp. 210-38.

¹²⁷Elliot, History of India as Told by its Own Historians, Vol. V, 85-95.

¹²⁸See Riazul Islam, "The Rise of the Sammas in Sind," Islamic Culture, Vol. XXII (1948), 359-82.

cause.¹²⁹ The danger of Isma'ilian herodoxy appears to have been eliminated even before the founding of the Mughul empire in India in the early part of the sixteenth century. The legacy of Sufism, however, remained. Hence, it is observed that "later there was such expansion of Sufism in Sind that the area is full of the descendants of the Sufis who at one time or another earned the respect of the population."¹³⁰

So far, the discussion has been confined chiefly to the Isma'ilian impact upon the area as a whole. On the broader horizon we note that the Arab period is to be commended for its singular tolerance towards indigenous religions and institutions. As pointed out earlier, the Hindu-Buddhist population had come to be treated as the "ahl-al-Kitab" or people of the book or the covenant, although by strict interpretation of religious law such a recognition was to be extended only to the Christians, the Jews and the Sabians.¹³¹ This concession rendered it possible for the non-Muslims to hold high-ranking bureaucratic posts throughout the Arab rule and beyond. The well-known Hindu community of Sindi Amils, which has played a signifi-

¹²⁹Qureshi, op. cit., pp. 42-59; T. W. Arnold, The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith, Second Edition (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1913), Chapter IX, "The Spread of Islam in India," pp. 254-293; The Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1877-1904), Vol. IX, Part II, 38, 46, 66, 76.

¹³⁰Qureshi, op. cit., p. 53. According to Elliot, "It notoriously swarms with sanctified beggars and imposters, and contains, according to the current saying, no less than 100,000 tombs of saints and martyrs, besides ecclesiastical establishments..." Elliot, op. cit., Vol. V, 134.

¹³¹See above, Chapter VI, pp. 122-123.

cant role in the Sindian administration over the past twelve centuries, owes its origins to the Arab period.

The successors of the Arabs, though Muslims themselves, wisely maintained a tolerant attitude toward their non-Muslim subjects.¹³² In this they differ significantly from the fanatic Turks, the Afghans and the Mughuls whose narrow policies in the spiritual realm did so much to widen the Hindu-Muslim antagonism. This largeness of comprehension on the part of the Arabs goes a long way to explain why substantial numbers of Sindians remained true to the faith of their forefathers whereas in Sijistan, Kabul and the present-day North West Frontier Province, areas which fell under the Muslim sway centuries after the fall of Sind, the Hindu element was entirely eradicated from the population.¹³³

¹³²As has been mentioned, except for a brief period when the Turkish Ghaznavid control was extended over Sind, Sind was ruled by local Muslim dynasties of the Sumras and the Sammas, both Hindu in origin.

¹³³On the eve of Indian independence in 1947 A.D. roughly one-fourth of the entire population of Sind was non-Muslim.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The annexation of Sind was neither inspired by fanatic religious zeal nor was it purely punitive in nature. Any conspiracy between the government of Sind, on the one hand, and the pirates on the other against Arab seafaring trade ships, a charge implied by medieval Muslim historians, must be ruled out. A substantial portion of the area's commercial prosperity was dependent upon the thriving coastal trade with the Islamic lands in the west. To retard this activity in any manner whatsoever would have been an act of singular unstatesmanship on the part of the Sind monarchy. The pirates had infested the Sind coast from time immemorial, a fact well known to Arab sea captains and the governors of the maritime provinces alike.

The exceedingly difficult financial responsibilities of a caliphate visibly shaken by a recently concluded bloody civil war, as well as a long nurtured desire to gain a suitable port of call on the Indian coast were the prime movers for this Drang nach Osten. The central government at Damascus was moved to action only when assured of substantial monetary returns from Sind, which incidentally amounted to twice the sum actually required to finance the campaign and was implemented by the vast sum of eleven million dirhams annually in the form of tribute. Provincial governors, particularly those of maritime areas, had displayed an unusual enthusiasm in favor of acquiring a foothold on the Indian coast, their actions in 637 A.D. against

Indian coastal sites having borne this out with clarity. With the increase of Arab maritime activities, this enthusiasm assumed greater proportions. Thus it was that the commercial prosperity of the lower Indus valley, together with its excellent seaport at Daybul, rendered Sind peculiarly liable to Arab military action.

Initially thwarted in his attempts to penetrate the areas, al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, the Umayyad viceroy of al-Iraq, requested additional troops and funds from Damascus--a move which clearly exhibits his anxiety over the campaign, on the one hand, and the military potential of Sind on the other. For more than six decades the armies of the caliphate had attempted to penetrate the defenses of India across the mighty Hindu-Kush with varying intensity, but had failed. The vast and arid Baluchistan plateau, separating Sind from the Islamic territory, was admirably suited to Arab military skill. On reaching Sind the invaders had to surmount a number of obstacles. Of these the chief were four--a very complex and advanced types of fortifications; a population which harboured no major grudge against the state; numerous and well-equipped "armies" which must be engaged in separate encounters, and a civilization which looked upon all outsiders simply as "barbarians." That all these obstacles were eventually overcome is to the credit of the Arabs. To be sure, the newcomers were aided in their seemingly improbable endeavor by certain unforeseeable elements to a unique degree. Among these we may count the treachery of some high-ranking Sindian commanders, repeated willingness of corporate interests to enter into secret negotiations with the enemy and individual Indian traitors disclosing well guarded military secrets. The vital element of mobility decisively favored the Arabs while the

Indians displayed an advantage in equipment and occasionally in numbers.

The "India policy," product of the imaginative minds of al-Hajjaj and Muhammad ibn al-Qasim, Arab commander in Sind, envisioned an area pacified not so much on the basis of military action as on the common identity of interests. The Indian administrative structure with its stable foundations and deeply imbedded in the social order characterized by the caste system was, on the whole, maintained intact. The interests of the state were identified with those of the mercantile communities, as well as with those of the religious and rural elite. The Hindu-Buddhist population was legally placed on a par with the Christians and the Jews within the Islamic commonwealth, the execution of which became possible only in the absence of any rigid schools of jurisprudence under the Umayyads. The privileged position of the Brahmins among the natives was wisely recognized. The village communities were not molested while local laws and customs were guaranteed. Islamic legal structure was erected to accommodate the Muslims, Arabs and native converts alike. The close political connections with the caliphate fostered an already thriving commerce, chiefly directed by non-Muslim mercantile communities.

For three centuries, then, Sind was governed by an Arabic speaking nobility which exercised a margin of political control by a closely knit military system entirely staffed by the Muslims, and centering around the heavily fortified sites or "amsars." The physical barrier which separated Sind from the other parts of the caliphate exerted its impact upon the area. The last Umayyad governor had withdrawn his allegiance from Damascus with impunity. With the rise of

the local dynasties in eastern and northern Persia, the caliphate's connections with the lower Indus valley were weakened. In Sind itself the ruling elite, cut off from the Arabic speaking lands by the intervening Persian territories, degenerated into warring factions and promptly fell victim, though briefly, to the expansionist designs of the Saffarids in 871 A.D. But neither the Saffarids nor the Samanids from their bases in Sistan and Khorasan were capable of, nor indeed willing to expend their energies for any considerable length over an area not easily accessible. The main communication routes on land ran along the Indus and not across the Baluchistan plateau. Throughout the tenth century the challenge to local Arab dynasties, now established at Multan and Mansurah, arose from the neighboring Hindu princes and not from the west.

During the tenth century a sensitive military balance began to prevail between the three great powers of the sub-continent, the Pratiharas of northern India, the Palas of Bengal and the Rashtrakutas of the Deccan. The Arabs were courted by the Rashtrakutas while the Pratiharas cultivated intense hostility towards the "barbarians."

Ironically, the Hindu powers were not responsible for the final destruction of the Arab authority in Sind, but rather it was the Muslim Turks of Central Asia. The Arabs had been sufficiently alarmed by the rapid rise of the Ghaznavids to conclude a defensive pact with the Hindu princes of the Punjab. The Ghaznavids, passionately obsessed with the desire to invade the rich lands of the Gangetic valley, considered this alliance as the major obstacle to their expansionist designs. During the first three decades of the eleventh century, all northwestern India was overrun by the Turkish forces,

among the victims being the Arabs of Multan and Mansurah.

Why did the Arabs fail to extend their political control over all northern India? For one thing Sind, by its very location, did not provide a suitable base from which large scale operations could be successfully launched against the upper Indus and the Gangetic plains. It is separated from the great centers of population by massive and inhospitable desert, and lies well south of the main invasion routes leading from Central Asia into India. Moreover, unlike the Turks who could draw upon the vast sources of manpower from bases in Central Asia, the Arabs, always a tiny minority in Sind, were cut off from the Arabic speaking lands by the intervening Iranian population.

Yet the significance of the Arab conquest of Sind should not be minimized. It was the first successful invasion of the sub-continent launched across the vast stretches of Baluchistan--a feat never before or since matched. The entire lower Indus valley was thrown open to Arab commerce, stretching from Spain to Canton. It was this commercial prosperity which invited the Fatimid intervention in the affairs of Sind, but in a somewhat unorthodox manner, the Ismaili missionaries simply undermined the Sufi orthodoxy in the area and with it the Abbasid connections. Cultural interaction followed commercial intercourse. Indian mathematics, astronomy, medicine and literature contributed to the "miracle of the Arab mind and culture." Conversely, Islam permanently affected the religious landscape of India and made itself a force in Indian civilization. Commercial and cultural contacts promoted and nurtured the desire for peaceful co-existence between India's two main religious communities. Unfortu-

nately, the coming of the Turks concluded this period of friendly intercourse and replaced it with one of extreme hostility and antagonism.

APPENDIX I

HIUEN TSIANG'S ACCOUNT OF SIND AND MULTAN¹

Sin-Tu (Sindh)

This country is about 7000 li in circuit; the capital city, called P'i-shen-p'o-pu-lo, is about 30 li round. The soil is favourable for the growth of cereals and produces abundance of wheat and millet. It also abounds in gold and silver and native copper. It is suitable for the breeding of oxen, sheep, camels, mules, and other kinds of beasts. The camels are small in size and have only one hump. They find here a great quantity of salt, which is red like cinnabar; also white salt, black salt and rock salt. In different places, both far and near, this salt is used for medicine. The disposition of the men is hard and impulsive; but they are honest and upright. They quarrel and are much given to contradiction. They study without aiming to excel; they have faith in the law of Buddha. There are several hundred *sangharamas*, occupied by about 10,000 priests. They study the Little Vehicle according to the Sammatiya school. As a rule, they are indolent and given to indulgence and debauchery. Those who are very earnest as followers of the virtue of the sages live alone in desert places, dwelling far off in

¹From Si-Yu-Ki: Buddhist Records of the Western World. Translated from the Chinese by Hiuen Tsiang by Samuel Beal (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1906), II, 272-73.

the mountains and the forests. There night and day they exert themselves in aiming after the acquirement of the holy fruit (*of Arhatship*). There are about thirty Deva temples,² in which sectaries of various kinds congregate.

The king is of the Sudra (Shu-t'o-lo) caste. He is by nature honest and sincere, and he reverences the law of Buddha.

When Tathagata³ was in the world, he frequently passed through this country, therefore Asoka-raja has founded several tens of *stupas* in places where the sacred traces of his presence were found. Upagupta, the great Arhat, sojourned very frequently in this kingdom, explaining the law and convincing and guiding men. The places where he stopped and the traces he left are all commemorated by the building of *sangharamas* or the erection of *stupas*. These buildings are seen everywhere; we can only speak of them briefly.

By the side of the river Sindh, along the flat marshy lowlands for some thousand li, there are several hundreds of thousands (*a very great many*) of families settled. They are of an unfeeling and hasty temper, and are given to bloodshed only. They give themselves exclusively to tending cattle, and from this derive their livelihood. They have no masters, and, whether men or women, have neither rich nor poor; they shave their heads and wear the *Kashaya* robes of Bhikshus, whom they resemble outwardly, whilst they engage themselves in the ordinary affairs of lay life. They hold to their narrow (*little*) views and attack the Great Vehicle.

²Hindu temples.

³Buddha.

The old reports state that formerly these people were extremely hasty (*impatient*), and only practised violence and cruelty. At this time there was an Arhat, who, pitying their perversity, and desiring to convert them, mounted in the air and came amongst them. He exhibited his miraculous powers and displayed his wonderful capabilities. Thus he led the people to believe and accept the doctrine, and gradually he taught them in words; all of them joyfully accepted his teaching and respectfully prayed him to direct them in their religious life. The Arhat perceiving that the hearts of the people had become submissive, delivered to them the three "Refuges" and restrained their cruel tendencies; they entirely gave up "taking life," they shaved their heads, and assumed the soiled robes of a Bhikshu,⁴ and obediently walked according to the doctrine of religion. Since then, generations have passed by and the changed times have weakened their virtue, but as for the rest, they retain their old customs. But though they wear the robes of religion, they live without any moral rules, and their sons and grandsons continue to live as worldly people, without any regard to their religious profession.

Going from this eastward 900 li or so, crossing the Sindh river and proceeding along the eastern bank, we come to the kingdom of Mu-lo-san-p'u-lu.

Mu-lo-san-p'u-lu (Multan)

This country is about 4000 li in circuit; the capital town is some 30 li round. It is thickly populated. The establishments are

⁴Buddhist missionary.

wealthy. This country is in dependence on the kingdom of Cheka (Tse-kia). The soil is rich and fertile. The climate is soft and agreeable; the manners of the people are simple and honest; they love learning and honour the virtuous. The greater part sacrifice to the spirits; few believe in the law of Buddha. There are about ten *sang-haromas*, mostly in ruins; there are a few priests, who study indeed, but without any wish to excel. There are eight Deva temples, in which sectaries of various classes dwell. There is a temple dedicated to the sun, very magnificent and profusely decorated. The image of the Sun-deva is cast in yellow gold and ornamented with rare gems. Its divine insight is mysteriously manifested and its spiritual power made plain to all. Women play their music, light their torches, offer their flowers and perfumes to honour it. This custom has been continued from the very first. The kings and high families of the five Indies never fail to make their offerings of gems and precious stones (*to this Deva*). They have founded a house of mercy (*happiness*), in which they provide food, and drink, and medicines for the poor and sick, affording succour and sustenance. Men from all countries come here to offer up their prayers; there are always some thousands doing so. On the four sides of the temple are tanks with flowering groves where one can wander about without restraint.

APPENDIX II

LETTERS OF YUSUF IBN AL-HAJJAJ TO MUHAMMAD IBN AL-QASIM,

ARAB COMMANDER, IN SIND¹

- I. From Hajjaj son of Yusif. O Muhammad Kasim, you must know that our mind assures us that our wishes and hopes will be fulfilled, and you will be successful in every way. You will be successful and victorious, and by the grace of God, the great and glorious, your enemies will soon be vanquished and punished and will repeatedly be overtaken by present torment and future misery. Do not, pray, entertain the evil thought that all those elephants and wealth and other property of your enemies will be your lot. Live happily with your friends, and treat every one kindly. Encourage them all to believe that the whole country will be yours. Whenever you take any fortified place, let your soldiers spend according to their wants. Let the booty be utilised for the necessary expenditure of the army, and for keeping up the pomp and circumstance of war. Let them eat and drink as much as is good for them. Do not scold them or prevent them from doing so. Exert yourself to the utmost to supply provisions in abundance, and fix the rates, so that corn may be had cheap in your camp. Whatever has been left behind in Debal had better be spent in supplying the troops with provisions than in laying up stores in the fort. When you have conquered the country and strengthened the forts,

¹See The Chachnamah, pp. 91 and 169.

endeavour to console the subjects and to soothe the residents, so that the agricultural classes and artisans and merchants may, if God so wills, become comfortable and happy, and the country may become fertile and populous. Written this 20th day of Rajjib 93.

- II. I have received my dear cousin Muhammad Kasin's letter, and have become acquainted with its contents. With regard to the request of the chiefs of Brahminabad about the building of Budh temples, and toleration in religious matters, I do not see (when they have done homage to us by placing their heads in the yoke of submission, and have undertaken to pay the fixed tribute for the Khalifah and guaranteed its payment), what further rights we have over them beyond the usual tax. Because after they have become *zimmi's* (protected subjects) we have no right whatever to interfere with their lives or their property. Do, therefore, permit them to build the temples of those they worship. No one is prohibited from or punished for following his own religion, and let no one prevent them from doing so, so that they may live happy in their own homes. (undated)

APPENDIX III


AL-SHEIKH ABU ISHAQ AL-FARISI AL-ISTAKHRI'S ACCOUNT
OF SIND, 951 A.D. TAKEN FROM HIS BOOK
ENTITLED KITAB'UL AQALIM¹

¹Personal copy of Dr. Aziz S. Atiya, Distinguished Professor of History, The University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, Gotha MSS, Arabic No. 312, dated 569 A.H. 1484 Calendar of Alexander.

(Pag 78)

صومالی و بلاد العرب

١٦٥٠ (2)



البحر مرحلة ومن سمرها الى رست ملت رحل ومن رست الى ياربم بلبه
 مراحل هذه حوامع المشافان كومان ٥ وسمى ذلك كله خراس وعروسه
 كومان ومفاره سحسار والى سحسار ساليها بلاد الهند وحنوبها مفاره ما
 من مكران والعص من وراياها خراس وانما اصدار خراس خط سري في هذه
 البلاد والخراس من ورايه المفاوز من اجل ان البحر ممتد من صبح صيمور على السري
 الى سمر مكران ثم يحطف على هذه المفاوز الى ان يهوس على بلاد كومان ورا من
 واما بلاد السند وما نضافها ما قد جمعناه في صورة واحدة وهي بلاد
 السند وسمى من بلاد الهند ومكران وكوران والند ٥
 ومدن السند المنصورة والاسل والبرور ووالوى وابرى وبلوى والمساوي
 والهارج وبابنه ومخازى وسدوسان والرود ومدن الهند امهل
 وكينانه وشوباره وسندان وصيمور والملتان وحند رود وشبك
 ومن كينانه الى صيمور من بلاد بلخ وبعض ملوك الهند وهي بلاد الكفر الا ان هذه المدن
 فيها المسلمون ولا يلى عليهم من قبل راء الامم مسلم فيها مسلم للجمعه ومدنه بلخ والملك
 يقيم بها ما يكثر وله مملكة عريضة والمنصورة مدنه مقدارها في الطول والعرض
 نحو ميل في ميل ومحيط بها حلق من بر مهران واما ملوك المسلمين وهم مدنه بها جبل
 وعصب السكر وارض المنصورة ثمرة على قدر الفلاح سمي الامونته حامض جدا
 ولهم فاكهة تشبه الخوخ سمونها الانج واسعارهم رخيصة جدا وزينهم رى اهل
 العراق الا ان رى ملوكهم يقارب رى ملوك الهند من السعور والفراطي ٥
 والملتان مدينته حوض المنصورة وبها صنم عظيم الهند ويحج اليه من اقاصي
 بلادها ويصوب الى الصنم في كل سنة ما اعظم فهو على سبب الصنم والمعلمين بها

٢٠ وسط هذا الفصير فيه والصنم فيها وهو الى القبة شوت سندها حرم هذا الصنم
 وضرب كفت غنكه وللسوق المثلان من الهند والسند الذين يحدون الانوار عن غيرها ولا يلبس
 هم ٢٠ هذا الفصير مع الصنم وهذا صورة على خلفه اسنان مربع على كرتي من حجر واحد
 والصنم واللسن جميع بانه جللا شنت السجستان الاجر لا يهين من حشته الاعناء فمنهم
 من نزع ان حشده خشب ومنهم من زعم انه من غير الخشب الا انه لا يترك بانه ينشف
 وعشاء جو هو فان على راسه اكليل ذهب مربع على ذلك الكرسي ولا جعل درافيد على
 كتفه وقد مضى اصابع كل يده في الحسب اربعة فاذا مضى الصنم للخراب وانزع هذا
 الصنم منهم اخرجوا الصنم واظهروا السرة واخروا وجهه ووجهه ووجهه ووجهه ووجهه ووجهه
 المنصورة الحصب منها وخارج المثلان على نصف فرسخ اسفله لانه وهي محسنة الايدي
 تدخل الاسر من الى المثلان الا ٢ كجته رب الفيل ويدخل الى صلاه الجمع واميرهم قري
 لا يطبع صاحب المنصورة اجرا الا انه خطب للخطبة ولما سمعته في مدنيه
 منوره وهي المثلان عن شريته من ميران وسكن واحد منها ومن اليهم في شين وما هم من
 قبار ومدنه اردو ديار المثلان الكبير عليها سوران وهي على شط ميران وهي من ج
 المنصورة والبرور مدنه من الدار والمنصورة ٢ نصف طرفهما ومن صبور الى
 اهل من بلاد الهند ومن قام الى مكران والبدنه وما ورا ذلك الى حد المثلان هي كلها
 من بلاد الهند والبدنه هناك كالمادنه وذي اهل المثلان الارز والمناذر والعال عليهم
 سان الفارسته والسنديه وكذلك المنصورة ومكران راجيه واسعه مريضه
 العالي عليها الفاو والخط واكر مدنه مكران الهويون وقد اسلم مدنيه كبيره
 ليس بها جبل وهي جريه وهما احجار البدهه واكثر زرعهم مباحس ولهم دروم وهي اشي
 هي احصيه حصبه وابل هو اسم رجل يعطى على هذه الكوره فحسب اليه ٥ واما
 سافاتها فمن تيز الى تيز هو خمس مراحل ومن كيز الى تيز هو خمس مراحل ومن اراد
 فيروز الى تيز مكران وطريقه على كيز ومن فيروز الى كيز ثلاث مراحل
 منها الى واسك ثلاث مراحل ومن اسك الى قلم هو ثلاث مراحل ومنها الى اصغفه

ومن كبر الى رماسل ثل مراحل ومن رماسل الى قسلي ورجلان ومنه الى الدليل اربع
 ومن المنصوره الى الدليل ثل مراحل ومن المنصوره الى الملبان اثناعشر ومن المنصوره
 الى طولان ثل مراحل ومن المنصوره الى اول حبل الاده خمس مراحل ومن الاده الى الدليل
 ثل مراحل وطول عماران من سبله فصدان ثل مراحل ومن الملبان
 الى اول حبل الاده ثل مراحل ومن رماسل الى المنصوره ثل مراحل ومن رماسل الى الملبان
 فصاره ثل مراحل ومن المنصوره وسبقا هل بان مراحل ومن فامهل الى ثل مراحل اربع
 مراحل وكثافه على ثل مراحل ومن كثافه الى سوربانه ثل مراحل
 وسوربانه على ثل مراحل ومن سوربانه وسندان ثل مراحل ومن سندان
 وصهور خمس مراحل وسوربانه وسندان ثل مراحل ومن الملبان وسندان ثل مراحل
 ومن سندان الى الدليل ثل مراحل ومن الدليل الى اربع مراحل ومن اربع مراحل
 مراحلان ومنه الى المنصوره مرحله ومن الدليل الى الدليل اربع مراحل ومنه الى السندان
 مراحلان ومنه الى الدليل ثل مراحل ومنه الى الدليل ثل مراحل ومنه الى الدليل
 من المنصوره ٥ واما الاده فاهم فانهم يعرفون بها ان بلغوا ان يخرج من طهر حبل الخرج
 منه بعض انهار حنوز فظهر مهران على حبل السند الرور صاحبه الملبان ثم على المنصوره
 حتى يقع بحور سر ٢ الدليل وهو بركبير عذب جدا يقال ان فيه مساح حامي النيل
 ١٢ عبر وجريه مثل جريه وترفع على وجه الارض ثم تصب في روع عليها مثل ما
 ذكرناه من ارض مصر والسند رود من الملبان على ثل مراحل وهو
 لا يركب عرب وقيل انه يفرغ الى مهران ومكران الغالب عليها الوادي وهي
 قلله الانهار جدا ولهم رماسل المنصوره مبيه الى مهران ٥
 ومنه صوره بلاد السند ٥

Translation

The country of Sind and the bordering lands are inserted in one map, which thus contains the country of Sind and portions of Hind, Kirman, Turan, and Budha.

Cities of Sind -- Mansura, Debal Nirur (Nirun), Kalwi (Kallari), Annari, Balwi (Ballari), Maswahi, Baniya, Manhanari (Manjabari), Sadusan, and Al Ruz (Alor).

Cities of Hind -- Amhal, Kambaya, Subara, Sindan, Saimur, Multan, Jandrud, and Basmand.

From Kambaya to Saimur is the land of the Balhara, and in it there are several Indian kings. It is a land of infidels, but there are Musulmans in its cities, and none but Musalmans rule over them on the part of the Balhara. There are jama' masjids in them. The city in which the Balhara dwells is Mankir, which has an extensive territory.

Mansura is about a mile long and a mile broad, and is surrounded by a branch of the Mihran. The inhabitants are Musalmans. The date tree and the sugar cane grow here. The land of Mansura also produces a fruit of the size of the apple, which is called Laimun, and is exceedingly sour. The land also produces a fruit called Ambaj (mango), which is like the peach. The price of them is low, and they are plentiful. The dress of the people is like that of the people of 'Irak, but the dress of their kings resembles that of the kings of India in respect of the hair and the tunic.

Multan is a city about half the size of Mansura. There is an idol there held in great veneration by the Hindus, and every year

people from the most distant parts undertake pilgrimages to it, and bring to it vast sums of money which they expend upon the temple and on those who lead there a life of devotion. The temple of the idol is a strong edifice, situated in the most populous part of the city, in the market of Multan, between the bazar of the ivory dealers and the shops of the coppersmiths. The idol is placed under a cupola in the midst of the building, and the ministers of the idol and those devoted to its service dwell around the cupola. In Multan there are no men either of Hind or Sind who worship idols except those who worship this idol and in this temple. The idol has a human shape, and is seated with its legs bent in a quadrangular posture on a throne made of brick and mortar. Its whole body is covered with a red skin like morocco leather, and nothing but its eyes are visible. Some believe that the body is made of wood, some deny this; but the body is not allowed to be uncovered to decide the point. the eyes of the idol are precious gems, and its head is covered with a crown of gold. It sits in a quadrangular position on the throne, its hands resting upon its knees, with the fingers closed, so that only four can be counted. When the Indians make war upon them and endeavour to seize the idol, the inhabitants bring it out, pretending that they will break it and burn it. Upon this the Indians retire, otherwise they would destroy Multan. Mansura is more fertile. At half a parasang from Multan there is a large cantonment, which is the abode of the chief, who never enters Multan except on Fridays, when he goes on the back of an elephant, in order to join in the prayers of that day. The governor is of the tribe of Kuraish, and is not subject to the ruler of Mansura, but reads the khutba in the name khalifa.

Samand is a small city situated like Multan, on the east of the river Mihran; between each of these places and the river the distance is two parasangs. The water is obtained from wells.

The city of Al Rur approaches Multan in size. It has two walls, is situated near the Mihran, and is on the borders of Mansura.

Niru is half way between Debal and Mansura.

From Saimur to Famhal, in Hind, and from Famhal to Makran and Budha, and beyond that as far as the boundaries of Multan, all belong to Sind. Budha is there a desert.

The people of Multan wear trousers, and most of them speak Persian and Sindi, as in Mansura.

Makran is a large territory, for the most part desert and barren. The largest city in Makran is Kannazbun.

Kandabil is a great city. The palm tree does not grow there. It is in the desert, and within the confines of Budha. The cultivated fields are mostly irrigated. Vines grow there, and cattle are pastured. The vicinity is fruitful. Abil is the name of the man who subdued this town, which is named after him.


Distances -- From Tiz to Tir (Kiz) about five days. From Kiz to Kannazbun two days. Going from Kannazbun to Tiz, in Makran, the road passes by Kiz. From Rasak to Fahalfahuh three days. From thence to Asghafa two days. From thence to Band one day. From Band to Bah one day. From thence to Kasrkand one day. From Kiz to Armabil six days. From Armabil to Kambali two days. From thence to Debal four days. From Mansura to Debal six days. From Mansura to Multan twelve days. From Mansura to Turan fifteen days. From Mansura to the near-

est frontier of Budha five days. From Budha to Tiz about fifteen days. The length of Makran from Tiz to Kasdan is about fifteen days. From Multan to the nearest border of the tongue (of land) known as Biyalas about ten days. Here the Mihran must be crossed to get into the land of Budha. From Kandabil to Mansura eight days. From Kandabil to Multan, by the desert, about ten days. Between Mansura and Kamhal eight days. From Kamhal to Kambaya four days. From Kambaya to the sea about two parasangs. From Kambaya to Surabaya about four days, and Surabaya is about half a parasang from the sea. Between Surabaya and Sindan about five days. From Sindan to Saimur five days. Between Saimur and Sarandib fifteen days. Between Multan and Basmad about two days. From Basmad to Al Ruz three days. From Al Ruz to Annari four days. From Annari to Kallari two days. From thence to Mansura one day. From Debal to Tiz four days. From thence to Manjabari two days. From Kalwi (Kallari) to Maldan (Multan?) about four days. Barband lies between Mansura and Kamhal at one day's journey from Mansura.

There is a river in Sind called the Mihran. It is said that it springs from the summit of a mountain from which many affluents of the Jihun rise. The Mihran passes by the borders of Samand and Al Rur (Alor) to the neighbourhood of Multan; from thence to Mansura, and onwards until it joins the sea to the east of Debal. Its water is very sweet. It is said that there are crocodiles in it as large as those of the Nile. It rises like as the Nile rises, and inundates the land, which on the subsidence of the water is sown in the manner we have described in the land of Egypt. The Sind Rud is about three

stages from Multan. Its water is very sweet, even before it joins the Mihran. Makran is mostly desert, and has very few rivers. Their waters flow into the Mihran on both sides of Mansura.

IBN HAUQAL'S MAP OF SIND



APPENDIX V

LETTER OF THE FATIMID CALIPH AL-MU'IZZ TO HALAM IBN SHAIBAN,

CHIEF ISMA'ILIAN DA'I IN SIND

DATED 354 A.H. (965 A.D.)¹

Referring to what you have written: that God has granted you a victory over those who had attacked you and wanted to oust you from your place; that terrible battles have been fought between you, till God gave you the victory, by His help and assistance you exterminated them completely; that you destroyed their idol and built a mosque on site--what a great favour, what manifest and palpable excellence and lasting glory is that from God! We would be very much pleased if you could send us the head of that idol; it would accrue to your lasting glory and would inspire your brethren at our end to increase their zeal and their desire to unite with you in a common effort in the cause of God. The realization of God's promise to us, which used to seem so remote, has, indeed, become imminent...We have sent you some of our banners, which you can unfurl in case of need. Whenever they are unfurled over the heads of the believers, God increases their glory by the banners and rails them with His assistance; on the other hand when they are unfurled over the heads of the unbelievers, banners humiliated their pride and overwhelm them by the power of God Who is our Benefactor. Written on Sunday, the 19th of Ramadān, of the year 354.

¹Printed in S.M. Stern, "Isma'ilian Propoganda and Fatimid Rule in Sind," Islamic Culture, Vol. XXIII (1949), 301-302.

APPENDIX VI

REFERENCES TO ARABS IN SIND IN SANSKRIT INSCRIPTIONS¹

1. The Nausari Grant of Pulakesin. Dated 738 A.D.

परममहेश्वरः परमभट्टारकः ब्राह्मः सीरमुद्रारिणि
तरुतर- तारतर- वारि- दारिनोदित- सै- धवकच्छेल-
सौराष्ट्र- चावोटक- मौर्य- गुर्जरादिराजे निः
शेष- दक्षिणात्य- क्षिणपतिजिगीषया दक्षिणात्यत्रवेमा
[मिलाधि] णि प्रथममेव नवसारिकाविषय- प्रसाध-
नायागते... समरमिरसि विजिति ताजिकानीके
शायिनुरागिणा आवल्लमनरेद्रेण प्रसादाकृतापा.

'The illustrious king Avanijanasraya Pulakesin Sarajha, the great lord and the great devotee of Mahesvara, whom the illustrious king Vallabha, appreciating his valour, favoured with the four following titles, "the solid pillar of the Deccan(?)," "the ornament of the Chalukika (Chalukya) dynasty," "the lord of the earth," and "the repeller of the unrepelled (Arabs)," when the Tajika army, which vomitted forth arrows and maces, which destroyed by its brightly glittering sharp swords the prosperous Saindhava (Sind), Kacchela (Cutch), Saurashtra (Gujrat), Chavotaka, Maurya and Gurjara kings and others, and which wishing to enter the Deccan with a view to conquering all the southern kings, came in the first instance to reduce the Navasarika country.'

¹Rama S. Avasthy and Amalananda Gosh, "References to Muhammadans in Sanskrit Inscriptions in Northern India--A.D. 730 to 1320," Journal of Indian History, Vol. XV (1936), pp. 161-165.

2. The Gwalior Inscription of Bhoja. Probable date 733 A.D.

येनासौ सुकृतप्रभायिवत्तत्र म्लेच्छाधिपाक्षौडणीः ।
 क्षदान स्फुरद्ग्रेहतिरुचिर्दोमिध्वतुमिर्व्वमौ ।

'He shone with all four arms brilliant with glittering and terrible weapons as he crushed the army of the Valaca (?) (Baloch) mleccha lord, the destroyer of virtue.'

3. The Gwalior Inscription. Probably Recorded Between 800 and 835 A.D.

आनर्त-मालव-किरात-तुरुष्क-वत्स-मत्सयादि.

'By forcibly snatching away the hill-forts of Anarta, Malava, Kirata, Turuska, Vatsa, Matsya and other kings.'

APPENDIX VII

ARAB GOVERNORS OF SIND WITH KNOWN DATES

I. Governors of The Umayyads

1. Muhammad ibn al-Qasim, 712 - 715 A.D.
2. Yazid as-Saksaki, 715 A.D.
3. Habib ibn al-Muhallab, 715 - 717 A.D.
4. Amr ibn Muslim al-Bahili, 717 - 720 A.D.
5. Junaid ibn Abd ar-Rahman, 720 - 730 A.D.
6. Tamim ibn Zaid al-'Utbi)
7. Al-Hakim ibn Awanah) 730 - 743 A.D.
8. Amr ibn Muhammad ibn al-Qasim)
9. Ibn Arar, 743 - 745 A.D.
10. Mansur ibn Jamhur, 745 - 750 A.D.

II. Governors of the Abbasids

1. Musa ibn Ka'ab, 750 - 754 A.D.
2. Hisham ibn Amr, 754 - 759 A.D.
3. 'Umar ibn Hafz Hazarmand, 759 - 771 A.D.
4. Ma'bad ibn al-Khalil)
5. Bustam ibn Amr) 771 - 781 A.D.
6. Abu Turab)
7. Ruh ibn Hatim, 781 - 800 A.D.

8. Dā'ud ibn Dā'ud, 800 - 822 A.D.
9. Bishr ibn Dā'ud)
10. Mūsa ibn Yāhya al-Barmak) 822 - 836 A.D.
11. Imrān ibn Mūsa, 836 - 842 A.D.

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VITA

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